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Abstract 
What causes managers to manipulate their financial statements? How best can 
shareholders or prospective investors, auditors, financial analysts and regulators detect 
earnings manipulations? Addressing these questions is of critical importance to the 
efficient functioning of capital markets. For an investor it can result to improved 
returns, for an auditor it can mean avoiding costly litigation, for an analyst it can mean 
avoiding a damaged reputation, and for a regulator it can lead to enhanced investor 
protection and fewer investment disasters. The objective of this thesis is two-fold. The 
first objective is to investigate the frequency and the magnitude of earnings 
management. Second, is to provide an analysis of the characteristics of companies 
discovered to manipulate earnings and the determinants of these manipulations. 
Exploratory interviews with the Financial Reporting Review Panel suggest 
that earnings manipulation usually results from escalating earnings management that 
after a certain stage violates accounting principles. This is analysed in a review of a 
series of companies publicly criticised for applying aggressive accounting practises. It 
is suggested that these cases involve specific accounting standards that require 
increased judgement from management. 
In order to gain a broader view of the extent that companies manage earnings, 
this thesis examines the distribution of earnings among thresholds such as zero 
earnings and earnings decreases. This thesis documents evidence of unusually low 
frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses and unusually high 
frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive earnings. Additional 
evidence suggests that three components of earnings, cash flow from operations, 
changes in working capital and discretionary accruals, are used to achieve increases in 
earnings. 
Finally, this thesis presents evidence of the characteristics of firms that 
manipulate earnings and proposes a model for detecting earnings manipulation. 
Companies found to manipulate earnings appear to have lower accrual quality, 
declining performance, weaker corporate governance structure, weaker balance sheet 
and increased leverage. The output of this investigation is a scaled logistic probability 
model for discriminating accounting manipulations, where higher values suggest a 
greater probability of manipulation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Context and background 
What causes managers to manipulate their financial statements? How best can 
shareholders or prospective investors, auditors, financial analysts and regulators detect 
earnings manipulations? Addressing these questions is of critical importance to the 
efficient functioning of capital markets. For an investor it can result to improved 
returns, for an auditor it can mean avoiding costly litigation, for an analyst it can mean 
avoiding a damaged reputation, and for a regulator it can lead to enhanced investor 
protection and fewer investment disasters. 
An issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter 
reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number 
of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided 
evidence consistent with managers' incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting 
earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives 
to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals. 
The explosive growth in accrual-based earnings management research can be 
related to three likely causes. First, accruals are the principal product of accounting 
standards and, if earnings are managed, it is more likely that earnings management 
occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, 
studying accruals reduces the impact of issues associated with the difficulty to 
measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). Third, if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it' is 
less likely that investors can distinguish the effect of earnings management on 
reported earnings. 
The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that 
academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the 
earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions 
intended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence 
a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Because the existing models of 
expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions 
12 
have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in 
fact occur'. Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence 
suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
discusses the aims and objectives of this research and section three presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The broad research objective of this thesis it to deepen the current understanding of 
earnings management and the mechanics of earnings manipulation. As already 
mentioned, empirical investigation in earnings management has been conducted in 
great extend using discretionary accrual methods but little attention has been given to 
specific accruals and how they can be applied in detecting earnings manipulation. 
This is somewhat surprising given the negative impact that follows the discovery of a 
company found to manipulate earnings. Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is 
to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the extreme instances of earnings 
management where a company is found to violate accounting standards. It seeks to do 
so by empirically focusing on three broad areas: i) the distribution of earnings among 
thresholds in order to measure the characteristics of firms that manage earnings, ii) the 
characteristics of the FRRP (Financial Reporting Review Panel) investigated 
companies, iii) the association of the probability of earnings manipulation with 
changes in specific accruals. This thesis aims to propose a model for detecting 
earnings manipulation that could be useful for both academics and practitioners. 
Recent literature and auditing standards provide no clear definition for 
earnings management or earnings manipulation (Section 2.2.1). Therefore it is not 
clear the stage at which earnings management becomes earnings manipulation. This 
research defines earnings management as the result of managerial discretion in 
accounting choices and estimates exercised within the limits of accounting standards 
t Criticism of the existing accrual models' ability to isolate the earnings management component of 
accruals includes McNichols and Wilson (1988), tiolthausen, Larker and Sloan (1995), Deneish (1997, 
1998), and McNichols (2000) who argue that when the incentive context studied is correlated with 
performance, inferences from the study are confounded; Guay, Khotari and Watts (1996) who suggest 
that accrual models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and that some 
accrual models randomly decompose earnings into discretionary and non-discretionary components; Beneish (1997) who provides evidence that accrual models have poor detective performance even 
among firms whose behaviour is extreme enough to warrant the attention of regulators; Thomas and Zhang (2000) who suggest that the performance of accrual models is dismal. 
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without violating the true and fair view principle. On the other side, for the purpose of 
this research earnings manipulation is defined as the result of managerial actions that 
violate the true and fair view principle and fail to comply with the accounting 
standards. A detailed approach on the definition of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation is documented in section 2.2.3. 
1.1 Structure of thesis 
The second chapter of this thesis provides a discussion on the recent literature. It 
identifies the different research designs applied in prior studies together with their 
inherent limitations. It is found that earnings management literature currently 
provides only modest insights for practitioners like regulators and investors. Prior 
research has focused almost exclusively on understanding whether earnings 
management exists and why (McNichols, 2000). For the investment community, 
these findings are likely to confirm their intuition that companies do manage 
earnings. However, if there is to be a more informed debate about the implications 
of earnings management for market practitioners there is need for additional 
evidence on the following questions. Which accounting standards are used to 
manage earnings? What is the frequency of managers' use of discretion to manage 
earnings rather than to communicate company performance to investors? What are 
the characteristics of firms criticised for manipulating earnings? How earnings 
manipulation can be detected? The implication of this critical review is that earnings 
management area remains a fertile ground for academic research. 
Chapter three addresses the research questions and forms the research 
hypotheses of this thesis. Additionally, this chapter suggest an analytical research 
framework that facilitates the investigation of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation, organising the research questions and hypotheses. 
Chapter four describes the institutional framework for regulating compliance 
with accounting standards in the UK. This chapter focuses on the institutional role 
of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in regulating compliance with the 
requirements of accounting standards. This chapter considers the views of the FRRP 
in relation to earnings management and earnings manipulation. Exploratory 
interviews were carried out in order to investigate and evaluate the Panel's 
perceptions, functions, procedures and the impact of the regulator. The interviewees 
suggested that there is no clear border line between earnings management and 
14 
earnings manipulation. Though, both of the interviewees mentioned that earnings 
manipulation relates to "creative accounting of a bigger scale (than earnings 
management)" which is "intended to mislead investors". 
Chapter five provides an analytical insight into the procedures used by 
directors to exercise discretion over accounting choices. This chapter contributes to 
prior research by documenting case-based examples of earnings 
management/manipulation and how this is achieved in practice. It can be inferred that 
investigated cases of earnings management are developed around accounting 
techniques exploiting the managerial discretion allowed by certain accounting 
standards. These findings can be seen as very preliminary evidence of the existence of 
earnings management and earnings manipulation and how specific accruals can be 
useful in investigating earnings manipulation. 
Chapter six explores a large sample of UK firm-years and documents that 
earnings are distributed discontinuously around basic thresholds while non- 
discretionary earnings are not. This chapter provides empirical evidence that earnings 
decreases and losses are frequently avoided thought earnings management. Evidence 
suggests a significant percentage of the companies with small pre-managed earnings 
decreases or losses exercise discretion to report earnings increases or profits. 
Moreover it is found that earnings management to avoid losses is more pervasive than 
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. Additionally, it is found that the 
discontinuity around zero earnings is increased with the number of prior years that a 
company reported positive earnings. Examining earnings management to avoid losses, 
it is found that two components of earnings, cash flow from operating activities and 
changes in working capital, are used to manage earnings. The results are robust to 
alternative methods of scaling earnings and different ways of subdividing the 
population. 
Chapter seven examines the characteristics of firms judged by the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel to have issued defective financial statements. Two main 
findings are reported. First, FRRP companies (earnings manipulators) are 
characterised by weak earnings performance in the defect year. FRRP companies are 
more leveraged, less likely to decide dividend increases, more likely to have lower 
effective tax rate and more likely to have deteriorating performance and increased 
audit fees. Another interesting finding is that while the profitability of the FRRP 
sample is weak in the defect year, they do not appear to be persistent 
15 
underperformers. One interpretation of these results is that short-term performance 
problems are an important cause of poor accounting quality to the extent that they 
create strong incentives for managers to engage in earnings manipulation. This is 
consistent with the work of Degeorge et al. (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
and Peasnell et al. (2001), who provide evidence of earnings management to avoid 
losses and earnings declines between companies. The second main result of this 
chapter relates to the corporate governance characteristics of FRRP companies. 
Multivariate tests reveal that the FRRP companies are more likely to have higher paid 
directors and higher audit fees. Finally, tests reveal that FRRP companies are less 
likely to have a Big Four auditor. 
The purpose of chapter eight is to estimate a model for detecting earnings 
manipulation. The chapter documents an analysis of the characteristics of 185 
companies discovered to manipulate earnings. The analysis of earnings manipulators 
includes accrual quality, financial performance and balance sheet strength. Based on 
the findings of this analysis two logistic models are developed, aiming to estimate the 
probability of earnings manipulation. The first model utilises the eight variables 
included in Beneish's (1999) M-Score model. The second model includes three 
additional variables: (i) Audit fees to assets index, (ii) Effective tax rate index and (iii) 
Directors Remuneration to Sales index. These three variables are statistically 
significant and appear to improve the performance of the model in discriminating 
earnings manipulators. The robustness of the coefficients is tested at 100 different 
estimate and holdout samples, using the bootstrap method. Both defined models 
appear to be insensitive in random sampling. It is shown that both models have power 
to detect manipulations., It is documented that the suggested 11-variable model has 
lower error rates in misclassifying manipulators and controls and increased likelihood 
in identifying manipulators. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Companies have been using creative accounting for a long time, and this practice, 
well known in the literature, has been given various names: earnings management, 
income smoothing, big bath accounting, window dressing and even accounting fraud. 
This chapter aims to provide a review of the literature and propose a conceptual 
framework for earnings management and earnings manipulation. Creative accounting 
has fallen under heavy criticism. For instance, a former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, 
in his September 28,1998 speech `The Numbers Game', attacked the earnings 
management and income smoothing practices of some public companies. Over a 
decade ago Turner and Godwin (1999) reported some of the efforts that were under 
way in the Office of the SEC Chief Accountant to help achieve objectives laid out in 
Chairman Levitt's speech. Then the Enron scandal (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002) 
meanwhile, put accounts manipulation in the spotlight for everyone, including the 
general public. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section two examines the 
distinction between earnings management and earnings manipulation. Section three 
explores the research designs applied in recent literature. Section four describes 
evidence of earnings management in different research settings and section five 
concludes. 
2.2 Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation 
2.2.1 Earnings Management 
The term `earnings management' embodies a wide array of accounting techniques 
used by management to achieve a specific earnings' target. While there exists no 
single accepted definition of earnings management, accounting literature provides 
various descriptions of the practice. Schipper (1989, p. 92) describes earnings 
management as `... a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains... ' Similarly, Healy and 
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Wahlen (1999, p. 368) explain that earnings management occurs when managers use 
discretion to manipulate financial information `... to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers... ' Consistent 
among these definitions is the notion of intentional smoothing of reported numbers by 
management. However, since managerial intent is unobservable, current definitions of 
earnings management are `.... difficult to operationalise directly using attributes of 
reported accounting numbers... ' (Dechow and Skinner 2000, p. 247). 
Earnings management is most likely to occur where there exists vagueness and 
subjectivity in Accounting Standards. Upon application of these Standards, 
management is permitted to exercise a certain level of judgement or discretion in the 
determination of the reported accounting numbers. Athanasakou et al. (2009) suggest 
that UK companies engage in earnings management through classification shifting of 
core expenses to non-recurring items. Similarly Bens and Johnston (2009) find an 
association between restructuring charges and earnings management. Somnath et al. 
(2009), show that reversals of earnings changes in the fourth quarter occur more 
frequently than would be expected in a random sample. Other indicators of earnings 
management, such as the size and direction of discretionary accruals, reversal of 
subsequent accruals, use of special items in the income statement, and adjustment of 
R&D spending and effective tax rate, suggest that firms with earnings reversals are 
more likely to have managed earnings than industry and performance-matched control 
firms (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). latridis and Kadorinis (2009) document that UK 
companies with low profitability and high leverage measures are more likely to use 
earnings management. 
Management can apply discretion in forming estimations required by certain 
accounting standards, in order to manage earnings towards a favoured direction. 
Levitt (1998, p. 16) explains that when flexibility within accounting standards is 
exploited, `... abuses such as earnings management occur 
... 
(and) trickery is employed 
to obscure actual financial volatility... ' Although the practice of earnings 
management has been suggested as being widespread (Levitt, 1998), the exact 
pervasiveness of managed earnings is not known. Levitt (1998) suggests that it can be 
assumed managers are unwilling to reveal the full extent of techniques used in the 
manipulation of earnings. 
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Interestingly, Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that regulators and 
practitioners may be `overstating the extent of the problem' of earnings management, 
whilst academics may be understating it. Despite similarities amongst definitions of 
earnings management, Beneish (2001, p. 5) states that academics have `no consensus' 
on what earnings management actually is. There exist inconsistencies even in the 
attributed incentives to exercise earnings management. Beneish (2001) describes two 
perspectives on earnings management as being the information perspective and 
opportunistic perspective. The information perspective holds that earnings 
management is designed to signal to investors expectations about the company's 
future cash flows, while the opportunistic perspective maintains that managers 
manipulate earnings to mislead investors. In a similar way, Scott (1997) distinguishes 
between `earnings management from an efficient contracting perspective' and 
opportunistic earnings management. The definitions of earnings management 
provided by both Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) allow for the 
management of earnings to deceive or mislead investors by means of disguising poor 
performance. However, while the definition by Schipper (1989) also allows for the 
management of earnings to inform investors, the word `mislead' in the definition 
provided by Healy and Wahlen (1999) seems to ' 
... 
preclude the possibility that 
earnings management can occur for the purposes of enhancing the signal in reported 
earnings' (Beneish, 2001, p. 5). `Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an 
opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information 
perspective' (Beneish, 2001, p. 5). In other words, the general assumption is that 
earnings management is conducted to the detriment of investors because of the 
implied reduction in the transparency and reliability of the financial reports (Scott, 
1997). While providing managers with an unlimited capacity for making judgements 
would not be practical, the elimination of management's judgement could be 
disadvantageous to investors (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Agency theory (Scott, 1997) suggests that permitting flexibility in reporting 
earnings is necessary for managers, as they are in the best position to choose the 
method of reporting that best aligns with shareholders' interests. In addition, earnings 
management is a vehicle by which inside information can be conveyed to the market 
(Scott, 1997), thereby promoting efficient decision-making (Arya et al., 2003). 
Broadly, and from a research perspective, the detection of earnings 
management involves determining whether accounting accruals differ from 
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expectations (that is, whether they are `abnormal'), and whether the difference is 
congruent with managers' incentives. Accrual models can be based on aggregate 
accruals (for example Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) or specific 
accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Beneish, 1999). Although accrual models 
have been extensively employed and researched, a number of recent studies have 
questioned the accuracy and usefulness of these models, and hence, of this type of 
research (McNichols, 2000; Thomas and Zhang, 2000). More recent research in the 
area of accruals management suggests that the method (or accrual) used to smooth 
earnings varies according to management incentives (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). 
In respect of earnings management, auditors have a responsibility to adopt 
,... an attitude of professional scepticism to determine whether management has 
intentionally misstated certain items (possibly by amounts below the materiality level) 
to manage reported earnings. " (ISA 240: Par. 30). `The Auditor's Responsibility to 
Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements' (IFAC 2004, par. 8) describes 
that: 'Fraudulent financial reporting involves intentional misstatements or omissions 
of amounts or disclosures in financial statements to deceive financial statement users. 
Fraudulent financial reporting may be accomplished by the following: Manipulation, 
falsification (including forgery), or alteration of accounting records' The implication 
is that auditors should not be concerned with whether intentional misstatements are 
invoked for opportunistic or efficient motivations; either creates opacity in financial 
reporting. 
Where the line between acceptable and unacceptable accounting practices is 
crossed, auditors have a professional and legal responsibility to confront those 
charged with the management of the entity (ISA 240). In addition to legal 
responsibilities, auditor constraint of aggressive earnings management is an essential 
component in providing reasonable assurance as to the truth and fairness of financial 
reports. Indeed, recent high profile corporate collapses have highlighted the auditor's 
role in credible, transparent financial reporting. Nonetheless, researchers have found 
that investors perceive a general decline in the quality of reported earnings and the 
reliability of audited financial information (Hodge, 2003). Such findings tend to 
suggest that auditor constraint of earnings management is perhaps more important 
now than at any other time. Extant research indicates that auditors possess, to varying 
degrees, the ability to constrain earnings management. Several studies have found that 
auditors employed by first tier accounting firms are more likely to demonstrate greater 
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reporting conservatism than auditors employed by other accounting firms (Becker, 
Defond, 1998; Jiambalvo and Subramanyam 1998; Krishnan 2003; Bartov et al., 
2000; Kim et al., 2003, Francis et al., 2009). Further, within first tier accounting 
firms, those auditors possessing industry expertise are more likely to constrain earning 
management than those who do not possess such expertise (Krishnan, 2003). 
In regard to aggressive earnings management, research suggests that auditors 
are more likely to permit aggressive reporting by clients where there exists flexibility 
within accounting standards, and significant judgement is required on behalf of 
management (llackenbrack and Nelson, 1996). Factors found to influence auditors' 
judgement in relation to permitting aggressive reporting include the client's financial 
health (Becker et al., 1998; Braun et al., 2008), the size or importance of the client 
(Wright et al., 2006), and the risk of litigation against the auditor (Farmer, 1993). 
Other studies have examined how auditors, when faced with aggressive earnings 
management, generate less aggressive financial reporting alternatives (Johnstone et 
al., 2002). However, despite extensive research in relation to auditor constraint of 
earnings management, little evidence exists as to how aggressive accounting is 
distinguished from earnings manipulation. 
2.2.2 Accounting Fraud 
Numerous definitions of the term `fraud' have been proposed within the academic and 
professional literatures. In the criminological, and most general, sense, fraud refers to 
,... any crime for gain which uses deception as its principal modus operandi' (Wells, 
1997). Fraud encompasses a range of deceptions including employee fraud, payroll 
fraud, insurance fraud, credit card fraud, identity theft, bribery, kickbacks, insider 
trading, and the deliberate falsification of financial reports. The focus of this current 
research is on the latter deception, that is, financial reporting fraud. Financial 
reporting fraud constitutes one of the two forms of fraud relevant to the audit 
profession. Consistent with the broad definition of fraud, financial reporting fraud 
involves deception; more specifically, deception of financial report users by preparers 
of those reports (ISA 240). 
2 The other form of fraud relevant to auditors, not dealt with in this research, relates to intentional 
misstatements resulting from misappropriation of assets. 
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This definition is consistent with the U. S. Statement on Auditing Standards, 
SAS No. 993 (AICPA 2002). The fact that the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) released the revised ISA 240 (February 2007), after prior 
revision in only 2005, suggests the importance of this issue to the auditing profession, 
especially in the wake of high profile international accounting scandals and their 
impact on the already existing audit expectation gap (McEnroe and Martens, 2001). 
Financial reporting fraud involves intentional deceit on behalf of the preparers 
of the financial reports, and attempted concealment of that deceit (Albrecht, 2003; 
Albrecht and Albrecht, 2004). Such actions result in the financial reports not 
representing a true and fair view of the company's underlying economic position. 
Fraudulent accounting can be perpetrated in a variety of ways including improper 
revenue and expense recognition, fictitious revenues and assets, over and/or 
undervalued assets and liabilities, improper disclosures, and related party transactions. 
A number of studies have found improper revenue recognition to be the most common 
type of fraudulent financial reporting; specifically, premature recording of revenues 
and recording of fictitious revenues (Loebbecke et al., 1989). Further studies have 
examined the relationship between the type of fraud and auditor litigation; findings 
indicate that frauds involving fictitious transactions result in a higher likelihood of 
litigation against auditors (Bonner et al., 1998). 
Professional Auditing Standards, both in the UK and internationally, were 
recently revised as part of a wave of regulatory reforms, in an effort to, inter alia, 
improve detection of financial reporting fraud. A key component of the resulting 
expanded guidelines for auditors in relation to fraud is the adoption of the `fraud 
triangle' approach. The fraud triangle approach, which is already well established 
within the psychological and criminological literature (Cressey, 1953; Cressey, 1986; 
Wells, 1997), involves decomposing fraud into its three basic elements: opportunity, 
incentive/pressure, and attitude/rationalisation. More analytically this involves: 
a) Incentive/Pressures: Management or employees have an incentive or are 
under pressure, which provides a reason to commit the fraud. The incentive 
could be either the direct gain (e. g., misappropriation of assets-stealing petty 
cash), or a different benefit (e. g., financial statement fraud-manipulating 
accounting for sales to meet a target). The pressure could be that unrealistic 
3 SAS No. 99 'Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit' 
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performance targets have been set and the individual is worried what will 
happen to them if the targets are not achieved. 
b) Opportunities: Circumstances exist that provide an opportunity for fraud to 
be perpetrated. This could be a position of trust, which they can manipulate, 
or lack of controls, such as not getting a second person to authorise checks, 
which means they can write them to a personal bank account. 
c) Attitudes/Rationalizations: Those involved are able to rationalize committing 
a fraudulent act. For example they could think that they work for a large 
company so what they are doing does not actually hurt anyone or that 
everyone else is doing it so why shouldn't they. 
Figure 2.1 describes the concept of the fraud triangle. ISA 240 (par. 10) has also 
adopted this approach, and describes fraud in terms of incentives or pressures to 
commit fraud, a perceived opportunity, and the ability to rationalise fraudulent 
behaviour: 
Figure 2.1: The three conditions generally present when fraud occurs 
'Fraudulent financial reporting can be caused by the efforts of management to 
manage earnings in order to deceive financial statement users by influencing their 
perceptions as to the entity's performance and profrtahil h'. Earnings management 
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may start out with small actions or biased judgments by management. Pressures and 
incentives may lead these actions to increase to the extent that they are not acceptable 
under the applicable financial reporting framework and result in fraudulent financial 
reporting. Such a situation could occur when, due to pressures to meet market 
expectations or a desire to maximize compensation based on performance, 
management intentionally takes positions that lead to fraudulent financial reporting 
by materially misstating the financial statements. It is important for the auditor to be 
aware of circumstances that may be indicative of earnings management and 
particularly ofpositions' 
Recent research suggests that decomposing fraud in this manner may, in fact, 
enhance auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive fraud cues (Wilks and 
Zimbelman, 2004). The responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud lies 
with management and those charged with the governance of an entity ISA 315 
explains that the auditor's responsibility is to provide `... reasonable assurance that the 
financial report taken as a whole is free from material misstatement, whether caused 
by fraud or error' (Par. 28). Nonetheless, research suggests that much fraud is not 
detected by the external auditor (PWC 2009). 
2.2.3 The Distinction between Aggressive Earnings 
Management and Financial Reporting Fraud 
Both aggressive earnings management and financial reporting fraud involve the 
manipulation of reported financial information to achieve a desired result. In 
achieving that result, both aggressive accounting and fraud can involve (to varying 
degrees) the same accounting technique. Such techniques, particularly those involving 
discretionary accruals, result from the existence of subjectivity and management 
discretion within accounting standards, and 611 into what has been described as a 
`grey' area between aggressive earnings management practices and outright fraud 
(Levitt 1998). Consequently, defining the distinction between aggressive earnings 
management and fraud, and determining the existence of either aggressive accounting 
or fraudulent accounting under certain circumstances, can be difficult. Few studies 
have attempted to establish a distinction between aggressive earnings management 
and financial reporting fraud. Indeed the ambiguity associated with where aggressive 
accounting ends, and fraud begins, makes the task of distinguishing between the two 
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types of financial manipulations challenging at best. The ambiguity lies not just in 
existing research, but also in existing UK and International legislation. Current 
Auditing Standards, both in UK and internationally, have yet to provide guidance on 
distinguishing between aggressive accounting and fraudulent financial reporting. ISA 
240 and SAS No. 99 do provide (what appear to be) relatively straightforward 
definitions of financial reporting fraud4 (IFAC 2004). However the issue of aggressive 
accounting, and when aggressive accounting becomes fraudulent, is provided minimal 
discussion. Contributing to the ambiguous demarcation between the two types of 
financial manipulation are similarities amongst existing definitions of earnings 
management and fraud. A common factor described in definitions of both earnings 
management and financial reporting fraud is that of managerial intent, specifically, 
intent to mislead or deceive. Aggressive earnings management can involve, and fraud 
certainly does involve, intent on behalf of management to mislead financial report 
users. 
Earnings management, especially when conducted opportunistically, can entail 
the misleading of stakeholders about a firm's underlying economic performance 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Financial reporting fraud, by definition, involves 
intentional misstatements in the financial reports designed to deceive financial report 
users (IFAC 2004). As both aggressive accounting and fraudulent accounting can 
involve intent to deceive, and since the concept of intent is difficult to ascertain for 
other than perpetrators, the distinction between aggressive accounting and fraud 
cannot be established through managerial intent alone. 
Existing research and professional literatures do attempt to provide recognised 
means of operationalising the distinction between aggressive earnings management 
and financial reporting fraud. Such methods include the establishment of compliance 
or non-compliance with GAAP (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; POB 2000; IFAC 2001), 
and the materiality level of the misstatements (Rosner, 2003). However, 
operationalising the distinction between aggressive and fraudulent accounting in 
practice using these methods may prove difficult. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
describes the acceptability of the accounting treatment under GAAP as the 
distinguishing factor between aggressive accounting and fraudulent accounting. 
4According to ISA 240 (par. 6) the term 'fraud' refers to an intentional act by one or more individuals 
among management, hose charged with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. 
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Accounting judgements and techniques that are acceptable within GAAP are 
described as a continuum from conservative accounting, to neutral accounting, and to 
aggressive accounting. 
Accounting practices that violate GAAP are described as fraudulent 
accounting (represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.2). According to this model, 
behaviours such as an overly aggressive recognition of provisions constitute 
conservative accounting, and behaviours such as drawing down provisions or reserves 
in an overly aggressive manner constitute aggressive accounting. As both of these 
techniques are described as being acceptable within GAAP, they constitute a form of 
earnings management. In contrast, behaviours such as recording sales before they are 
realisable, recording fictitious sales, backdating sales invoices, and recording 
fictitious inventory are described as violating the boundaries of GAAP, and hence are 
fraudulent by their nature. An interesting point to note is that the model proposed by 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) use acceptability under GAAP to present earnings 
management practices as separate and distinguishable from fraudulent accounting 
practices. Furthermore, earnings management practices are distinguished from 
legitimate management discretion. Dechow and Skinner (2000) propose that 
judgements and estimates that fall within the bounds of GAAP may comprise either 
legitimate use of discretion or earnings management, depending on management 
intent. Only those accounting practices that violate GAAP and "clearly demonstrate 
intent to deceive" are described as fraudulent (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
However, the concern with distinguishing accounting practices in this way is 
the restrictive nature of the classifications. It is quite possible that some of example 
accounting techniques described could represent either legitimate earnings 
management or financial reporting fraud. As a result, there is a potential for some of 
the example accounting techniques to be incorrectly classified. For example, 
backdating of sales invoices is described as fraudulent accounting because it violates 
GAAP and there exists a (seemingly) clear intent to deceive. Yet there may be 
circumstances (however rare) where the backdating of sales invoices represents a 
justifiable business decision. In such cases, this action would constitute a form of 
legitimate accounting, not fraudulent accounting (i. e. accounting for construction 
contracts, IAS 11). 
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Figure 2.2 
The distinction between earnings management and earnings manipulation 
Accounting Choices Cash Flow examples 
Within GAAP 
Overly aggressive 
recognition of provisions 
or reserves Delaying sales 
Accelerating R&D or 
' 
Overvaluation of acquired advertising expenditures 
`Conservative 
Accounting in-process R&D in 
purchase acquisitions 
Overstatement of 
restructuring charges and 
asset write-offs 
`Neutral' Earnings Earnings that result from 
a neutral the accrual 
generating process 
Understatement of the 
provision for bad debts Postponing R&D or Earnings management advertising expenditures. 
`Aggressive' Accounting Drawing 
down provisions or 
reserves in an overly Accelerating sales 
aggressive manner 
Violates GAA P 
Earnings Manipulation 
'Fraudulent' Accounting Recording sales 
before they are 
realized. 
Recording factious sales 
Overstating inventory by 
recording factious inventory 
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Similarly, actions described by this model as earnings management may 
actually represent fraudulent financial reporting. Such is the case with subjectively 
measured misstatements, including the estimation of provision or reserve account 
balances. The understating of provisions is depicted as aggressive accounting, yet 
could readily constitute fraudulent accounting. ISA 240 explains that inappropriately 
adjusting assumptions and changing judgements used to estimate account balances, 
constitutes fraudulent financial reporting (APB 2004: Para. 09). If provision account 
balances are inappropriately estimated with an intention to deceive, then the 
understating of provisions would constitute fraudulent accounting, not merely 
aggressive accounting. There exists little research into measurement subjectivity, and 
the resulting classification, of a misstatement. ISA 240 explains that subjectively 
measured misstatements can constitute fraudulent accounting, while Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) propose otherwise. There does, however, exist evidence to suggest 
that measurement subjectivity isý an important factor in auditors' book or waive 
decisions. Research by Braun (2001), Philips et al. (2001), finds that auditors are more 
likely to waive a detected misstatement when that misstatement is measured 
subjectively as opposed to objectively. The difficulty with accounting techniques 
involving subjectivity, however, is that intent to deceive is not easy to establish. 
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness (POB 2000) takes a somewhat broader 
approach in describing the distinction between earnings management and financial 
reporting fraud. As with Dechow and Skinner (2000), the distinguishing factor 
between aggressive accounting and fraud is described as being the acceptability of the 
accounting treatment under GAAP. However, the POB report describes earnings 
management activities as forming a continuum along which the available accounting 
techniques vary from legitimate discretion at one end through to fraudulent 
accounting (with intent to deceive) at the other. According to the POB approach, 
accounting techniques such as estimating provisions or accelerating sales could 
constitute either legitimate management discretion or financial reporting fraud, 
depending upon the particular circumstances of each situation. The POB approach to 
describing earnings management and fraud appears to be less restrictive than that 
propounded by Dechow and Skinner (2000), and as such, seems less likely to result in 
misclassifications. Nonetheless, operationalising the distinction between aggressive 
accounting and fraudulent accounting in practice may be no less problematic. 
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An alternative method of operationalising the distinction between aggressive 
earnings management and fraud ka the Teseareh literature is adopted by Rosner (2003). 
She explains that accounts involving estimation, such as discretionary accruals, can 
represent either aggressive earnings management or fraud depending on the size of the 
disputed amount. She uses the term `earnings manipulation' to incorporate both 
earnings management practices and fraudulent accounting. In examining the earnings 
management behaviour of (ex post) bankrupt companies, Rosner employs quantitative 
materiality as the key factor in her distinction between aggressive accruals 
management and fraudulent accruals management. Rosner suggests that material 
earnings overstatements (fraud under her classification) can be distinguished from 
(legitimate) earnings management by the magnitude of the earnings manipulation 
proxy variables; lower (immaterial) magnitudes are considered legitimate earnings 
management, with higher (material) magnitudes considered fraudulent. For accounts 
involving estimation, size may be a relatively straightforward method of 
distinguishing between aggressive accounting and fraudulent accounting in practice. 
However, consideration must still be held for underlying managerial intent. 
Establishing a distinction between aggressive earnings management and fraud 
that encompasses all relevant factors is indeed challenging. While in the research and 
professional literatures there have been some attempts to provide a distinction 
between aggressive accounting and fraud, there has been little (if any) effort to 
explore how this distinction is operationalised in practice. 
2.2.4 Definitions of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation 
In this study the term `earnings management' refers to directors' discretionary choices 
within the limits of the accounting standards and `earnings manipulation' refers to 
fraudulent accounting, whereas the term creative accounting is used to incorporate 
both `earnings manipulation' and `earnings management'. Earnings management in 
this study is defined as the application of aggressive accounting practices that arc 
within the limits of GAAP. Earnings manipulation in this study is defined as the use 
of managerial discretion to make accounting choices or design transactions that 
violate GAAP. The result of earnings manipulation is that financial statements fail to 
document a true and fair view. 
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Figure 2.3 
- 
Earnings management 
- 
earnings manipulation and 
potential wealth transfers 
Company 
Stakeholders 
Cost Minimization of 
-Taxation 
-Regulatory 
intervention 
(i. e. utilities) 
Fund providers 
Cost Minimization of- 
-Raising new capital 
-Debt contracts 
Earnings Management 
Managers 
Maximization of the 
manager's compensation: 
-Bonus plan 
-Stock options 
Earnings Manipulation 
Creative Accounting 
E Potential wealth transfer 
2.3 Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation 
Research Designs 
Three approaches are used by researchers to evaluate the existence of earnings 
management. The first approach studies aggregate accruals and uses regression 
models to calculate expected and unexpected accruals. The second approach focuses 
on specific accruals such as the provision for bad debts, or on accruals in specific 
sectors, such as the claim loss reserve in the insurance industry. The third approach 
investigates discontinuities in the distribution of earnings. 
2.3.1 Aggregate Accruals 
The Jones (1991) model is the most widely used model in studies of aggregate 
accruals. The model follows Kaplan's (1985) suggestion that accruals likely result 
from the exercise of managerial discretion and from changes in the firm's economic 
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conditions. The model relates total accruals to the change in sales (Sales) and the level 
of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE): 
Total Accruals;, 
= a,, + bi, Sales;, + C21 PPE;, + i;, (1) 
The model is based on two assumptions. First, that current accruals (changes in 
working capital accounts) resulting from changes in the finn's economic environment 
are related to changes in sales, or sales growth since equation (1) is typically 
estimated with all variables scaled by either lagged assets or lagged sales. Second, that 
gross property plant and equipment controls for the portion of total accruals related to 
nondiscretionary depreciation expense. 
The second version uses current accruals as a dependent variable and only the 
change in sales as an explanatory variable: 
Current Accruals;, 
= a21 +b2, Sales;, + u;, (2) 
These models are either estimated in time series company-by-company or cross- 
sectionally using all companies in a given two-digit industry code and year. Each 
annual estimation is used to make a one-year ahead forecast of expected accruals 
which, subtracted from the dependent variable, yields unexpected accruals. Two 
alternative versions of the Jones (1991) model have also been proposed. In their total 
accrual form, the models are given by: 
Total Accruals = a3t + b3, (Sales;, 
- 
Receivables;, ) + c3, PPE;, + u31 (3) 
Total Accruals;, 
= a4t + b4, Cash Sales,, + C41 PPE;, + u;, (4) 
The expectation model in equation (3) is typically attributed to Dcchow et al. (1995), 
even though, the modified-Jones model presented in Dechow et al. (1995) is the same 
as the Jones model in the estimation period and only has the receivable adjustment in 
the prediction period. Indeed, the revenue based variable in (3) equals Cash Salcs- 
Sales_,. Since it is not clear how the construct proxies for the effect on accruals of 
changes in the fine's economic environment, Bcneish (1998b) proposed an alternative 
modification based on cash sales (equation 4). His evidence indicates that change in 
cash sales preserves the intuition behind using changes in sales to proxy for changes 
in economic performance and has the advantage of using as an explanatory variable 
an accounting construct that reduces the endogeneity problems. 
It is less likely for management to exercise discretion over cash sales than over credit sales. ßeneish (1997) finds that cash sales are rarely manipulated. tie reports that one firm out of 64 (1.6%) engages 
in circular transfers of money to create the impression of receivable collection. In contrast, 43 of 64 
firms (67.2%) engage in manipulations affecting credit sales (e. g., fictitious invoices, front loading with 
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Notwithstanding these modifications, the primary criticism on accruals models 
remains: The models fail to distinguish the accruals that result from managers' 
exercise of discretion from those that result from changes in the firm's economic 
performance (McNichols, 2000). This is intensified by the fact that it is unknown how 
changing operating decisions that are ex-ante value maximizing affect measures of 
earnings management. In other words, it is unclear whether estimates of earnings 
management reflect efficient operating decisions or reporting considerations. To this 
effect Beneish (1997, p. 83) describes the following example: "... a firm's financial 
reporting strategy depends on its business strategy and should be evaluated ex-ante, 
not ex-post. To illustrate, consider a personal computer manufacturer who seeks to 
gain market share on a competitor increases production and offers, before the holiday 
season, incentives to distributors who increase their demand. If the strategy is not 
successful and translates into lower than expected earnings and a price drop, the 
manufacturer may be sued and its reporting criticised. While the firm ends with higher 
discretionary accruals, it is, conditional on its strategy, an aggressive competitor 
rather than an earnings manager. This firm is, however, not distinguishable from a 
firm who deliberately pushed sales on its distributors to improve earnings. " An 
additional issue is that if managers indeed have an incentive to manage earnings, they 
are likely to do so in a manner that is difficult to detect, making more difficult the 
construction of an accurate model based on aggregate accruals. 
Despite their widespread usage, models' of aggregate accruals have been 
subject to significant criticism. Criticism on the models' ability to isolate the earnings 
management component of accruals includes McNichols and Wilson, (1988); 
Holthausen et al. (1995); Beneish, (1997,1998), and McNichols (2000) who argue 
that when the incentive context studied is correlated with performance, inferences 
from the study are confounded and Guay et al. (1996) who suggest that accrual 
models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and that some 
accrual models randomly decompose earnings into discretionary and non- 
discretionary components; Beneish (1997) who provides evidence that accrual models 
have poor detective performance even among firms whose behaviour is extreme 
enough to warrant the attention of regulators and Thomas and Zhang (2000) who 
suggest that the performance of accrual models is gloomy. 
a right of return, keeping books open past the end of the fiscal period, overstating the percentage of 
completion). 
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In fact the estimation of discretionary accruals requires specification of an 
estimation and test period, and specification of company-year observations in which 
earnings were not managed. The underlying assumption is that earnings management 
occurs in the test period but not in the estimation period. Given that directors arc 
hypothesised to manage earnings either upwards or downwards, this can be a difficult 
assumption to maintain in many studies. 
A second issue regards the estimation approach. Jones (1991) used a 
company-specific model to estimate the relation between total accruals and 
explanatory factors. In order to estimate company-specific parameter estimates, a 
reasonable time series is required. Most studies impose the requirement that sample 
companies have at least 10 years of data, subsequently excluding companies that do 
not have a sufficient data series. This approach eliminates growth companies with less 
that 10 years trading history. An alternative is to use a cross-sectional estimation 
approach, which does not require a time-series for each company. 1lowever, then the 
benchmark for each company's accruals depends on the accounting policies of the 
other companies in the sample. Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest this can result in 
positive or negative discretionary accruals that may not reflect earnings management. 
2.3.2 Specific Accrual Techniques 
As noted above, many of the studies to date use unexpected accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management. Regulators and standard setters arc very likely to be interested 
in evidence on which specific accruals or accounting methods arc used for earnings 
management. Teoh et al. (1998) examine depreciation estimates and bad debt 
provisions surrounding initial public offers. They find that, relative to a matched 
sample of non-IPO firms, sample firms arc more likely to have income-increasing 
depreciation policies and bad debt allowances in the IPO year and for several 
subsequent years. A similar study by Adams ct at. (2009) yields similar results. 
Banking and insurance companies have also provided a fertile ground for 
research on specific accruals used to manage earnings. Loan loss reserves of banks 
and claim loss reserves of insurers are directly related to their most critical assets and 
liabilities, are typically very large relative to net income and equity book values, and 
are highly dependent on management's judgment. Studies of bank loan loss 
provisions include Beaver et at. (1989), Moyer (1990), Scholes et at. (1990), Wahlen 
(1994), Beatty et at. (2002), Collins et at. (1995), Beaver and Engel (1996), Liu and 
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Ryan (1995) and Liu et al. (2006). Some of these studies also find evidence that 
financial institutions engage in earnings management by timing the realization of 
gains/losses on investment securities, e. g., Moyers (1990), Scholes et al. (1990), 
Beatty et al. (1995), and Collins et al. (1995). Overall these studies find compelling 
evidence of earnings management among banks, presumably (in part) for stock 
market purposes. Many of these studies, however, suggest that the market `sees 
through' such earnings management. 
Studies of property-casualty insurance claim loss reserves, including Petroni 
(1992), Anthony and Petroni (1992), Beaver and McNichols (1998) and Petroni et al. 
(1999), also find evidence of earnings management among insurers. It is not clear, 
however, whether this is motivated by stock market incentives or by regulatory 
concerns. 
Other recent earnings management tests that use specific accruals have 
examined deferred tax valuation allowances. Under FAS No. 109, managers with 
deferred tax assets are required to forecast tax benefits that are not expected to be 
used. One criticism of this standard is that it permits too much judgment in reporting. 
Cook et al. (2008), Badertscher et al. (2009), Visvanathan (1998), Miller and Skinner 
(1998), and Ayers (2002) test this hypothesis, and all conclude that there is little 
evidence that managers misuse reporting judgment relating to the valuation reserve to 
manage earnings. However, since these studies have not directly examined settings in 
which managers have strong market incentives to manage earnings (e. g., to meet 
analysts' earnings expectations or to window-dress results prior to an equity issue), 
their tests may lack power. 
Overall, there is remarkably little evidence on earnings management using 
specific accruals, suggesting that this is likely to be a fruitful area for future research, 
McNichols (2002). By examining specific accruals, researchers can provide direct 
evidence for standard setters and regulators of areas where standards work well and 
where there may be room for improvement. As a secondary benefit, such studies may 
be able to develop more powerful accrual models. 
Recent research in specific accruals is used in estimating models for detecting 
earnings manipulation. Beneish (1997,1999) suggests a model (M-score) designed to 
capture either the financial statement distortions or preconditions that might prompt 
companies to engage in such activities. The results suggest a systematic relationship 
between the probability of manipulation and specific accruals. The robustness of this 
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model is tested against Jones model using a sample of companies experiencing 
extreme financial performance. It is found that models which take into account 
managers' incentives have a better chance of identifying discretionary accruals. 
The m-score model proposed by Beneish (1999) includes eight variables: Days 
in Receivables Index, Gross Margin Index, Asset Quality Index, Sales Growth Index, 
Depreciation Index, Sales General and Administrative Expenses Index, Leverage 
Index, Total Accruals to Total Assets. The definition of these variables is documented 
in chapter 7, Table 7.7. A review of the literature involving specific accruals is 
documented below: 
Sales Growth Index: 
Teoh et al. (1997) find that high growth companies can raise reported earnings by 
altering discretionary accounting accruals. This is consistent with the findings of 
Petrols and Lougee (2010), they find that companies discovered to manipulate 
earnings are more likely to inflate revenue and report significant growth, comparing to 
control companies. Specifically, the average revenue growth among companies 
engaging in earnings manipulation was 53% whereas for those in the control sample 
was 12%. Evidence of the link between earnings manipulation and high growth rates 
is also suggested in the research of Beasly (1996); Bell et al. (1991); Loebccke et al. 
(1989); Loebecke and Willingham (1998). 
Gross Margin Index 
A disproportionate (to sales) decrease in the gross margin balance (sales minus cost of 
sales) is viewed negatively by analysts (e. g., Hawkins, 1986). Gross margin is, in 
general, a less noisy indicator than earnings of the relation between the firm's input 
and output prices (Lev, 1993). This relation is driven by underlying factors, such as 
intensity of competition and the relation between fixed and variable expenses 
(operating leverage). Variations in these fundamental factors (indicated by 
disproportionate changes in gross margin) obviously affect the long-term performance 
of the firm and are therefore informative with respect to earnings persistence and firm 
values (Lev, 1993). Unusual movements in gross margin could be associated with 
earnings manipulation, as suggested by Chen and Scnnctti, (2005) and Fanning and 
Cogger, (1998). Both papers document a positive relation between gross profit margin 
and earnings manipulation, which is evidence of inflated sales (or deflated cost of 
goods sold). 
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Sales General Administrative expenses 
Most administrative costs are approximately fixed, (Lev, 1993), therefore, a 
disproportionate (to sales) increase is considered as a negative signal suggesting, 
among other things, a loss of managerial cost control or an unusual sales effort 
(Bernstein, 1988). This signal was estimated as the difference between the annual 
percentage change in Sales and Administrative expenses and the percentage change of 
Sales. Chen and Sennetti (2005) find that companies identified to manipulate earnings 
have lower ratios of research and development expenditures to sales as well as sales 
and marketing expenditures to sales than control firms do. Lower values for these 
ratios suggest reduced discretionary spending (or inflating revenue). Consistent with 
the idea of scaling revenue by a resource used to generate revenue, Fanning and 
Cogger (1998) and Kaminski et al. (2004) find that sales to general administrative 
expenses is a significant predictor of earnings manipulation. 
Receivables/Inventory 
SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting and Audit (AICPA 1984, 
AU312.29), states that any account that requires subjective judgment in determining 
its value increases audit risk. Accounts receivable and inventory are noted as two such 
accounts due to the subjective judgment involved in estimating uncollectible accounts 
and obsolete inventory. Because subjective judgment is involved in determining the 
value of these accounts, management may use these accounts as tools for earnings 
manipulation (Summers and Sweeney, 1998). Jones et al. (2007) find that the 
inventory account and accounts receivable were involved in 35 percent and 61 
percent, respectively, of manipulations in their sample. 
Under both UK GAAP and IFRS, the receivables figure, appearing on the 
face of the balance sheet, is the net figure after taking into account the provision for 
doubtful debts. The provision for doubtful debts is largely discretionary, so unusual 
changes (relative to accounts receivable) can be associated to earnings management 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988 and O'Glove, 1987). Firms with inadequate provisions 
for doubtful receivables are expected to suffer future earnings decreases from 
provision increases. McNichols and Wilson, 1988 frequently referred to the adverse 
implications of inadequate bad debt provisions (in recent years particularly for loan 
losses of financial companies) for the persistence and growth of earnings. 
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Directors' Remuneration Index 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) test whether high equity incentive managers engage in 
earnings management by examining whether these managers arc more likely to report 
earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. Their analysis indicates a 
significantly higher incidence of meeting or just beating analysts' forecasts for 
managers with high equity incentives. Additional analysis document that managers 
with high equity incentives, are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. 
Effective Tax Rate 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) in their research find that changes from third to fourth quarter 
effective tax rates are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings 
absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecasts. They provide 
robust evidence that fines lower their projected effective tax rate when they miss the 
consensus forecasts, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expenses if 
non-tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. They also 
find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their effective tax rate, but this 
effect is less significant. These findings are consistent with the results of Cook et at. 
(2008) that suggest tax expense represents an opportunity for firms to manage 
earnings. They also find that tax fees paid to auditors significantly impact firms, third- 
to-fourth quarter changes in effective tax rate for firms that would miss consensus 
earnings forecasts absent tax expense management. 
Audit fees 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) find consistent evidence of a negative relation 
between the level of fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i. c., 
higher fees are associated with smaller accruals). Ferguson ct. at. (2004) examine a 
sample of U. K. firms over the period 1996 to 1998 and find a positive association 
between earnings management and fees paid to auditors (audit and non-audit fees). 
The results of Ferguson et at. (2004) are consistent with the proposition that higher 
levels of economic bonding between auditor and client resulting from the joint 
provision of non-audit-services may reduce auditors' willingness to restrain clients' 
opportunistic accounting practices and in turn, may reduce the quality of financial 
reporting. This is consistent with the findings of Antic et at. (2001) that suggest an 
association between increase in audit fees and increase in abnormal accruals. The 
findings of Antic et al. (2001) are consistent between both US and UK samples. 
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Depreciation Index 
Healy et. at. (1987), find that changes in accounting methods from accelerated to 
straight-line depreciation are positively associated with earnings management. The 
findings of Holthausen (1980) suggest that companies close to breaching debt 
covenants are more likely to change depreciation method from accelerated to straight- 
line. 
Total Accruals to Total Assets 
Earnings management through accruals is the process where a manager may increase 
or decrease the levels of accounting accruals (such as accounts receivables, inventory, 
accounts payable, deferred revenue, accrued liabilities, and prepaid expenses) in order 
to reach a desired profit level. 
As an example of such an accruals management, let us assume that a 
manager reports a cash expenditure of, say, £90,000 on a marketing campaign as an 
asset called "deferred subscriber acquisition cost" instead of an expense. (For 
illustration, let us assume that this is not in legal violation of the applicable accounting 
and disclosure rules. ) The result of this accounting decision is to boost the bottom line 
of the division by £90,000. Generally accepted accounting principles and IAS 38 on 
intangible assets define assets as economic resources that provide future benefits to 
the company. It may well be that the above manager is convinced that the marketing 
expenditure will result in future benefits, and is simply trying to report the transaction 
properly as an asset. On the other hand, it could be that the manager is really trying to 
manipulate reported earnings using an accounting decision. In their recent research 
Bartov and Cohen (2009) fmd that companies with increased accruals are more likely 
to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. 
Asset Quality Index 
Asset quality is the ratio of non-current assets other than property plant and equipment 
(i. e. goodwill, development costs and intangible assets) to total assets. This ratio 
isolates the increase in assets for which future benefits are potentially less certain. 
AQI is the ratio of asset quality in year t, relative to asset quality in year t-1. If 
company has increased its involvement in cost deferral then the AQI estimation will 
yield a result greater than 1. Duh et al. (2009) examine whether the reversal of a 
previously recognized impairment loss provides an opportunity for earnings 
management and they find that firms recognising more impairment losses are more 
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likely to reverse impairment losses when doing so would avoid an earnings decline in 
a subsequent period. 
In a more recent research Dechow et at. (2008) expand the model suggested by 
Beneish. They examine the characteristics of companies that arc alleged to have 
manipulated their financial statements by the SEC. Their results suggest that 
manipulations are more common in growth companies experiencing deteriorating 
operating performance. Moreover, they compare manipulating companies to the 
broader population of public companies and develop a model to predict accounting 
manipulations. The output of this model is a scaled logistic probability, where higher 
values suggest a greater probability of manipulation. 
2.3.3 Distribution Techniques 
Several recent studies adopt a new approach to test for earnings management. These 
studies examine the distribution of reported earnings to assess whether there is any 
evidence of earnings management (Burgstahlcr and Dichcv 1997,1998; Degeorge et 
al. 1999). These studies hypothesize that corporate managers have incentives to avoid 
reporting losses or reporting declines in earnings, and examine the distribution of 
reported earnings around these points. The findings indicate that there is a higher- 
than-expected frequency of firms with slightly positive earnings (or earnings changes) 
and a lower-than-expected frequency of firms with slightly negative earnings (or 
earnings changes). These patterns also appear in studies using quarterly data 
(Burgstahler and Eames 2003) and using analysts' earnings forecasts as the threshold 
(Degeorge et al. 1999, Gore et al., 2007). The authors interpret these findings as 
evidence that some firms use earnings management to avoid reporting negative 
earnings, or earnings declines, or falling short of market expectations. 
These studies have several appealing features. First, the authors do not have to 
estimate (potentially noisy) abnormal accruals; instead, they inspect the distribution of 
reported earnings for abnormal discontinuities at certain thresholds. A related 
advantage is that this approach captures the effects of earnings management through 
cash flows (i. e., reduced R&D or advertising expenditures), that may not be captured 
by unexpected accrual measures. Second, the authors are able to estimate the 
pervasiveness of earnings management at these thresholds. For example, Burgstahlcr 
and Dichev (1997,1998) find that '8-12% of the firms with small pre-managed 
earnings decreases exercise discretion to report earnings increases' and '30-40% of 
39 
the firms with slightly negative pre-managed earnings exercise discretion to report 
positive earnings. ' Evidence suggests that frequency of earnings management is 
relatively high among the subset of firms confronted with reporting losses. This 
approach has several disadvantages, however, because it does not capture the 
magnitude of earnings management or the specific methods by which earnings are 
managed. 
In summary, these tests provide convincing evidence that some firms do 
manage earnings when they anticipate reporting a loss, reporting an earnings decline, 
or falling short- of investors' expectations. As it stands, this evidence does not have 
direct implications for standard setters and regulators. What is currently lacking from 
these studies is a clear understanding of the steps that these firms take to increase 
reported earnings, the magnitude of earnings management, the effect of this type of 
earnings management on resource allocation, and whether such earnings management 
can be mitigated by additional standards. 
2.4 Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings 
Management. 
Four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management are discussed: 
(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider 
trading. These sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory 
research and described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in recent research. 
2.4.1 Contracting Motivations 
Accounting information is used to help monitor and regulate the contracts between the 
company and its stakeholders. Explicit and implicit management compensation 
contracts are used to align the incentives of management and shareholders. Lending 
contracts are written to limit managers' actions that benefit the firm's shareholders at 
the expense of its creditors. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest these contracts 
create incentives for earnings management because it is likely to be costly for 
compensation committees and creditors to reverse earnings management. 
Earnings management for contracting reasons is likely to be of interest to 
standard setters and regulators for two reasons. First, earnings management for any 
reason can potentially lead to misleading financial statements and influence resource 
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allocation. Bhojraj et at. (2005) show that companies that just beat analyst forecasts 
with low quality earnings exhibit a short-term stock price benefit relative to firms that 
miss forecasts with high quality earnings. Second, financial reporting is used for 
communicating management information not only to stock investors, but also to debt 
investors and to investors' representatives on boards of directors. A large literature 
has emerged to test whether the incentives created by lending and compensation 
contracts can explain earnings management (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Das et 
at., 2009; Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Meek et al., 2007; Roncn ct at., 2006). 
Earnings management via the accounting process (accrual based earnings 
management) involves exercising management's discretion over accounting policies 
and accounting estimates. For example a change of the depreciation policy from the 
accelerated method to straight line would fall in this category, as earnings arc 
influenced through an adjustment in the accounting process. 
Real activities manipulation is defined as: "management actions that deviate 
from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting 
certain earnings thresholds", Bens et al., 2003. An example of real activities earnings 
manipulation would be the deferral of discretionary expenses such as Marketing or 
R&D, to influence short-term earnings. Dcchow and Sloan (1991) lind that CEOs 
reduce spending on R&D toward the end of their tenure to increase short-term 
earnings. Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998) also find evidence consistent with 
reduction of R&D expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds cvidcncc consistent with managers 
manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses and develops empirical 
methods to detect real activities manipulation utilising accounting variables. The 
research of Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence suggesting price discounts to 
temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and 
reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. 
A further example of using accounting variables to investigate real-activities 
earnings management is the research of Bartov and Cohen 2009,2007. They compare 
accrual-based earnings management and real activities earnings management. They 
estimate a model based on accounting variables and find that the level of real earnings 
management activities declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the 
passage of SOX, suggesting that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings 
management methods after the passage of SOX. 
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2.4.1.1 Debt Covenants 
Debt contracts are an important area in financial accounting research as lenders often 
use specific financial limitations to regulate firms' activities, e. g., by requiring that 
certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and 
financing activities. The linkage between financial ratios and debt contracts is used in 
studies investigating (i) why economic consequences are observed when companies 
comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash 
flow impact, (ii) the determinants of accounting choice and managers' exercise of 
discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that 
debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce 
the restrictiveness of accounting-based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the 
costs of covenant violations. 
A number of studies have examined whether firms that are close to lending 
covenants manage earnings. For example, Healy and Palepu (1993) examine whether 
companies close to their dividend constraint changed accounting methods, accounting 
estimates or accruals to avoid, cutting dividends or making costly restructuring 
decisions. Holthausen (1981) examines whether companies close to their dividend 
constraint switched to straight-line depreciation. All three studies conclude that there 
is little evidence of earnings management among companies close to their dividend 
covenant. Instead, companies in financial difficulty tend to place more emphasis on 
managing cash flows by reducing dividend payments and restructuring their 
operations and contractual relations. Of course, dividend-paying companies can avoid 
violating their dividend constraint by cutting dividends when necessary, whereas 
companies may have fewer options available to meet other covenants, such as 
restrictions on interest coverage or debt-equity ratios. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
and Sweeney (1994) examine a sample of companies that actually violated a lending 
covenant. The evidence from these studies is mixed. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
find that sample firms accelerate earnings one year prior to the covenant violation. 
They interpret this as evidence of earnings management by companies that are close 
to their lending covenants. Sweeney (1994) also finds that covenant violators make 
income-increasing accounting changes, but these typically take place after the 
violation. This finding indicates that the sample firms did not make accounting 
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changes specifically to avoid violating the lending covenant. It is certainly possible. 
however, that the changes were made to reduce the likelihood of future covcnartt 
violations. 
Sweeney (1994) also reports evidence on the frequency and resource 
allocation effects of earnings management for lending contract purposes. From a 
detailed analysis of 22 companies that violated debt covenants, she concludes that 
only 5 succeeded in delaying technical default by one or more quarters through an 
accounting change. Given the study's focus on firms that have a strong incentive to 
manage earnings, this frequency is quite low. However, because Sweeney (1994) only 
samples companies that actually violated loan covenants, her sample does not include 
firms that successfully managed earnings to avoid a technical default. As a result, her 
findings may understate the frequency of earnings management for debt covenant 
purposes. Charitou et al. (2007) find that companies receiving unqualified audit 
opinions four or five years prior to the bankruptcy-filing event manage earnings 
upwards in subsequent years, which is consistent with Rosner (2003). 
Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income 
increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large 
sample of private debt agreements, and measuring firms' closeness to current ratio 
and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2002) find significantly 
greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant's violation threshold than 
below. They suggest that managers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant 
default. 
2.4.1.2 Compensation Contract 
A number of studies examine actual compensation contracts to identify managers' 
earnings management incentives. On balance, the evidence reported in these studies is 
consistent with managers using accounting judgment to increase earnings-based bonus 
awards. For example, Guidry et al. (1998) find that divisional managers for a large 
multinational firm are likely to defer income when the earnings target in their bonus 
plan will not be met and when they are entitled to the maximum bonuses permitted 
under the plan. Healy (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995) show that fines with caps 
on bonus awards are more likely to report accruals that defer income when that cap is 
reached than firms that have comparable performance but which have no bonus cap. 
Several other studies examine whether implicit compensation contracts have any 
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effect on earnings management incentives. These studies test whether their job 
security is threatened or their expected tenure with the firm is short. DeAngelo (1988) 
reports that, during a proxy contest, incumbent managers exercised accounting 
discretion to improve reported earnings. Dechow and Sloan (1991) show that CEOs in 
their final years in office reduced R&D spending, presumably to increase reported 
earnings. They argue that this behaviour is consistent with the short-term nature of 
their compensation contracts and their short employment horizons. In summary, these 
studies suggest that compensation and lending contracts induce at least some 
companies to manage earnings to increase bonus awards, improve job security, and 
mitigate potential violation of debt covenants. 
A number of studies examine whether earnings management for compensation 
purposes increases executive compensation. Healy et al. (1987) find that changes in 
accounting methods from accelerated to straight-line depreciation or from FIFO to 
LIFO have little effect on bonus compensation for top management. Defeo et al. 
(1989) analyse the compensation effects of gains reported on equity-for-debt swaps 
and report similar findings. These open questions suggest many avenues for future 
research. 
However, there is very little evidence on whether this behaviour is widespread 
or infrequent, and no evidence on which accruals are most likely being used to 
manage earnings for contracting purposes. In addition the existing studies do not 
provide evidence on the magnitude of earnings management. Finally, there is little 
evidence that earnings management for contracting reasons has any effect on share 
prices or resource misallocation. 
2.4.2 Equity Offerings 
A significant body of research examines managers' incentives to increase reported 
income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between 
shareholders managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public 
offerings, is recognised in prior research. Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) 
suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, 
and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. 
(1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these 
models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a 
commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical 
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studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to 
estimate managers' exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security 
offerings. 
Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the 
puzzling behaviour of post-issuance stock prices. Tcoh et at. (1998) study earnings 
management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) do so 
in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of 
earnings management using Jones-like models around the time of the security 
issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings 
and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings 
management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and 
returns performance. 
The results in these studies suggest that market participants fail to understand 
the valuation implications of unexpected accruals. While the results arc compelling, 
the conclusion that intentional earnings management at the time of security issuance 
successfully misleads investors is premature, Bencish (1998b). 
2.4.3 Insider Trading 
Like raising capital, insider trading is a trading-related incentive and a relatively new 
comer to the set of potential instances of income increasing earnings management. 
The reason is that, if one accepts two economic efficiency-based arguments, the study 
of such incentives becomes futile. Specifically, the arguments arc: (1) capital markets 
are informationally efficient (a central hypothesis in capital market research), and 
investors see through managers' accounting actions, (2) reputation effects and the 
labour market discipline insiders, preventing them from profiting in firms facing 
declining prospects. 
The evidence on insider trading as an incentive to increase income to mislead 
investors is less pervasive, but according to Beneish (1999) more compelling than the 
evidence on equity issuance as an incentive. One reason is that evidence is drawn 
from firms that have actually perpetrated financial statement fraud (ileneish, 1999), or 
committed illegal acts (Summers and Sweeney, 1998). It is consistent with 
professional views of the causes of earnings management (National Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners 1993), and also with evidence that managers reduce their 
stake in the firm's equity in the years preceding bankruptcy filings (Seyhun and 
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Bradley 1997). The most direct evidence linking financial statement manipulations 
and insider trading is in Beneish (1999) who finds `that managers of firms with 
earnings overstatements that violate GAAP are more likely to sell their holdings and 
to redeem stock appreciation rights during the period when earnings are overstated 
than managers in a control sample of firms. ' Evidence in Beneish (1999) also suggest 
an average stock price loss of 20 percent when the overstatement is discovered and an 
average cost of settling litigation that is 9 percent of market value prior to discovery. 
This infers that managers' stock transactions during the period of earnings 
overstatement occur at inflated prices that reflect the effect of the earnings 
overstatement. 
Beneish (1999) relies on prior insider trading research to develop hypotheses 
about manipulation incentives related to insider trading. This research suggests that 
managers act as informed traders, buying (selling) in advance of stock price increases 
(declines) (Jaffe 1974; Seyhun 1986) and views the managers' gains as an efficient 
means of compensating managers for providing their private information to investors 
on a timely basis (Carlton and Fischei, 1983; Dye, 1984; Noe, 1997). 
Beneish (1999) thus argues that if managers act as informed traders, they are 
expected to use their information about earnings overstatement to trade for their own 
benefit. Thus, if managers overstate earnings to provide market participants with 
positive private information about the firm's prospects, they are expected to either 
strategically increase their stake in their firm's equity (perhaps to provide another 
positive signal about firm prospects) or abstain from trading. Alternatively, if 
managers overstate earnings to hide deteriorating firm performance, they are expected 
to sell their equity contingent wealth. If overstatement is intended to mislead 
investors, managers may limit their selling to reduce the likelihood of attracting the 
attention of the SEC's insider trading monitors. Alternatively, as argued by Summers 
and Sweeney (1998), managers who mislead investors may possess low personal 
ethics, low risk aversion and/or a downwardly biased assessment of the probability of 
getting caught. Yet another possibility is that, in the event of detection, managers 
could justify their selling for personal liquidity reasons. Beneish (1999) also 
investigates the penalties facing managers after the manipulations are discovered. His 
research concludes that if reputation losses and the consequent disciplining in the 
stock market preclude managers from engaging in earnings manipulation and making 
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profitable trades, employment and monetary penalties subsequently imposed on 
managers should be substantial if they arc to serve as a deterrent. 
Literature suggests (Sloan, 1996) that even sophisticated market participants 
such as analysts and auditors do not fully understand the persistence and valuation 
implications of accounting accruals. Two possible explanations for these findings 
include (1) the relation between the firm's accrual-generating process and future 
earnings is sufficiently complex that investors fail to identify the transitory nature of 
the accruals (Thomas and Zhang, 2002), or (2) managers opportunistically manage 
earnings and investors fail to recognise until later periods that accruals are less 
persistent than operating cash flows (Bradshow et at. 2001; DeFond and Park 2001). 
Whether they manage earnings or not, a fine's top executives likely possess private 
information regarding the underlying economic factors associated with the nature and 
persistence of accounting accruals, and it is suggested that their trading is informative 
ex ant about earnings management (ßencish, 2002). 
2.4.4 Regulatory Motivations 
The earnings management literature has explored the effects of two forms of 
regulation: industry-specific regulation and anti-trust regulation. Recent survey 
evidence in Nelson et al. (2002) suggests that income decreasing in earnings 
management in the form of "cookie jar" reserves is pervasive. Surveying 526 
experiences of Big-4 audit partners and managers, they find that 40% of the responses 
describe attempts at income decreasing earnings management. While the ratio 
suggests that income decreasing earnings management is pervasive, it is difficult to 
make a more precise assessment because the survey was conducted in the autumn of 
1998, a period characterized by economic expansion and a bull market. 
2.4.4.1 Industry Regulations 
Banking regulations require that banks satisfy certain capital adequacy requirements 
that are defined in terms of financial ratios. Insurance regulations require that insurers 
meet conditions for minimum financial health and liquidity. Utilities have historically 
been rate-regulated and permitted to cam only a normal return on their invested assets 
to prevent them from exploiting their dominant position. It is frequently asserted that 
such regulations create incentives to manage the income statement and balance sheet 
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accounts of interest to regulators. A number of studies provide evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis. There is considerable evidence that banks that are close to 
minimum capital requirements overstate loan loss provisions, understate loan write- 
offs, and recognize abnormal realized gains on securities portfolios (Moyer 1990; 
Scholes et al. 1990; Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995). There is also evidence that 
financially weak property casualty insurers that risk regulatory attention understate 
claim loss reserves (Petroni, 1992) and engage in reinsurance transactions (Adiel, 
1996). Several of these studies provide evidence on the frequency with which firms 
engage in earnings management for regulatory purposes. For example, Collins et al. 
(1995) find that nearly half of their sample banks use five or more of seven options 
for managing regulatory capital. Collins et al. (1995) also examine the use of two 
options to manage reported earnings. Across the sample of 60 banks, over 75 percent 
used at least one option, and almost 20 percent used both options to manage reported 
earnings. Adiel (1996) also provides evidence on the frequency of regulatory 
management behaviour. He examined data for 1,294 insurer-years in the period 1980 
to 1990 and reported that for 1.5 percent of the sample insurer-years financial 
reinsurance appeared to be used to avoid failing regulatory tests. 
This evidence offers strong support that accounting discretion is used to 
manage industry-specific regulatory constraints. However, the frequency of the 
accounting management varies considerably across studies. Further, little is known 
about whether regulators "see through" earnings management for regulatory purposes. 
2.4.4.2 Anti-Trust and Other Regulations 
Other forms of regulation can also provide firms with incentives to manage earnings. 
For example, it is often alleged that managers of firms vulnerable to an anti-trust 
investigation or other adverse political consequences have incentives to manage 
earnings to appear less profitable (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Managers of firms 
seeking government subsidy or protection may have similar incentives. 
A number of papers have examined whether regulatory scrutiny increases the 
likelihood of earnings management. Cahan (1992) showed that firms under 
investigation for anti-trust violations reported income-decreasing abnormal accruals in 
investigation years. Jones (1991) found that firms in industries seeking import relief 
tend to defer income in the year of application. Key (1997) examined unexpected 
accruals for firms in the cable television industry at the time of Congressional 
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hearings on whether to deregulate the industry. tier evidence is consistent with firms 
in the industry deferring earnings during the period of Congressional scrutiny. 
Evidence from these studies on the frequency of earnings management for 
regulatory purposes is difficult to interpret. The number of firms sampled in the above 
studies is relatively small: Cahan's (1992) sample is 48 firms subject to anti-trust 
investigation during the period 1970 to 1983, Jones' (1991) sample comprises 23 
firms in industries seeking import relief between 1980 and 1985, and Key (1997) 
examines 22 firms in the cable industry. The frequency of negative unexpected 
accruals for these firms is relatively high, however: 70 percent for the cable firms and 
90 percent for firms seeking import relief. If the expected frequency of negative 
unexpected accruals is 50 percent, these findings suggest that as many as 20 percent 
of cable firms and 40 percent of import relief firms managed earnings. A question that 
is unanswered by these studies is whether regulatory motives for earnings 
management affect only the limited number of firms sampled, or a wider segment of 
the economy. Finally, there is no direct evidence on how regulators respond to 
earnings management. There is also no direct evidence on how investors respond to 
earnings management for anti-trust purposes. In summary, earnings management 
studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations can induce firms to manage 
earnings. There is limited evidence on whether this behaviour is widespread or rare, 
however, and very little evidence on the effect on regulators or investors, McNichols 
(2002). 
2.5 Conclusions 
Overall, it can be concluded that earnings management literature currently provides 
only modest insights for standard setters. Prior research has focused almost 
exclusively on understanding whether earnings management exists and why. The 
findings suggest that earnings management occurs for a variety of reasons, like to 
meet analysts' expectations, to increase management's compensation, to reduce the 
likelihood of violating lending agreements, and to avoid regulatory intervention. 
For regulators and standard setters, these findings arc likely to confirm their 
intuition that companies do manage earnings. However, if there is to be a more 
informed debate about the implications of earnings management for standard setting 
and regulation there is need for additional evidence on the following questions. Which 
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accounting standards are used to manage earnings? What is the frequency of 
managers' use of discretion to manage earnings rather than to communicate company 
performance to investors? What factors limit earnings management? 
For example, are companies with effective corporate governance or disclosure 
policies less likely to engage in earnings management? Chan et al. (2009) and Prawitt 
et al. (2009) find evidence that companies with material control weaknesses, as 
documented in their Sarbanes-Oxley Act report, are more likely to have material 
positive discretionary accruals. Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer 
from current studies for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to 
identify earnings management, but do not provide evidence on its magnitude and 
scope. Consequently, existing evidence offers limited help for standard setters and 
regulators to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating 
communication with investors, or whether they encourage widespread opportunistic 
earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accruals for 
evidence of earnings management. While this approach provides a useful summary 
aggregate of earnings management it offers limited contribution in distinguishing 
between effective and less effective standards in facilitating communication between 
managers and investors. 
Third, most studies examine research settings where earnings management is 
most likely to be observed. This increases the possibility of identifying earnings 
management, but it hinders extrapolating about the pervasiveness of earnings 
management. Finally, findings on specific accruals that can be used to detect earnings 
manipulation are limited, suggesting the need for future empirical and theoretical 
research. 
The implication of this review is that earnings management area remains a 
fertile ground for academic research. This research aims to extend current literature in 
the area of earnings management, suggesting a model based on Beneish (1997,1999) 
for detecting earnings manipulation. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
This study aims at critically analyzing the characteristics of earnings management and 
the parameters that can signal earnings manipulation. Chapter two shows that, no 
similar study has been conducted so far for the UK setting. The exemption is studies 
of earnings manipulation in the US and studies on earnings management in the UK. 
These studies attempt to understand the accrual generating process in cases of 
earnings management. Nonetheless, according to McNichols (2002), they lack 
reliability in the estimation of discretionary accruals under extreme circumstances 
such as earnings manipulation. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is twofold: a) to understand how earnings 
management and earnings manipulation is invoked in the UK setting b) to determine 
and test a model for detecting earnings manipulation. Both (a) and (b) aim at filling a 
significant gap in the literature. There arc strong reasons to expect differentiating 
characteristics in companies whose financial reports violate accounting standards. 
a) Gore et al. (2007) provide evidence on discontinuities in the distribution of 
reported earnings using a sample of UK companies covering the period 1989- 
1998. They report that an empirical distribution of earnings before 
discretionary accruals does not reflect the unusually high frequency of small 
surpluses and unusually low frequencies of small deficits relative to targets 
found in the distribution of reported earnings. They find that discretionary 
accruals have the effect of significantly increasing the frequencies of 
companies achieving earnings targets. 
b) Companies subject to adverse rulings by the FRRP arc characterised by 
significantly weak financial performance. They have a higher frequency of 
losses or earnings decreases, higher leverage, a lower frequency of dividend 
increases, greater restructuring activity, and fewer optimistic management 
forecasts for the year ahead (Peasnell et al., 2001). 
c) Companies censured by the FRRP are less likely to have an audit committee 
and high proportion of outside directors (Peasnell et al., 2001) 
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3.2 Research Questions 
Managers that decide to manipulate earnings are facing increased pressure and they 
implement aggressive accounting practices, overriding the 'true and fair view'. These 
differences in companies that fail to comply with accounting standards are expected to 
be manifested in their financial statements and especially in their accrual generating 
process. This study examines the characteristics of companies that manage earnings 
and the characteristics of companies subject to adverse rulings by the FRRP. The 
main thesis of this research is that earnings manipulation is largely an escalation of 
earnings management. Therefore, the research questions seek to explore the nature of 
earnings management and earnings manipulation. The first two research questions aim 
at exploring the research subject (earnings management and earnings manipulation) 
from an official perspective (FRRP) and gaining an understanding of the mechanics 
involved in creative accounting. The next two research questions aim at exploring the 
characteristics of companies that engaged in creative accounting practices. The last 
question aims at modelling the financial characteristics of manipulators. Based on the 
literature review and interviews, the current research purports to answer the following 
questions: 
Qi What is the FRRP's perceived difference between earnings management and 
earnings manipulation in terms of: 
a) the nature of managerial discretion applied in accounting policies and 
estimates 
b) the impact of those decisions in financial statements 
Q2 How earnings are managed operationally in specific cases regarding: 
a) particular accounting standards that allow increased managerial discretion 
b) the design of specific transactions aiming at influencing earnings towards a 
specific direction 
Q3 To what extent earnings are managed in UK listed companies, in terms of: 
a) the number of cases and their pervasiveness among the population of public 
listed companies 
b) the estimated magnitude of earnings management relative to reported earnings 
c) the association between specific accruals and earnings management 
d) the evolvement of earnings management over the most recent years 
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Q, What are the characteristics of companies that are subjected to adverse 
rulings from the FRRP for applying aggressive accounting practices? 
a) company specific characteristics measuring balance-sheet strength and annual 
performance prior to the discovery of the accounts manipulation. 
b) financial ratios and specific accruals that could signal increased likelihood for 
non-compliance with accounting standards 
c) subsequent performance following the discovery of the accounts manipulation 
d) quality of corporate governance in companies that have been publicly 
censured for aggressive accounting practices. 
Qs Which are the financial variables that could signal non-compliance with 
accounting standards? 
a) compare specific accruals and financial ratios between manipulators and 
controls 
b) analyse and test the estimation of a model that signals carvings manipulation. 
Linking the research questions to the questions identified in the introduction: 
Q2 refers to the question: Which accounting standards arc used to manage 
earnings? 
Q3 refers to the question: What is the frequency of managers' use of 
discretion to manage earnings rather to communicate company pcrfonnance 
to investors? 
Q4 refers to the question: What are the characteristics of firms criticised for 
manipulating their earnings? 
QS refers to the question: now earnings manipulation can be detected? 
Following the above research questions, it can be inferred that the hypotheses of 
this research mainly relate to (a) methods that companies utilise to manage or even 
manipulate their earnings and (b) techniques that can be applied to identify earnings 
management and earnings manipulation. Under the methods analysis stage, the 
following issues are examined: 
a) The frequency and magnitude of earnings management 
b) The way companies manage their earnings, taking advantage of specific 
accounting standards or designing specific transactions 
Under the techniques, there are examined company specific characteristics. The 
important dimensions which seem to require investigation involve: 
53 
(a) The distribution of earnings among specific thresholds, to test for 
discontinuities. 
(b) The association between specific accruals and the likelihood of achieving 
earnings targets 
(c) The examination of patters between companies that have been publicly 
criticised for non compliance with accounting standards, in terms of specific 
accruals and financial variables. 
(d)The corroboration of these variables into a model. 
3.3 Research Hypotheses 
Figure 3.1 below, imposes a structure (rather artificially) in order to facilitate the 
analysis and the construction of the research hypotheses. Specifically, figure 3.1 
depicts the believed two stages of earnings management, the first is presumed to take 
place within the limits of accounting standards and the second involves accounting 
choices that violate GAAP. This research examines also the key firm characteristics 
relating to each stage. The starting point is the research question on how earnings are 
managed and therefore, the potential two stages are examined. The research 
hypothesis will be organised around the same areas. For example, this thesis examines 
earnings distortions via two dimensions namely, `earnings management' and 
`earnings manipulation'. Therefore, the central cycle represents the main heading i. e., 
the `earnings management' whereas adjacent boxes represent the sub-headings, under 
which the research hypotheses are organised. Finally, in each box the issue examined 
is stated next to the corresponding hypothesis. 
According to figure 3.1, the sections that follow discuss the issues that this 
study examines and how they are actually being examined developing relevant 
research hypotheses6. Further, a link of this to the existing literature is made. 
However, readers are reminded again that the structure is rather artificially being 
imposed in order to facilitate the research process. Therefore, it must be 
acknowledged that in strict terms this does not actually represent what way may apply 
in practice. 
6 The numbering used on research hypotheses refers to this chapter only. 
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Figure 3.1 Summary of the thesis 
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An improved version 
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3.3.1 Defining Earnings Management and Earnings 
Manipulation 
As discussed in chapter two, the definition of earnings management in recent 
literature is vague. Moreover the relevant Auditing Standard does not specify the 
limits between earnings management and earnings manipulation. Some researchers 
suggest that earnings management and income smoothing is beneficial for markets as 
it gives an opportunity for managers to convey their private information on the future 
prospects of their company. Thus it can enhance the relevance of the accounting 
information. Though, examining the informative content of earnings is beyond the 
limits of this research. 
Prior literature suggests that earnings management which involves accounting 
choices within the limits of accounting standards can be escalated to earnings 
manipulation, thus overriding the true and fair view concept. From a different 
perspective, it can be suggested that earnings manipulation refers to companies that 
report one-off transaction or accounting treatment that overrides accounting standards 
without having engaged into earnings management before. To gain a better 
understanding into the association between earnings management and earnings 
manipulation, two interviews took place with key employees of the FRRP. These 
research interviews are discussed in Chapter 4 that analyses the institutional 
framework for regulating financial reporting in the UK. The interviews with the FRRP 
refer to the research question Q, and test the following hypothesis: 
HI: Earnings manipulation is the result of escalated earnings management. 
3.3.2 Case studies of Creative Accounting 
After understanding the view of the regulator in the research interviews, the next 
research question seeks to analyse cases of aggressive accounting as described in 
FRRP press releases and other sources8. A detailed analysis into the mechanics of 
creative accounting is documented in Chapter 5 and provides an insight on how 
specific accruals can be used in identifying earnings manipulation. This analysis aims 
at answering the second research question and testing the following hypothesis: 
8 Company Reporting, Financial Times, Lexis-Nexis 
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112: The instances of earnings management and carnings manipulation involve 
specific accounting treatments. 
3.3.3 Earnings management to achieve specific thresholds 
After exploring how earnings are managed in specific cases, the sixth chapter 
provides a broader view examining a wide sample of companies. This approach gives 
extensive systematic evidence about whether, how, and why, firms avoid reporting 
earnings decreases and losses, addressing the issues raised in Q3. Earlier research 
(Shen, 2005; Brown, 2005; Gore et at. 2007) demonstrates that companies exercise 
discretion to increase earnings when the level of earnings is slightly below a 
threshold. 
Chapter six examines whether earnings levels and changes are distributed with 
a discontinuity at zero applying an approach similar to Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Degeorge et al. (1999) and Marinakis et al. (2009). Earnings management to 
avoid earnings decreases is expected to be reflected in the shape of the cross-sectional 
distributions of earnings changes in the form of unusually low frequencies of small 
earnings decreases and unusually high frequencies of small earnings. Similarly, 
management to avoid losses will be reflected in the form of unusually low frequencies 
of small losses and unusually high frequencies of small positive earnings. 
The advantage of applying conditional distributions to investigate discontinuities 
among thresholds is that it avoids estimating (potentially noisy) abnormal accruals. A 
related advantage of this approach is that it captures the effects of earnings 
management through cash flows (i. e., reduced R&D or advertising expenditures), that 
may not be captured by unexpected accrual measures. Meanwhile it allows estimating 
the pervasiveness of earnings management at these thresholds. Therefore the 
hypotheses referring to Q3 are set as follows: 
113: Earnings management aims at avoiding earnings decreases. 
114: Earnings management aims at avoiding losses. 
II 
. 
s: The frequencies of small negative non-discretionary earnings levels 
(changes) and small positive non-discretionary earnings levels (changes) 
are equal to the frequencies expected under a smooth distribution. 
116: The proportion of observations with positive earnings levels (changes) 
is larger than the proportion of observations with positive non- 
discretionary earnings levels (changes). 
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H7: Earnings discontinuity at zero has not declined over the last years of 
the sample. 
3.3.4 The characteristic of companies criticised by the FRRP 
After examining the characteristics of earnings management among earnings 
thresholds, the next session explores the area of earnings manipulation focusing on 
recent cases of companies censured by the FRRP. The characteristics of these 
companies are analysed in the seventh chapter. 
Prior research has identified a number of causes that create motives for 
directors to manipulate and violate accounting principles. These include poor 
performance (Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgtahler and Dichev, 1997) and high leverage 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). These factors are grouped as `financial motives' and 
it is investigated whether they are associated with defective financial reporting. It is 
predicted that these factors could capture the increased probability of triggering an 
FRRP investigation. 
Academic research (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) and policy 
initiatives (Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 1995) emphasise the 
importance of effective corporate governance for ensuring directors' accountability to 
shareholders. The corporate governance characteristics of companies censured by the 
FRRP are compared to a control sample. The board characteristics examined are: the 
size of the board, the proportion of independent directors and directors' remuneration. 
Additionally, chapter seven documents the characteristic of external auditors in terms 
of audit and non-audit fee, frequency of audit switch in current year and whether the 
auditor is an upper tier firm. 
Beneish, 1999 and Dechow et al. (2008) suggest a model designed to capture 
either the financial statement distortions or preconditions that might prompt 
companies to engage in such activities. Their results suggest a systematic relationship 
between the probability of manipulation and increases in specific accruals. The 
variables suggested in the Benish's eight variable M-Score model are examined to 
assess whether they are positively correlated with the possibility of earnings 
manipulation in the UK setting. Therefore the following hypotheses, related to Q4, are 
set: 
118: FRRP companies are characterised by deteriorating performance in the defect 
year. 
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119: Corporate governance in FRRP companies is of a lower quality comparing to the 
control sample. 
I1 1o: The financial variables described in M-Score model are positively correlated 
with the likelihood of earnings manipulation. 
3.3.5 Predicting Earnings Manipulation 
After analysing the characteristics of FRRP companies the next step is to estimate a 
model to capture either earnings manipulation or preconditions that might prompt 
companies to engage in such activity. Beneish (1999), Dechow et al., (1996), and 
Beasley (1996) use firms subject to SEC Enforcement Actions to investigate why and 
how US managers manipulate earnings. Publicly censured companies represent 
exogenously determined examples of poor accounting and as such help to overcome 
the measurement problems that confound other more commonly used earnings 
management proxies (i. e. discretionary accruals). 
It is expected that variables described in Beneish's M-Score model will 
provide a fruitful approach in estimating a model to 'detect earnings manipulation. 
Furthermore, three additional variables are considered in an effort to improve the 
model's performance and reduce misclassification errors. These variables relate to (i) 
unusual increases in audit fees, (ii) unusual decreases in the effective tax rate and (iii) 
unusual increases in directors' remuneration. 
As audit fees are set by the auditors to compensate for the audit work needed, 
they are expected to be a reliable proxy for increases in the internal risk of a company. 
Earnings manipulation is more likely to occur in an environment of low internal 
controls and lack of segregation of duties. 
Similarly, the effective tax rate is estimated based on the tax accounting 
system that is less flexible in recognising revenues and expenses. For example a 
revision in the asset's useful lives, will not affect tax profits at the same magnitude as 
the financial accounting profits. Additionally, a company seeking to increase profits 
after tax would attempt to decrease the tax charge of the year. Holland and Jackson 
(2004) examine the association between deferred tax provisions and earnings 
management, and find that companies take an overall view in determining the 
required level of provision of deferred tax in order to manage earnings. 
Directors' remuneration (excluding bonuses) is usually agreed at the beginning 
of the financial year and is likely to be associated to performance (Beneish, 1999). An 
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increase in the remuneration to sales index can be explained from an unexpected drop 
in sales. As sales are directly connected to profitability, directors' might result to 
earnings management in order to restore the unexpected decline. If the business 
environment continues deteriorating, escalating earnings management can result to 
earnings manipulation. 
Considering the above considerations, the following research hypotheses, 
related to QS, arc stated: 
II11: A probit model based on M-score's variables can be used as a classification tool 
for signalling earnings manipulation. 
II12: The inclusion of the three additional variables will increase the ability of the 
model to identify manipulators and decrease misclassification errors. 
3.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter develops a list of research hypotheses regarding earnings management 
and earnings manipulation. These arc derived from the extant literature but also from 
the results of exploratory research interviews with the FRRP. The dimensions within 
which the research hypotheses are developed relate to the stages of accounting 
distortions induced by managerial discretion in the context of the escalation of 
creative accounting from earnings management to earnings manipulation. 
Regarding the earnings management stage, this thisis examines to which 
extent and how frequent earnings are distorted to achieve specific thresholds. Then, 
the thesis explores the roles of discretionary and specific accruals in meeting earnings 
targets. Finally, there arc examined the characteristics of companies that manage 
earnings to the extent that override accounting standards (earnings manipulation). 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) was deemed as an innovation in the 
UK as it was responsible for the previously little considered issue of ensuring 
compliance with financial reporting regulations. This chapter explores the aims, 
objectives and operating procedures of the FRRP. The aim is to provide a richer 
understanding of the way in which this relatively new institution achieves its 
objectives. This chapter explores the original objectives of the FRRP, as well as 
subsequent public pronouncements on its aims, procedures and achievements. 
Discussions with key members of the FRRP have enabled further clarification of 
some of the issues. The role and the operating procedures of the Panel were explored 
in two semi-structured interviews. Interviews were carried out with a member of the 
Panel's board and the director of the Panel's operations who is also the Panel's 
secretary. These exploratory interviews aimed at analysing the role of the FRRP in the 
market and how the objectives of the Panel are achieved. The contact with the Panel 
helped also to gaining an understanding on the regulator's perceived difference 
between earnings management and earnings manipulation. Another objective of the 
interviews was to identify additional resources that report non-complying companies. 
4.2 History and Operations of the FRRP 
The FRRP was created in 1991, following recommendations of the Dearing 
Committee, to provide enforcement of accounting standards and to improve the 
quality of information available to shareholders (FRC, 2003). The Panel's objectives 
are described in Table 4.1. The FRRP was established as a subsidiary of the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), which had the overall objective of strengthening the 
regulatory framework for financial reporting in the UK9. Prior to the 1990s. 'creative 
Control of the process for setting accounting standards was transferred from the professional 
accountancy bodies to a legally mandated body, the FRC, and its subsidiaries. The FRC itself has the 
objectives of generally promoting good quality financial reporting, providing guidance to the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and ensuring that the arrangements are conducted efficiently and 
are adequately funded (FRC. 1991). The ASU have "the responsibility tier making, amending and 
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accounting' excesses were widely reported and auditors were under pressure to 
conform to the interests of preparers rather than the spirit of accounting standards 
(McBamet and Whelan, 1999). Then a regulatory model was chosen that maintained 
emphasis on self-regulation in the business sector. At the time of the FRRP's creation, 
setting of accounting and auditing standards was controlled by the accounting 
profession and stock exchange listing rules were set by the London Stock Exchange 
(Brown and Tarca, 2005). 
Table 4.1 Financial Reporting Review Panel's Objectives 
" 
Carrying out its formal responsibilities on behalf of the Secretary of State in 
relation to annual accounts and other documents falling within its remit 
" 
Maintaining a Panel body that includes a wide and balanced representation, at 
the most senior level, of business people, accountants, lawyers and preparers 
and users of accounts such that those who come before the Panel knows that 
they are judged by their peers in the financial reporting community 
" 
Developing and operating a selective programme of proactive review of 
annual accounts and other documents falling within its remit and which is 
based primarily on risk assessment 
" Enquiring appropriately into specific sets of published financial statements 
and other documents falling within its remit which come to its attention, 
whether through proactive review, through complaints, or otherwise. 
" 
Ensuring that any published findings of the Panel concerning any case 
considered by it are brought to the attention of relevant regulatory bodies and 
provide information to such regulatory bodies so far as permissible 
" 
Liaising with FSA and other enforcement agencies in the U. K. and 
internationally to foster consistent application of accounting requirements and 
generally to improve the compliance of financial information with relevant 
reporting requirements 
" 
Contributing to and seeking to sustain an EU approach to enforcement that, 
recognising the effectiveness of the U. K. arrangement, is vigorous and 
effective 
" 
Seeking an appropriate level of knowledge, understanding and public 
recognition within the financial reporting community to maximize the Panel's 
deterrent effect 
withdrawing standards" (FRC, 1991). The main role of the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) is to assist 
the ASB in areas where an accounting standard or Companies Act provision exists, but where 
unsatisfactory or conflicting interpretations have developed or seem likely to develop (FRC, 1991). 
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The structure chosen for the FRRP was compatible with the existing 
institutional framework for financial reporting and the cultural preferences of the 
business community, but was markedly different from the structure of a securities 
regulator like the SEC. The FRRP is funded by both private and public sector bodies 
as well as the accounting profession. The presence of an oversight body, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), provides a barrier against undue influence by bodies 
providing funding and avoids possible problems with independence such as regulatory 
capture10. The FRRP members are drawn from the legal and accounting professions 
(FRC, 2003) and have practical experience useful for assessing cases brought before 
the Panel. This structure means directors and auditors discuss their financial reporting 
practices with their peers, which is a possible advantage compared to the securities 
regulator model. However, it can create the perception that the Panel lacks 
independence. In practice, Panel members serve on a part-time basis and can avoid 
participating in cases which would involve a potential conflict of interest. 
The FRRP is authorised to examine departures from the requirements of the 
applicable accounting standards and is given a mandate to pursue directors of 
companies whose accounts do not comply with accounting standards and company 
law. The FRRP is concerned with the accounts of public limited companies and large 
private limited companies. Its authority extends only to company directors, not to 
auditors (although directors are encouraged to involve their auditors when an inquiry 
is initiated). 
Despite not having regulatory authority over auditors, where defects are 
identified and the audit report is not qualified, the FRRP draws the case to the 
attention of the auditors' regulatory body. In all but one case to September 2009 this 
has been the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
which is responsible for regulating the auditors of most large companies (Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1995). The company directors who are members of the auditors' regulatory 
body, mainly the ICAEW, may also be investigated. The establishment of the FRRP 
was greatly welcomed by the accounting profession (Plaistowe, 1992) but, despite the 
introduction of audit regulation, disciplinary action has only recently been taken 
against registered auditors in respect of FRRP cases (Fearnley et al., 2000). 
10 Regulatory capture refers to the process by which the parties to be regulated come to control the 
regulator (Walker, 1987). 
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The Panel can seek a court order requiring the directors to revise the accounts 
at their personal expense (Companies Act 1985) but to date (September 2009) no 
court action has been taken as companies whose accounts have been deemed defective 
have voluntarily agreed to make amendments. The chairman (a lawyer) and deputy 
chairman (an accountant) of the FRRP are part time and remunerated. Approximately 
18 other members (consisting of lawyers, accountants in practice and representatives 
from industry and commerce) are unpaid. Their work is supported by a secretary and 
other technical staff employed by the FRC. 
Until 2004, the FRRP was described as a reactive body, because it acted only 
on cases brought to its attention. These arose from complaints made by individuals, 
companies and press comments" (Hines et al., 2001). Proactive surveillance activities 
were commenced during 2004. Thus, until 2004, the FRRP's actions related mainly to 
referred cases. The FRRP had discretion over the cases it pursued, but did not control 
the cases brought to it. Therefore it had limited control over the extent of matters it 
considered. 
On receiving a complaint, a preliminary investigation is undertaken. The case 
is then classified as one of apparent substance, a minor issue or one which should not 
be pursued further. In cases of apparent substance the FRRP chairman writes to the 
chairman of the company concerned setting out the issue of concern and the FRRP's 
powers and procedures, and invites the directors to comment. If the FRRP is satisfied 
with the directors' response the matter may be dropped at this stage. If it cannot be 
resolved by correspondence then a meeting between the FRRP and directors may be 
arranged. The meeting may be formal or informal. A formal meeting involves a 
specially constituted group of five or more FRRP members which is formed when the 
chairman considers firm action to be necessary. Further meetings may be held until 
the matter is resolved to the FRRP's satisfaction (FRRP, 1993). 
If remedial action is agreed with the directors of the company, a press notice is 
issued which names the company, briefly explains the defect and specifies the 
remedial action. This is distributed both to the financial press and the financial 
markets (FRRP, 1993). No information is released by the FRRP about cases which 
have been examined but not pursued, or minor matters which have been explored 
through "informal discussions" with a company. 
11 Prior to 1997 the FRRP also acted on information about qualified audit reports and other disclosed 
non-compliance matters received from the London Stock Exchange (Fearnley et al., 2000). 
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FRRP cases appear to relate to companies experiencing financial difficulties. 
Peasnell et al. (2001) found that companies in FRRP cases were less likely to have a 
large auditor (Big 4), an audit committee and a high proportion of outside directors. 
The firms showed weak operating performance in the defect year, but not in 
subsequent years. Feamley et al. (2000) reported a decline in referrals and press 
notices over the period 1991-2000, which was interpreted by the FRC as an 
improvement in compliance levels. McBarnet and Whelan (1999) explored the 
alternative view that the decline in cases was not a positive sign. They explained that 
there were deterrents to whistle-blowing, which could mean that serious cases were 
not being pursued. Hines et al. (2001) presented evidence that an FRRP investigation 
was not considered a favourable event by either the company or its auditor, providing 
support for the notion that preparers and auditors were likely to improve their level of 
compliance to avoid an investigation. 
The FRRP received considerable publicity in its early years, which could have 
led to increasing compliance in the early years and thus fewer cases in the later years, 
Feamley et al. (2000). The secretary of the FRRP (Carol Page) provided an 
explanation for the smaller number of cases in recent years. She suggests'2 that while 
the level of compliance by large companies was high, the complexity of their financial 
statements was a barrier to public queries, leading to fewer issues being raised with 
the Panel. In addition, some cases brought to the Panel related to less significant 
accounting issues and those without broader application in the financial community. 
Therefore, they were resolved without the Panel issuing a press notice. 
From 2004 significant changes occurred in the FRRP's operations, involving 
widening its remit and commencing proactive surveillance (FRC, 2005). Adoption of 
IASB standards in 2005 created a demand for proactive, risk-based enforcement. In 
2003, the Secretary of Trade and Industry announced a number of reforms to improve 
corporate governance, including proactive enforcement of accounting standards (FRC, 
2003). This task could have been allocated to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
but the government decided to expand operations of the FRRP, clearly a vote of 
confidence in the Panel. A budget of twenty-one staff and £3.7m was proposed, a 
considerable increase from 2003 when it had approximately six full-time equivalent 
staff and a budget of £700,000. 
12 in an interview with the author, see sections 4.4 and 4.5 for more details 
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Proactive monitoring commenced in 2004 with review of 226 sets of accounts. 
The FSA and the FRRP began to work more closely, with the FSA assisting in the 
identification of issues and companies to target, based on risk-based assessment 
models (Accountancy, 2003). The Companies Bill (Audit, Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) was introduced into the U. K. Parliament in December 2003 
and received Royal Assent in October 2004 (GNN, 2004). It extended the remit of the 
FRRP to cover financial information other than annual accounts, certain listed entities 
that are not companies and foreign companies. The Bill also gave the FRRP power to 
require supplementary information from issuers and their auditors (FRC, 2003). In 
2005, the Panel issued draft revised operating procedures and made its first report on 
proactivity (FRRP, 2005). 
For the period 2007/08, the FRRP had an annual budget of £2.1m, employed 
12 full time experts and a legal war-chest of £2m. During 2007/8, the Panel reviewed 
326 sets of accounts (interim and year-end), 112 companies were approached by the 
Panel for further information or explanation. In the cases where no immediate action 
was required, 68 companies reflected the Panel's comments in their future reporting 
and two companies were the subject of a Panel's press release having agreed to restate 
amounts reported in prior periods. 
As part of the Panel's proactive approach, every year a set of priority sectors is 
announced. For the period 2009/10 the Panel's monitoring activity is currently biased 
towards the following industry sectors: banking, retail, travel and leisure, commercial 
property and house builders 13. 
13 Ian Wright, head of FRRP's corporate reporting, recently said (Accountancy, Sep. 2009) he was 
aware of credit arrangements which allowed homebuyers to stagger payments over time. "The housing 
industry is a good example of an industry which is under phenomenal stress, " he said. "We have seen 
comments about new ways of selling houses, changing the terms and conditions of house sales. " He 
said he will be investigating the issue and is reminding businesses to stick to the rules and make the 
proper disclosures when reporting revenue. It's not the first time the FRRP has signalled its concern 
over the issue. In its 2008 annual review it said revenue recognition criteria "is likely to require greater 
attention during the coming reporting season". Another example of the Panel's proactive approach is a 
recent article in FT (Oct. 2009) covering the Brewin Dolphin's accounts restatement after inquiry: 
`... The 15-month inquiry into Brewin's accounting was part of a larger look at the way UK companies 
account for intangible assets during acquisitions, said Carol Page of the FRRP. Several other 
companies in different industries were also in talks with the Panel about similar accounting questions, 
she said. The Financial Reporting Council is undertaking a project on the issue and hopes to publish 
new guidance on how companies should account for intangible assets before the end of December, 
when many UK companies conclude their fiscal year... ' 
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4.3 Literature Review 
As the FRRP is a relatively recently established institution, there have been few 
studies on its activities. Brandt et al. (1997) surveyed finance directors (FDs), audit 
engagement partners of listed companies (AEPs) and financial journalists (a proxy for 
financially literate users) to establish whether the changes to the regulatory 
framework, which were introduced in the UK in 1991, have enhanced the integrity of 
financial reporting. AEPs rank the FRRP as the top influence. Financial journalists 
and FDs rank it second to the reformed Financial Reporting Standards introduced by 
the ASB. 
Beattie et al. (1999) surveyed financial journalists, listed company FDs and 
AEPs on their perceptions of the impact of factors enhancing auditor independence. 
From 45 factors, financial journalists rank the risk of referral to the FRRP for the 
auditor as the joint fifth most important factor in enhancing independence, with the 
risk of referral to the FRRP for the company ranked seventh. The FDs and AEPs 
surveyed consider the risk of referral to the FRRP for the auditor as being, 
respectively, the third and joint fourth most important independence enhancement 
factor. 
There is some evidence that not all auditors consistently support the FRRP. 
Cooper, Lancaster Brewers, the auditors of Butte Mining, which was subject to two 
FRRP press notices, qualified the revised accounts resulting from the second case 
claiming that following the revisions the accounts no longer showed a true and fair 
view. This is the only occasion where an audit firm has publicly disagreed with the 
FRRP. Interestingly it was not one of the major firms. Fearnley et at. (2000, p. 61) 
find evidence of a FD being pressured by his auditor to defend his case in court. The 
FD felt that the big firms wanted to `put a marker across the Panel' but interestingly 
they were not prepared to do it publicly themselves. 
Taking an institutional theory perspective, Hines et al. (2001) find that the 
FRRP has created an institutional image for itself which somewhat overstates its 
achievements. It is believed to achieve its objectives through its own persistence and 
because the prospect of court proceedings are economically unattractive and could 
cause reputation damage to companies and to directors personally. An analysis of the 
FRRP's cases (Fearnley et al., 2000) shows that of the 54 press notices issued to June 
2000, issues relating to recognition and measurement, which are most likely to affect 
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key financial indicators and represent material misstatement of accounting numbers, 
represent only 27.7% of the total defects found. The others relate to omission (4.8%), 
classification (25.3%) and disclosure (42.2%). Disclosure failings dominate, therefore, 
but although disclosure issues can be important they are not necessarily the most 
important. There has been continuing criticism (e. g. Peel, 2000) that the FRRP 
concerns itself with trivia and risks its own standing with the financial community by 
doing so. 
Fearnley et al. (2000) find links between the issue of FRRP press notices and 
the introduction of new accounting standards. The FRRP may be developing a role 
which concentrates on the interpretation and enforcement of new standards and may 
be taking a different approach to materiality and the true and fair view from that 
which is currently understood and applied by practitioners. The FRRP can only 
normally deal with non-compliance, or creative compliance which is visible in a 
company's published accounts. Non-compliance or creative compliance which is not 
visible, such as an incorrect valuation, would not be picked up by the FRRP. Creative 
compliance is defined by McBarnet and Whelan (1991,1992) as the application of 
rules to escape control without actually violating those rules. Therefore, some 
significant misstatements in the recognition and measurement categories could be 
missed. The FRRP set an interesting example in the Wiggins case (Fearnley et al., 
2001) where, after an inquiry had started, it became apparent from a more detailed 
examination of the accounts that some large transactions had been recognised in the 
wrong accounting period. These recognition misstatements were corrected in the 
restated accounts. 
Fearnley et al. (2002) find the FRRP to have motivated auditors to improve 
accounting compliance by increasing the possibility of some errors being exposed. It 
is also found to have enhanced the independence of auditors by changing the cost- 
benefit association of permitting non-compliance. FRRP inquiries cause auditors to 
incur non-recoverable costs that can undermine the auditor-client relationship and 
increase the risk of client loss. Possible career damage and the risk of an ICAEW 
disciplinary inquiry arise for the audit partner. The FRRP is found to provide auditors 
with an additional negotiating tool in dealing with directors, thus making in easier for 
auditors to prevent non-compliance, Feamley et al. (2002). 
Peasnell et al. (2001) examine companies judged by the FRRP as having 
published defective financial statement relative to a pair wise matched control sample. 
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They find that FRRP companies are average performers suffering temporary 
performance difficulties. FRRP companies arc also less likely to have a Big Four 
auditor and less likely to have an audit committee and a high proportion of outside 
directors. 
4.4 Research Method 
In order to relate the FRRP's role to reducing earnings management and earnings 
manipulation, a member of the Panel's board and the Panel's secretary were 
interviewed. Both of them had extended experience of the Panel's operations. Dexter 
(1970) describes interviews as conversations with a purpose. The purpose of these 
interviews was to obtain detailed insights into the operations and the structure of the 
FRRP. Rich descriptive data of this type cannot be obtained by the use of 
questionnaires, and conversations with those involved enabled insights to be collected 
on the FRRP's procedures as explained by the participants. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
justify the use of interviews, observing that they allow the researcher and rescarchec 
to move back and forth in time; to reconstruct the past, interpret the present and to 
predict the future. Thus the Panel members interviewed were able to comment on 
their experiences of the FRRP's pursuit of particular issues, the investigation process 
and on any subsequent outcomes. 
A series of open ended questions was drafted from an analysis of publicly 
available evidence of the FRRP's activities. The semi-structured interview schedule 
was used for the member of the Panel's board and adapted as appropriate for the 
Panel's secretary. During the interviews, questions were used flexibly to enable the 
interview to flow and other related issues were explored as they arose. Both 
interviews were conducted in person, at the interviewee's premises and recorded in 
full. All recorded data were transcribed in full for analysis. It has been suggested that 
a grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) approach provides a means of handling 
complex unstructured qualitative data (Henwood and Pigeon, 1995) and this method 
of taking the ideas of grounded theory as structured device was employed. The next 
section summarises the results of these interviews. 
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4.5 Findings 
Research findings analyse the responses of FRRP members about the Panel's 
operations and procedures. Three major themes were identified from the transcript of 
each interview, which provide the structure for this section: 
(a) The structure and investigation process of the FRRP. 
(b) Earnings management and earnings manipulation. 
(c) The wider role of the FRRP 
The research interviews aim to test the following hypothesis described in chapter 
three: 
HI: Earnings manipulation involves accounting treatments beyond the limits of true 
and fair view and results from escalating earnings management. 
4.5.1 The structure and investigation process of the FRRP 
Exploratory interviews with the FRRP took place in order to gain a better 
understanding of the Panel's functions and procedures. Since 2004, the Panel 
implements a proactive approach. This sections documents how this proactive 
approach is operationalised in practice 
On receipt of a complaint by one of the Case Officers14, a Reviewer will carry 
out a review for indications of potential breach of relevant accounting or reporting 
requirements. Discussions with the Panel suggest that at the time of the interview it 
employed five reviewers: 
'... Well, it is a strange set tip, we have, let me think, five reviewers. A 
couple those are employees who work a number of days per month and we 
also have two consultants who bill tos for the work that they do on reviewing 
accounts. Those reviewers do nothing but review accounts. We send them 
the accounts we want them look at and we might give them some helpful 
information about why we want them reviewed 
... 
` 
14 According to a recent job advertisement for Case Officers at the FRRP's website, the position 
Responsibilities include: a) Evaluating the reviews and recommending appropriate actions to the Panel. 
b) Drafting communications to companies, analysing responses and attending meetings with company 
representatives. c) Producing reports and papers on individual cases including reports of meetings. 
d) Assisting in the preparation of papers in respect of cases that are taken to Court. e) Contributing to 
the determination and application of the Panel's annual risk based approach and its periodic updating. 
f) Undertaking relevant research and comparative studies on issues as requested by the Chair and / or 
Deputy Chairs, as well as other opportunities to participate in ad hoc project and research work. The 
Panel requires that Role holders are fully qualified accountants with significant experience at a Senior 
Manager level in a major firm or a similar level within industry. 
70 
Reviewers are specialised at examining and reviewing accounts without being 
involved at the correspondence or the decision making process: 
'... Some of the reviewers don't actually like doing the correspondence 
with the companies, they like just silting down with a set of accounts and 
working on their own. We don't have a checklist; it's up to them how then 
work through these accounts... Similarly the case officers they will also 
review the accounts but not in the same amount of detail, so that 's the check 
really... ' 
The Panel employees seven fyll time Case Officers who arc responsible for the 
correspondence with the companies: 
'... The reviewers then send their accounts in and they are looked by 
case officers and that's really the Panel team that we have here at ANnych 
House. And those case officers we have, let me think, seven, seven fall time 
case officers. And their job is to process those reviews and to decide 
whether we want to write to the company about any of the issues... ' 
In the course of its review, the Panel may find other issues which it may wish 
to raise with the company. 
,... reviewers also review those accounts for other aspects as tirell, not just the issue that there has been a complaint about. It would be very 
embarrassing for example, if someone complained about the intangible fixed 
assets on somebody's balance sheet, we looked at the issue and we thought: 
"oh yes we do actually need to do something about this" but then when that 
correction is made public everybody says: "but the tangible fixed assets are 
also wrong, surely you must have seen that ". We always do a full review of 
the accounts... ' 
A preliminary analysis with a recommendation as to a course of action is 
provided to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman who then make a decision on 
whether or not to proceed with the case. 
`... we have three Panel chairmen. Our main chairman is Bill Knight 
who is a lawyer and then we have two deputy chairmen who are both 
accountants. They are both actually from ex big four, we have David Lindsel from E&Y and Ian Wright who was at PWI'C so very experienced people who 
guide the team really and help its to make sure that if we challenge a 
company we are robust in how we do that... ' 
A decision to proceed will generally result in a letter to the company asking 
for further information. This does not constitute a formal enquiry. Sometimes a 
company's reply will satisfactorily deal with the matters at issue, but where it does 
not, a decision may be taken to open a formal enquiry. 
When a formal enquiry is opened, the company will be informed and a Panel 
Group will be set up. Independency is an important principle in the Panel's 
operations: 
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`... Obviously we wouldn't agree to participate in a case in which we 
have an interest. It would be impossible to appoint a Panel team which is 
inconsistent. Many people are ex 
-partners in accountancy firms that could 
create a conflict... ' 
A formal enquiry is begun when the Chairman and Deputy Chairman decide 
that there may have been a potentially significant breach of accounting or reporting 
requirements. This will usually be after an initial round of correspondence with a 
company, although in exceptional circumstances, a formal enquiry may be opened 
straight away. In order to commence a formal enquiry, a Panel Group is set up. 
Where there may be a case to answer the Chairman appoints a group to 
conduct the enquiry, normally made up of five members including himself and the 
Deputy Chairman. The Group then decides whether to proceed with the enquiry. 
'... There was a group of Chairman, Deputy Chairman and I think 
three others. We never actually met; we did everything by telephone and e- 
mail. The Panel wrote to the company, after the first teleconference, and we 
got some replies, and concluded to accept the company's treatment. So 
there is therefore no statement by the Panel about that case which has been 
investigated... ' 
Other members are chosen from the Panel to provide a balance of experience 
relevant to the enquiry, excluding any potential conflicts of interest. Members of the 
Panel outside the group are not normally involved and the group's exchanges with the 
company are confidential. 
The group puts its concerns to the directors in correspondence and at meetings. 
The Panel encourages directors to consult their auditors, to involve their audit 
committee and to take any other advice they feel they need. 
'... The first time we wrote to companies about their interim accounts, 
one set of auditors actually rung me up to say that the three issues we raised 
in their interims are exactly the three issues they have raised with the 
company. The company chose not to take their advice and the fact that we 
came independently to raise those issues, immediately increased the 
credibility of the Auditors. It's nice when that happens... '. 
The process is informal but is intended to combine efficiency with fairness. As 
defective accounts could mislead the public, the procedures need to allow for speedy 
rectification. 
`... In the first meeting I attended this year the Chairman did say: "we 
get faster responses because we put in the letter a request to be responded 
by a particular day ". I think it is possible in the past with some letters; they 
actually do nothing. In the first case I was involved a small company 
responded very quickly and under detail... ' 
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The group aims to reach agreement with the directors of the company by 
persuasion. If the group is satisfied by the company's explanations, the case is closed 
and the fact that an enquiry was made remains confidential. 
'... I am not allowed to say anything; who it was, what it was about. it 
is in the general terms we have here. Clearly the company knows, or at least 
its financial director knows, because he was part of the correspondence. I 
would imagine the auditors know, or at least the key people involved in 
audit, but I have got no evidence to confirm that... ' 
Where the directors agree to take remedial action the Panel issues a press 
notice. The Panel does not comment on or discuss its conclusions further. Panel 
members are qualified accountants or lawyers who specialise in company law and 
who hold or have held senior positions in financial reporting. They may be, or have 
been, in practice, in the public sector or in industry, for example as a senior partner in 
a major accounting firm or as Finance Director of a FTSE 100 company. They are 
recruited by public advertisement. Other than the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 
they are unpaid. The underlying principle is that companies arc reviewed by their 
peers. This ensures that the Panel's approach takes note of business considerations and 
is sensible and practical (FRC, 2005). The Panel started operating proactively in 2004, 
following the recommendation of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) 
'... Then with the event of IFRS, and EU decided that all the stock 
exchange listed companies had to move to IFRS. EU also decided that we 
should have consistent audit and consistent enforcement. Therefore the 
regulators got together through CESR and agreed the set of standards for 
other issues CESR standard one. One of the things is CESR standard one, is 
that you do have to look at things on a sound proactive basis, not only on a 
complaints basis. CESR responded to IAS regulation; led the Review Panel 
to change its approach, and become proactive, to use this tivord... ' 
There is evidence that Panel's proactive approach was welcomed by auditors 
as it provided them with an additional negotiating tool in dealing with directors, thus 
making it easier for auditors to prevent non-compliance. 
'... Well in a way we think, we hope that we support the work of the 
Auditor. It's not very often that we found that we think ct company s 
auditor should have qualified that accounts. That happens only very rarely 
where we think they should've been qualified because the error is so 
significant. We have had a number of accounts where the auditors have 
qualified the accounts and we support the auditors in that. And we started 
a project last year, or the year before, looking at qualified accounts. It's 
been quite successful, we wrote to the company saying we know you got a 
qualified audit report, under the companies act as directors you need to 
make sure that your accounts comply. We are not going to take issue this 
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year but we're looking on next year's and if there's still an audit 
qualification then we'll pursue the mater in accordance with our operating 
procedures. So in effect we are giving them a year's notice to get their 
accounts tided up and the companies we have written to so far have 
managed things in a way that their accounts are no longer qualified. And 
we think that that's good news.... ' 
In another instance it was mentioned that: 
'... Up until 2003 we had to wait for a complaint to be made before we 
looked at a set of accounts. So the threat was pretty empty, by the Auditor. 
Whereas now accounts are being looked on a regular basis and it's not an 
empty threat. When the auditor says to a company "it's not material so we 
can't really qualify, we comfortably sign the audit report but if the Panel see 
it, they will raise a point... " 
The Panel selects accounts for review in a number of ways and includes a 
control group within its sample. First, the Panel discusses with the Financial Services 
Authority and the Panel's Standing Advisory Group which sectors of the economy are 
under strain or likely to give rise to difficult accounting issues. Then the Panel 
chooses a number of sectors and reviews a selection of accounts in each. Next, the 
Panel is developing its own risk model to identify cases where accounting problems 
are more likely 
- 
cases of poor corporate governance for example. 
`... But the ABI publishes lists of companies with what they call "red 
top companies " when the guide of corporate governance is not considered 
to be as good as it might be. We take this as a proxy for a company where 
perhaps corporate governance is not as good as it could be. As of June or 
July this year [2009] we'll also be responsible for looking at the corporate 
governance statements in accounts. So we'll have more direct access to 
areas where corporate governance doesn't look to be very good. Our role 
will be restricted really just to make sure that they make all the statements. 
Clearly if a company cannot make those corporate governance statements 
that raises an issue... ' 
Then the Panel looks at specific topical accounting issues and last but not 
least responds to complaints from the public, the press and the City. In all cases the 
selection is based on the Panel's assessment of the risk of non-compliance and the risk 
of significant consequences if there is non-compliance. 
`... Well, a good complaint is a very good source. Referrals from other 
regulatory authorities and a lot of our proactive reviews are prompted by 
being in what we call the high priority industries and where we select a 
sample of those companies across the full remit. So this year we've got 
retail, building construction, property, travel and leisure, advertising, we'd 
looking at those companies in that industry and we'd look at a sample of 
very big FTSE 100s, smaller companies, a number of AIM companies and 
also larger private companies. A fair number of our accounts are selected 
on that basis. We also then have what we call a company specific target and 
this is where we try to build a model on how to choose these companies. 
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Where ignoring the industry they are in, there is something about the 
company that we think raises a bit of a red flag. And maybe one of the issues 
we always looked at is corporate governance. And if the AB! has 
highlighted a company with not very good corporate governance we tend to 
look at those companies. If there is a lot of merger and acquisition activity if 
we can see fron: the announcements that the company's doing a lot of, very 
complex transactions, like reverse acquisitions, find raising, difficult 
things, all been dealt at the same time by a small company perhaps there is 
a change of board as well. That must indicate that with so much going on 
there are some difficult accounting questions to answer and they may be 
more likely not to gel them all right. So that's what we '11 choose to do, we 
might pick a third of the companies on that basis... ' 
The risk based approach was also mentioned by the second interviewee: 
'... there is risk in the sense of the likelihood of the accounts to being 
wrong. But I guess it goes a bit more than that because one of the areas is 
concerned with is the credit boom here in UK [2007]. And if there is a 
credit boon: what is the risk in terms of financial statements. And that is 
more than earnings management and manipulation, because its got to he a 
concern that the sales or revenues are overstated and is not as simple as a 
misapplication of accounting standards.... ' 
The Panel also considers for reviewing the companies reported for their 
aggressive accounting practices at Company Reportingt s. This explains the high 
degree of correlation between the work of Company Reporting and that of the FRRP. 
'... Well, it's interesting because Company Reporting are looking at 
the accounts at the same time that we are. But Company Reporting can ring 
the company and get a view from somebody and publish it next month. But 
once we review the accounts we have to go through due process. We have to 
do the review, make sure that it goes through manager review, goes to the 
chairman for approval, then the letter goes out, the company may take a 
month in which to respond and then we enter into the inquiry, So by the time 
we come to conclude and issue a press notice, if ire think it's appropriate. of 
course Company Reporting will have it out bcjore its, because the don't 
have all this process. Particularly when we're reactive we did pick a 
number of cases front them... ' 
The use of Company Reporting as a source of information for non-compliance 
with accounting standards was mentioned also by the second interviewee: 
'... Anybody can make a complaint; the complaints can come from press. 
analysts, Company Reporting... ' 
The Panel would consider very useful a quantitative model that could be used 
as a screening instrument that highlights probable non-compliance with the Act, 
though no such model is formed yet. 
's Company Reporting is a service which identifies changes in corporate reporting practice and 
governance procedures by listed companies, including the development of, and instances of divergence 
from, generally accepted accounting practice under IFRS. 
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'... we have too many companies that come within our remit. J have 
all the listed companies that includes everything on AIM, except overseas 
plus all the large private companies. So it's about two hundred thousand 
sets of accounts. We don't have time, and I think its not very effective way, 
of reading even the top 350 sets of accounts, in order to find out which are 
the ones we want to pursue. So what we are trying to do, is there a model or 
an approach, or some kind of strategy we could adopt to identify those 
companies which are going to, not comply with the Act... ' 
Section 461 of the Companies Act 2006 lists a number of persons with whom the 
Panel is entitled to share information which would otherwise be confidential under the 
Act. These persons include the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, the Treasury, the Bank of England, FSA, and HMRC. If 
requested by one of these authorities the Panel will normally be prepared to review a 
set of accounts and report its findings to the authority concerned. 
'... Well there is a gateway between the IR (Inland Revenue) and us 
and we cannot pass information to them but they can pass information to us. 
But it is a very tight gateway and we don't tell anybody if, as or when 
anything comes through that gateway.... In a way that gateway was put in 
place when we became proactive, because clearly the IR, they have sixty or 
seventy people who review sets of accounts and the government thought, if 
we're already paying people to review the accounts, why did the double 
work?... What would happen in practice is that they would raise an issue 
with us. We would then look at the company's accounts and would form our 
own view about how we take that forward with the company and we'd make 
sure that the information which is needed would come to us directly from 
the company... ' 
The FRRP gained significant power after its memorandum of understanding with 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), in 2005. The Panel informs the FSA of its 
findings and both bodies co-operate over action to be taken. 
`... The one where there is more collaboration probably is with the 
FSA, because we have a memorandum of understanding with them whereby 
we have to notify them if we are investigating certain companies and we are 
at a serious state of negotiations. So we meet with the FSA on a monthly 
basis to discuss, some times the cases that we have in common where we are 
in our process, if we are likely to issue a press notice and they can raise 
issues with its, they can raise particular companies with its, if they have a 
concern. Because our powers are very different and if they pick up 
something that has to do with the accounting compliance then they pass it 
over to its. Similarly, some times, we come across with issues which are not 
issues for its but they might be for the securities regulator and we refer the 
mater back to them... ' 
The Panel will draw to the attention of that authority any matters apparent 
from its review which the Panel believes to be relevant to that authority's regulatory 
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function. Whether the Panel will go on to open a full enquiry itself will be a matter to 
be decided by the Panel in each case. 
In many cases no question of substance arises from a review of the published 
accounts. In others, questions are resolved by explanation from the company. In a 
number of cases the company agrees to improve its disclosures or accounting in the 
future. The Panel only issues a press notice where a significant correction to published 
accounts is being made or where there is a case that the Panel considers otherwise 
merits publicity. 
'... 1 mean we had Granger this year, which was a big case on a 
property; clearly we would not be satisfied with just a reference to the 
Panel, in those accounts. But some of them, I think really is just giving 
additional or better information about a past event. Then that's not really 
worth a press notice. Unless there's something absolutely critical that 
would have meant a contingency to crystallise, or something. But it all 
depends on the facts and circumstances. So it is the case when the issue is so 
small that really doesn't merit a press notice. We have di iculty to explain 
why it is a press notice... ' 
4.5.2 Earnings management and earnings manipulation. 
In the recent literature, there is no clear definition of earnings management and 
earnings manipulation nor on what is the difference between them. The same view is 
shared by the member of the Panel interviewed: 
'... I would say that it seems to be like tar avoidance and tar evasion. 
isn't it? Its just earnings manipulation is a much bigger size earnings 
management. So I think the real difference is in terms of size. Because in 
both cases what's happening is that ntaiºagement is choosing accounting 
policies or is applying accounting policies to get a pre-determined result. 
That is what earnings management is. So we have a lot of issues in US about 
this. 
We have got the famous speech of the SEC Chairman, about six years 
ago, about the ways in which US companies manage their earnings to 
achieve Wall Street estimates, and if you look at some of the tricks that he 
talks about, clearly that sort is the gentle side of earnings management 
whereas there is the sort here and there to make sure that you don't surprise 
Nall Street. Manipulation always sounds a lot more, it sa bigger sort of 
value. You know the Isoft case here in UK which looks that it would be 
earnings manipulation in the sense it goes beyond the normal management 
of earnings, its just completely wrong... ' 
The interviewee described an example that highlights the difference between 
earnings management and earnings manipulation: 
I often talk of earnings m anagenlent and particularly in my 
courses and I say: 'it is the way It all Street is expecting you, or the marke! 
here in London is expecting you to make 95 cents/share and when you 
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produce your accounts you make 93 cents, and therefore you do something 
to have 93 Grp to 95 or 94.5 so that the market would be happy. Whereas the 
manipulation of the Isoft type case is so big, it isn't a move from 93 to 95, it 
is a move from 50... ' 
A second example of earnings manipulation was given: 
'-where the directors of an IT company wanted to mislead the 
market, because they had not performed as well as they felt the market 
expected. They therefore took into account the revenues of contracts which 
were not even signed. That is one good example because, size is the point, 
and it was clearly earnings manipulation. They were bringing forward sales 
from the future, because they performed badly. It is quite clearly 
manipulation because it is actually so big. They were getting themselves off 
from 20 to 100, and probably from loss. The CEO and the CFO were found 
guilty..., 
At another instance, the interviewee mentioned the direction of earnings as the 
distinguishing characteristic between earnings management and earnings 
manipulation, emphasising that earnings manipulation shifts earnings upwards. 
`... Another difference between earning management and earnings 
manipulation is that, I guess, is an implication of earnings management is 
that of trying to smooth earnings way up and way down. Whereas earnings 
manipulation is intending to boost earnings... ' 
The significance of the size of distortion is critical in distinguishing between 
earnings management and earnings manipulation and it was also mentioned at the 
following point: 
`... If we interpret manipulation as doing something wrong, it can be 
something small. But manipulation implies deliberate, so you know that you 
are doing something wrong. I am trying to think of reasons why you do that 
instead of managing earnings. You talk about accounting fraud. So there is 
some point that earnings management becomes fraud, surely earnings 
manipulation becomes fraud earlier, consistently misleading the market. We 
can argue any management of earnings is probably technically a criminal 
offence, may not be worthwhile for regulators to pursue that particular 
case. Even the SEC and the Review Panel might take that view here, that the 
regulators need to have a good chance of success before'to start a case... ' 
The limits between earnings management and earnings manipulation are 
unclear, the Panel's secretary mentioned that it is difficult to give a specific definition. 
'... All that we are there to do is to determine whether the accounts 
comply with the accounting standards. And that can be too little profit or 
too much profit but that's not what we're looking at. We're looking at 
compliance with the accounting standards. So to what end and why they do 
it is not relevant. It's purely compliance with the act... ' 
Though, an example was given by the Secretary of the Panel that explains the 
operational difference between earnings management and earnings manipulation. It 
supports the view that earnings management refers to small deliberate actions to 
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smooth income, whereas earnings manipulation involves illicit and misleading 
alterations of a bigger scale. 
'... things like: whether you capitalise intangible assets, there's 
generally more at stake than a company saying: "it-ell I want to capitalise 
rather than write off'. We don't ask a question of why they're doing it, w hi, 
they're capitalising it. We look at the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether they're doing the right thing. And what happens in the income 
statement really folds out at the end. So it is not what we focus on, in 
particularly. But obviously, things like: if we've got an issue with the 
company about capitalising or not capitalising, if they over-capitalise, then 
obviously it's going to have a big impact. But again it's the compliance with 
standards that we focus on, rather than asking them for the motives... ' 
The main pressures that result to earnings management appcar to be market 
expectations to reach specific earnings targets and bank covenants. 
'... We have not done as well as the market expected, or our finances 
expected, therefore there might be pressure on its. Or we might have done 
better and we want to play safe, planning years ahead. Maybe that 
accounting treatment probably is going to give its probably lower loan 
covenants; therefore we try to find a way, an accounting treatment to meet 
those loan covenants... ' 
In cases where the reporting issue is not misleading then the Panel asks the 
company to adjust its accounts in the following year, without issuing a press notice. 
Though, the company has to disclose in its annual report that it had been in 
discussions with the FRRP. The secretary of the Panel mentioned that: 
'... And there is an mvful lot of dirt that attaches to the compagv. So, 
sometimes you think ºvhen it's not so significant that it needs a press notice, 
there is no lesson to be learnt here and they just got it wrong. It didn Y 
probably affect the share price, because it's probably narrative, it tends to 
be narrative things, so what we do, when the company improves its 
narrative, the next year, we sometimes say, we think when you explain why 
you're giving additional information, we want you to refer to the Panel. So 
in their accounts, for next year, you might see, in sonic sets of accounts, it 
would say 'following discussions with the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel, we have this year provided the additional information to further 
clarify x, y, z ". So it is not as bad as a press notice, but it's something on a 
public record, that they did have to address something of er a Panel 
intervention... ' 
The point of view was expressed by the member of the Panel's boards, who 
described that: 
.. 
And very often we find things that ire don't really like in the 
accounts, they have been published but they are not misleading, perhaps 
they are not material, so we won't make the company revise those uccounls 
but we'ii seek an undertaking for an improvement next year... ' 
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The Panel can use the threat of issuing a press notice during the negotiations 
with companies for improving their financial statements in the next reporting period, 
in instances where minor issues are identified. 
'... Well, that's the thing, whether we did it last year, we'll certainly do 
it next year. We say "we issued six press notices and asked five other 
companies to refer to our discussions in their annual reports ". And most of 
the companies they don't argue very much because the alternative is we say 
"Ok you don't want to refer to us in your note, would us issue a press 
notice? " and then they say "ok, ok we 'll put you in the note "... . 
Both interviewees mentioned that there is an association between poor corporate 
governance and earnings management or earnings manipulation. The member of the 
Panel's board mentioned that: 
`... where there has been earnings management/earnings 
manipulation very often there has been weak corporate governance. If you 
go back, there is a series of cases, middle of 70s, there is a legal process in 
UK when a company fails, and the guards of Trade/Industry can appoint 
inspectors. There is a series of reports in the late 70s from the DTI 
inspectors, and with each and every case of earnings 
management/manipulation came weak corporate governance for the 
standards, by 19 70s standards... ' 
The Panel's Secretary also mentioned the link between poor corporate governance 
and earnings manipulation: 
`... Everybody talks about Maxwell, that kind of culture where you 
have an overarching chairman who just rules everything, decides everything 
and the culture is really that there's a fear of doing the right thing, a fear of 
reporting properly. Those are all bad things you don't want to see. We see 
very little of that in the companies that we deal with... ' 
IFRS are argued to introduce greater flexibility for managers to choose 
between alternative treatments as a means of providing more relevant information to 
investors. 
'... How you apply those policies, is a matter of judgment. I think 
under IFRS, now there's a requirement to disclose those judgements. I think 
there's more transparency. So if it is a significant judgement or a key 
estimate, or sort of uncertainty, whatever, the fact that companies have to 
disclose then, is I think an improvement. Because they should really think 
about them, rather carefully, if they're going to go public on them... ' 
The Secretary of the Panel mentioned the need for efficient corporate reporting 
departments: 
'... now they are taking sort of "through the eyes of management ". 
Where management reports on the information it comes up to them and 
IFRS 7 and IFRS 8,1 think that might become rather more significant than it 
has in the past. What sort of information does the board have, what's the 
quality of that information and the data that it has which makes its decision 
and I think that could become important in future. I suppose with a strong 
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finance team and a culture within the 
importance of the financial clepartment... ' 
On commenting on the opportunity for 
company which recognises the 
earnings management after the 
introduction of IFRS the member of the Panel's board mentioned that: 
'... Someone argued that using the fair values might do that, but on the 
other hand that reduces the space for earnings management, because after 
measuring equity and/or securities in fair value instead of the lower cost of 
market value and lower cost of net realisable value removes the ability of 
management to simply shell things when it is completely to get the results 
they want. There are some who argue the difficulty of investment at fair 
value, allows flexibility for more earnings management. On the move from 
UK GAAP to IFRS, there are some who might argue that there is no UK 
GAAP equivalent to IFRS 5 and that may allow greater flexibility for 
earnings management. There definitely are ways to manage earnings... ' 
In discussing specific IFRS that provide firms with opportunities for earnings 
management, the member of the Panel's board mentioned that: 
'... For example IFRS 5, on assets for sale, says when you commit to 
sell an asset (part of PPE), you stop depreciating that asset until you sell it. 
I argue with some scope, that classifying things at sale, avoids depreciation. 
You might argue that hedge accounting; IFRS 39 allows scope for earnings 
management. They rely on designation of something as a hedge so your 
decision whether or not to designate something as a hedge could be used to 
manage earnings. But on the other hand all the hedging is done off balance 
sheet. So the only thing that ever has to recognise will be basically expected 
losses from hedging contracts... ' 
And we can argue on with IAS 38 on intangible assets doesn't allow more 
flexibility for earnings management in that it requires you to capitali: c 
internal created intangibles in certain circumstances. The circumstances 
require management judgement and it is quite easy that you don't meet the 
criteria and someone might use that as a way of managing earnings... Companies just used to buy things and sell things. Nowadays the 
sales are a lot more complex, so you have to split the sales revenue in different components, and how do you allocate the profit between the 
components? Some people say: 'all the profit in the first components, no 
profit in the last ones'. The standards themselves don't create the options for earnings management. The standards say: 'recognise the revenue when 
you performn' The earnings management is coming from the way companies 
interpret them... ' 
The Secretary of the Panel highlighted that the current economic environment 
puts pressure on companies as credit is scarce and economic activity is in decline. 
Under such circumstance, companies might slash earnings with excess provisions, 
creating reserves that can be released in the future known as 'big bath' accounting. 
'... Well, I think generally there's more pressure on the boards, there 
's more pressure on management and perhaps to meet their targets if 
they've announced at the market and under more pressure in the everyday 
management of the business. A considerable number of businesses will run 
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into financing difficulties and funding difficulties. We have heard but it's 
only anecdotal, but some banks the amount of cover they want for 
covenants. They perhaps are lending less, rolling over for three years, not 
five. Companies are going to have to deal with it their going concern 
disclosures. And also I think we're anticipating impairment charges. But 
there might be a tendency to try and take a significant impairment hit now, 
in advance, when they really need to. A kind of soaring up so people might 
be over impairing, Big Bath Accounting... ' 
4.5.3 The wider role of the FRRP 
The FRRP's role is to ensure the provision of financial information by companies 
complies with relevant accounting requirements and to contribute to the continuous 
improvement in the quality of corporate reporting. 
`... I think perhaps the way on which we do that and the focus of how we 
work is improving the quality of future financial reporting. If something 
stands and it is really wrong and we think the market needs to be aware 
then we will make revise their accounts or correct but our real impetus is to 
encourage companies always to improve the quality of what they are doing 
in next years accounts... ' 
The Panel aims to establish constructive dialogue with companies to understand 
their analysis and agree improvements to their corporate reporting where necessary. 
The Panel's remit has increased recently and now embraces annual accounts, interim 
reports and directors' reports. 
`... we do look, at 300 a year. In the last two years we had our remit 
extended. First of all, we look at directors' reports. So in those 300 set of 
accounts, we now have to focus on the director's report as well and 
particularly the business review which is kind a difficult area to look at. It's 
much more judgemental than just the accounting disclosure that means 
more work... ' 
The Panel considers the directors' report as a significant statement that needs 
to be consistent with the underlying fmancial position of the company, otherwise it 
can be misleading to the non-sophisticated investor. 
`... In a way is human nature because where we are now is much worst 
position that we thought we would've been 12 months ago. That's in 
people's minds and that's influencing how they behave and what they think 
what about the next 12 months, if I appear to be to confident that's not too 
good but I don't want to give the opinion that things are necessarily going 
to get worse. I think it's quite a difficult challenge for boards to get the 
words right. To get that tone right, in their narrative disclosures... ' 
The Panel has changed its operating procedure, since it became proactive. This 
can be explained by the decline in the number of press notices in the latest years. In 
the past the Panel had to issue a press notice for every complaint it received. 
However, currently if the reporting issue is considered to be minor, no press notice is 
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issued. Though, in the next reporting period the company has to treat the issue in 
question, following FRRP's instruction mentioning the contribution of the Panel. 
'... I think there are several things. The original operating procedures 
of the Panel, when it was reactive, were that every complaint that came into 
the Panel had to have a group set up to look at it. Even if it was a tiny 
mistake, if it was a valid complaint, had to have a Panel group set tip and if 
the Panel group supported the complaint there had to be a press notice. 
That was our operating procedure... Yes. In theory that worked very well. 
but in practice what happed was that we had a lot of very small complaints. 
about some very small companies and we had quite a jew press notices 
where really the issue wasn't very significant and it was in a cam/'rnw that 
nobody ever heard of and it was a mistake, or oversight. Subsequently, 
chairman and deputy chairman fell that wasn't a very good way of using the 
Panel members, the Panel group, and it wasn't the sort of publicity that was 
helpful to anybody. So over the years what's happened was that we refined 
our operating procedures, to give our staff more flexibility about when we 
issue a press notice and what other public reference we might seek, if we've 
been in a correspondence with a company. What has happened the last two, 
I think, perhaps two or three years, some times we'll come across something 
which is not so bad that it needs a press notice, because we know a press 
notice is very bad news for a company... ' 
Interviewees suggested that the FRRP has made a great impact on the quality of 
financial reporting in the UK. The view of the interviewees was that the FRRP has 
been a necessary and positive force in UK financial reporting, and that its presence 
has encouraged companies to be more diligent in complying with accounting 
standards. The secretary of the Panel mentioned that: 
'... Most UK companies pride themselves on their accounts and are 
genuinely quite keen to improve. When we finish writing to a company we 
often get a letter saying "thank you for showing an interest in the 
company's accounts,, and you know, they think that their accounting is 
improved as a result of that process, and that really what we 're there to do... It is, not everybody realises that but some people actually they do 
appreciate the fact that we spend time helping them, perhaps think more 
clearly why they do certain things. And the way which we work as well 
'cause we do try to work on a consensual basis that it's fairly informal 
"how we can help you to improve" attitude, is very %ti-elcomed by most 
companies. It is not the same as the FSA or another regulator, saying ')-Oil 
must do it this way" or trying to tell them what to do. It's much more 
helpful, constructive approach we hope... ' 
The same view was shared from the member of the Panel's board, who 
mentioned that: 
'... The feeling is that it has a good, positive impact. It is sort ofa very 
peculiar British type structure, it operates sort of in the private sector. It 
seems to be successful in that way. But it is livery different front the SECT 
approach Which is doing the same sorts of things. The sense is that it does 
work. I Wouldn't know, and 1 don't think the Panel would be able to tell you. 
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how many cases have not been resolved and the Panel decided not to 
pursue. The only sanction that the Panel has got is to get someone to 
court... ' 
The Panel appears to apply a company-centric approach in conducting 
inquiries, while it has an `iron fist in a velvet glove'. 
`... companies recognise the way we have to work some times quickly 
to help people and they just like the manner in which we conduct the 
inquiry. We're not trying to find people guilty, there's no assumption that 
people are guilty. It's a genuine attempt just to try to find out the facts about 
an issue and then how best to deal with it. We have no powers, so we just 
want to make sure that we help the company and ourselves, we get to the 
right answer and we deal with it appropriately and then we move on... ' 
The broader role of the Panel is to improve compliance with the accounting 
standards and the informative content of the disclosures. The Panel criticizes 
companies that provide boiler plate statements in their financial reports. 
`Yes, that's where we're trying to get them away from [boiler plate 
statements] but it's not easy... ' 
'... it could be the narrative disclosures in the business review, are as 
important as anything that a company puts out. We may find that there are 
more issues in there; companies have to say what their principle risks and 
uncertainties are. That's quite difficult for boards to do. How do you know 
in six months time, what are the principle risks, especially now... ' 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter considered the views of the FRRP in relation to earnings management 
and earnings manipulation. Exploratory interviews were carried out in order to 
investigate and evaluate the Panel's perceptions, functions, procedures and the impact 
of the regulator. A fuller appreciation was gained of how it actually achieves its aims. 
It is worth noting that, as is usually the case with interview based research, it may be 
inappropriate to make broad generalisations. The views expressed relate to the 
specific people interviewed, using a framework provided by prior literature, which 
focused on the existence and occurrence of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation. Compared with the enforcement agency in the US (SEC), the FRRP has 
fewer powers at its disposal to deal with such cases. 
Interviewees suggested that the Panel has been successful in improving 
corporate reporting in the UK by encouraging companies to avoid boiler-plate type 
disclosures. The Panel utilises both referrals and a risk based approach in identifying 
cases of non-compliance with accounting standards. In those cases the Panel writes to 
the company. The Panel aims to reach agreement with the directors of the company by 
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persuasion. If the group is satisfied by the company's explanations, the case is closed 
and the fact that an enquiry was made remains confidential. Where the directors agree 
to take remedial action the Panel issues a press notice. The Panel has the power to 
bring a case to court, if it does not receive adequate explanations from the company's 
directors. 
The interviewees suggested that there is no clear border line between earnings 
management and earnings manipulation. Though, both of the interviewees mentioned 
that earnings manipulation relates to creative accounting of a bigger scale (than 
earnings management) intended to mislead investors. Both mentioned that earnings 
manipulation is associated with weak corporate governance and usually aims to reach 
the earnings figure expected from the market. The recent economic downturn sets an 
extra pressure to directors as it is more difficult to make realistic estimations on fair 
values and future cash flows. 
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Chapter 5 
Earnings Management Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
Many of the accounting scandals that came to the public eye after 2001 had already 
been predicted in 1998 by Arthur Levitt 16, the President of the SEC, in his speech 
entitled `The Numbers Game', in which he severely criticized the creative accounting 
practices used by North American companies to meet the earnings forecasts expected 
by the market and highlighted the main accounting techniques behind this abuse. 
This chapter provides an analytical insight into the procedures used by 
directors to manage earnings. However, it cannot be assumed outright that such 
alterations constitute earnings manipulation, i. e. are illegal. Accounting standards 
leave room for different interpretations on the part of directors, and this subjectivity, 
taken to an extreme, might mean that financial information does not reflect the true 
and fair view, despite complying with the law. That would be earnings management 
(Chapter 2). The following sections in this chapter look at the areas where creative 
accounting is most common, using specific case studies to investigate the impact of 
such techniques. The chapter also explores cases of earnings manipulation that have 
been brought into the public arena by the FRRP or by Company Reporting. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, documents specific cases of 
earnings management where reported earnings were influenced within the limits of 
accounting standards. It also explores how earnings management had been escalated 
to earnings manipulation in cases of publicly criticised companies. The second 
16 According to Levitt, the five techniques used most were: 
(i) `Big Bath' charges to clean up balance sheets 
This practice consisted of recording huge extraordinary charges, reducing the value of certain assets 
only to restate them later as ordinary income, thus generating greater income growth; 
(ii) Creative acquisition accounting 
The use of the pooling system to simulate mergers which in reality are acquisitions. Companies have 
also often treated acquired patens as goodwill and not as intangible assets, in order to write them off in 
twenty years and not in four or five as intangible assets should be amortised, normally in the case of 
research and development expenses; 
(iii) Cookie jar reserves 
These were overstated charges to generate reserves that were used in difficult years to mitigate earnings 
fluctuations; 
(iv) Premature recognition of revenue; and 
(v) Reporting potential losses as a specific percentage of possible losses and then reporting 
that their net income impact was too small to be relevant (under-provisioning). 
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contribution is that the difference between UK GAAP and IFRS is compared, in 
regulating specific areas and how companies exploited these differences in reporting a 
more favourable position. Finally this chapter contributes by documenting case-based 
examples of earnings management/manipulation and how this is achieved in practice. 
The examination of earnings management methods aims to test the following 
hypothesis described in chapter 3: 
H2: The instances earnings management and earnings manipulation involve specific 
accounting treatments. 
Although the companies criticised for earnings manipulation arc in public 
domain, this chapter documents how management manipulated earnings exploiting 
the discretion allowed in specific standards. The areas discussed in chapter 5 are 
selected from the sample of earnings manipulators, documented in Table 7.4. The 
chapter concludes that specific accounting treatments allow increased managerial 
discretion as they involve subjective accounting estimates (i. e. accounting for mergers 
and acquisitions, revenue recognition, capitalisation of development costs, 
depreciation policy, recognition of financial instruments). 
5.2 Acquisition Accounting 
IFRS requires that the assets and liabilities of a company being acquired should be 
brought into the acquirer's balance sheet at fair value. Fair Value, is defined by the, 
IAS 18 (par. 7) as: `the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability 
settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction. ' 
This means that in practice adjustments arc applied to the values of these 
assess and liabilities to bring the acquired assets and liabilities into line with a) the 
acquirer's accounting policies, and b) current rather than historic values. This fair 
value adjustment on acquisition can be presented as a conservative approach, on the 
director's report: "we are writing down the value of the assets we have acquired, 
applying strict accounting valuations" 
However, fair value adjustments on acquired assets and liabilities present an 
opportunity for acquisitive companies to manage earnings. Acquisitive companies 
write down the value of current assets such as stock and debtors aggressively, in order 
to realise profits from the disposal of these current assets. Similarly, if fixed assets are 
written down beyond their fair value, then the future depreciation charge is reduced, 
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so profits are boosted. Profits on disposals of fixed assets could also be boosted. This 
could result to the situation in which a company sold fixed asses at a loss compared 
with their costs, but above their written down value, showing profit on the transaction. 
In order to prevent this type of accounting discretion in disposals, IFRS 5 
regulates transactions relating to Assets Held for Sale. In general, the following 
conditions must be met for an asset (or `disposal group') to be classified as held for 
sale (IFRS 5.6-8) 
" Management is committed to a plan to sell 
" The asset is available for immediate sale 
" 
An active programme o locate a buyer is initiated 
" The sale is highly probable within 12 months of classification as held for sale 
" 
The asset is being actively marketed for sale at sales price reasonable in 
relation to its fair value 
If these conditions are met, then the entity shall measure a non-current asset (or 
disposal group) classified as held for sale at the lower of its carrying amount and fair 
value less cost to sell (IFRS 5, par. 15). 
There is another other aspect of fair value accounting which gives accounting 
discretion to the acquisitive company looking for a boost to its profits, the 
reorganisation provision. The acquiring company might need to take action to 
improve the profitability of its target. Plants need to be closed, work force reductions 
and there are costs associated with these actions in the form of redundancy payments 
and capital expenditures. These costs can be recognised at the outset of the acquisition 
by including reorganisation provisions in the fair value adjustments. These provisions 
could be retained on the balance sheet and be released gradually in future accounting 
periods, when profits are beyond management's threshold. 
Though, IAS 37 reduces managerial discretion in manipulating provisions, 
setting specific conditions that need to be met in order for a provision to be 
recognised. Specifically, lAS 37 (par 14) requires that a provision shall be recognised 
when: 
(a) an entity has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past 
event; 
(b) it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will 
be required to settle the obligation; and 
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(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of that obligation. 
If these conditions are not met, no provision shall be recognised. 
An example of recognising excess provisions in reorganisation costs is the 
case of Isoft plc in 2003, its aggressive approach was criticised by the FRRP. 
Following the acquisition of Torex, Isoft undertook a reorganisation to integrate the 
business that involved severance and redundancy costs, professional fees and property 
related costs. As a result, it created provisions of £7.9 million that it charged to 
income and was shown separately on the face of the profit and loss account classified 
as an exceptional item. A note (Table 5.1) disclosed that the company expected to 
utilise the provision relating to severance and redundancy next year while the property 
related provision was expected to be utilised during the next 8 years. 
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Figure 5.1: Extract from Isoft's Annual Report 
I_Merger with Torex PLC 14 
on 23 December 2003, tie merger of SOFT Group pic and Torex PLC rTorex') was declared unconddionai. Acquisition Acquisitions 
accounting Aas been adopted. The book and provisional fair values of Torex on acquisition were as follows: 
Provisional 
Book value Revaluations fair value 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Tangible fixed assets 9,922 (473) 9,449 
Assets held for resale 1.475 67.685 69,160 
Stocks 4,750 (1.193) 3,557 
Debtors 52,388 (2.412) 49,976 
Deterred tax 3.104 3,675 6,779 
Overdraft (5.134) 
- 
(5,134) 
Corporabon tax (5,626) (1.501) (7,127) 
Deferred consideration (12,724) 4,057 (8,667) 
Trade and other creditors (56,244) (8.489) (64,733) 
Debt (69.675) (69,675) 
Provisions for liabilities and charges (1.551) (1,379) (2,930) 
Pension fabiWty (5.964) (5,964) 
Net Aabiuties acquWed (79,315) 54.006 (25,309) 
Goodwill 397,187 
Consideration 371,878 
Satisfied b 
Shares i sued 367,825 
Acquisition costs (of which £200,000 remains unpaid at 30 April 20(4) 4,053 
371.878 
Revaluation adusümM omvL, 
-. 
" Write off of obsolete fixed assets of £473,000. 
" The adjustment in respect of assets held for resale represents the actual net proceeds of £61,185.000 of the Retail 
Drvision of Torex which was disposed of on 14 February 2004 to Lynxangel Linked, together with £6,500,000 
representing the estimated carrying value of Torex Laboratory Systems Limited. Both the Retail Division of Torex and 
Torex Laboratory Systems have not been consolidated into the acquisition balance sheet or the Group's post 
acquisition balance sheet on the grards that they weretare held exclusively for resale. 
" Write down of stocks by £1,193,000 to their estimated recoverable value. 
" Additional provision for bad and doubtful debts of £2,412,000. 
" Reassessment of the corporation tax liabilities of latex to reflect an additional babibty of £1.501,000 and inclusion of 
a deferred tax asset arising as a result of the fay value adjustments of £3,675,000. 
" Reassessment of the amounts payable in respect of deferred consideration by £4,057,000 based on most recent 
available data. 
" An adjustment to trade and other creditors of £8,489,000 comprising the reassessment of a number of onerous 
contracts to reflect an additional üabdrty of £4.293,000 and the inclusion of £4,196.000 of liabilities in existence at 
the acquisition date but not recorded in the acauisition balance sheet 
" Adddronal property provisions of £1.379.000 In respect of onerous lease commitments and dilapidation. 
" Inclusion of the £8,519.000 pension liability of latex calaMted on an FHS 17 basis and stated net of the related 
deferred tax asset of £2,555,000. See We 22 to details of the assumptiau used in assessing this liability. 
From 24 December 2003 to 30 April 2004. Torex (excluding the Retail Division and Torex Laboratory Systems) contnbuted 
£43,268,000 to turnover, £6.329.000 to operating profit before goodwill amortisation and exceptional items and 
£5,321.000 to profit before taxation, goodwill amortisation and exceptional items. Torex contnbuted £6,266,000 to the 
Group's net operating casMbws, paid £902,000 in respect of Interest, [nil in respect of taxation and utilised £1,521,000 
for capital expendiAue. 
Source: Isoft annual report (2003) p. 43 
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An example of accounting manipulation involving disposals after an 
acquisition is the case of Seymour Pierce plc (2002), which was also censured by the 
FRRP. During that year, Seymour Pierce (Seymour) made an acquisition for which 
consideration of £32.3 million was satisfied by the issue of 380 million shares valued 
at 8.5p per share. Additionally, acquisition expenses of £2.5 million were incurred. A 
table was published showing that the assets acquired consisted of investments and 
cash. A fair value adjustment reduced the £14.2 million book value of investments to 
a fair value of £4.8 million and results in goodwill arising of £6 million. A note 
disclosed that the fair value adjustment reflected the directors' valuation of the 
investments after taking into consideration the marketability of individual 
shareholdings within the portfolio. The note added that, since acquisition, all the 
investments had been either fully provided against or sold. Total sale proceeds 
amounted to £I I million net of costs and a profit on disposal arose of £8.3 million. 
Surprisingly, Seymour disclosed that an alternative treatment in relation to the fair 
value of the investments sold was to equate their fair value with the net cash received. 
The company added that if it had adopted this treatment, the profit on disposal would 
had been reduced by £8 million and created a write back of negative goodwill of some 
£0.4 million. Describing this as an alternative accounting treatment is not in 
accordance with FRS 7 `Fair values in acquisition accounting' which specifics 
methods for determining fair values of assets acquired. While FRS 7 notes that, where 
quoted market prices are not available, subsequent sales of acquired assets may 
provide the most reliable evidence of fair value at the time of acquisition (par. 43), 
neither it nor FRS 6 `Acquisitions and mergers' provide for alternative fair values. 
FRS 6 requires that if additional information becomes available, adjustments should 
be made to fair values with corresponding adjustments to goodwill. 
Another option available to companies is to dcconsolidatc from their group 
results a subsidiary at the time when they decide to sell it rather than when a sale is 
completed. The profits (or more likely the losses) of the subsidiary between the 
announcement and completion are added to the profit or loss on disposal. This 
technique has the major advantage of keeping the results of a loss-making subsidiary 
out of the core profit & loss account. More specifically, IFRS 5 (par. 33) states that an 
entity shall disclose a single amount on the face of the income statement comprising 
the total of. 
(i) the post-tax profit or loss of discontinued operations and 
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(ii) the post-tax gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair value less 
costs to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s) constituting 
the discontinued operation. 
Thus a company seeking to create a reserve for improving future profits, can 
recognise an increased impairment charge in the year of deconsolidation and a 
positive revaluation to the real fair value in the next year. A recent example is the case 
of Misisy plc (2008). In 2008, Misys disposed of three businesses, all classified prior 
to disposal as discontinued operations, recognising a pre-tax profit on disposal of 
£73.6 million which it disclosed as exceptional, net of £2.3 million tax charge on the 
income statement. This was in addition to the £48.9 million pre-tax profit from 
continuing operations quoted above and contributed to the return to a net asset 
position. Previously, only one of the businesses was classified as discontinued and, in 
the prior year, Misys recognised £17 million impairment of goodwill in it. In 2008, it 
recognised a profit on disposal of £0.7 million. 
Following IFRS 5 `Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued 
operations', the company restated its comparative income statement in respect of the 
two reclassified businesses, reducing pre-tax profit from continuing operations by 
£18.1 million, or 81.9%, to £4 million. 
5.3 Deferred Consideration 
Deferred consideration is a payment, the value of which is contingent upon the future 
performance of the business acquired. More commonly known as `earn-outs' (from 
the point of view of the vendors of the business acquired). This technique became 
popular in structuring acquisition in consolidating sectors particularly in business 
services. Typically, an acquirer would make an up-front payment with further 
payments in either cash or shares based on a multiple of future profits of the acquired 
company. This method of acquisition has a number of advantages: 
(1) Limited downside risk 
- 
if the acquisition underperforms the future deferred 
consideration payments could be adjusted downwards accordingly. 
(2) In the `people' businesses of the services sector, in particular, tying-in the 
vendors of a business is important as the success of the business often depends 
heavily upon their creative talents and expertise. Nonetheless, most of these 
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companies have few tangible assets to secure the acquirer against the risk of a 
downside. 
(3) There is often an immediate enhancement to earnings as the profits of the 
acquired company were consolidated at once, but the additional consideration 
was only paid some time later. 
But further issues can arise. These relate to the ability of the acquirer to 
finance the future deferred consideration payments if they arc in cash, to the dilutive 
effect of the shares to be issued and to the resulting cost of maintaining the dividend 
payout. It is usual to disclose these potential liabilities rather than providing for them 
as the amount is uncertain. If there is a reliable estimate on these future payments, 
then a provision needs to be recognised as these liabilities arise from a past event (the 
acquisition). The provision is recognised after discounting the deferred consideration 
at the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of the acquirer [IFRS 3 `Business 
combinations' (par. 26)]. Though, if the deferred consideration is payable in shares 
and the share price of the acquirer is depressed at the time of payment, the result is 
often the need to issue a greater number of shares in order to fulfil the deferred 
consideration. This has a highly dilutive effect on Earnings per Share and increases 
the cost of the total dividend and the WACC. The amount of subjectivity involved in 
the measurement of the differed consideration and subsequently the recognition of the 
acquired goodwill, allows management to influence the reported amounts. 
A recent example of managerial discretion in the estimation of differed 
consideration and goodwill is the case of Brewin Dolphin Holdings plc (2007). 
Brewin Dolphin changed its accounting policy on goodwill, stating that future 
anticipated payments in respect of earn-outs are based on the directors' best estimate 
of the obligations incurred. It discounted the consideration back to present value, with 
the annual unwinding of interest included in finance costs. Discounting of deferred 
consideration follows IFRS 3 `Business combinations' (par. 26). The company 
recognised £0.5 million such costs of unwinding in the current year and deducted 
from adjusted earnings per share the net £0.3 million post-tax effect. 
The company disclosed that goodwill was the only asset of the investment 
management businesses it acquired, but did not disclose the factors that have given 
rise to it in the year, as required by IFRS 3 (par. 67(h)). It reduced the carrying value 
of goodwill by £9.8 million or 14.9% and described this as a revaluation. however, 
this referred to a change in estimate in relation to prior years. It attributed the 
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adjustment to a diminution of liabilities in respect of deferred consideration, with £8 
million attributed to shares to be issued and £1.8 million to reduction in the value of 
deferred purchase consideration. This follows along the lines of IFRS 3 (par. 33). It 
was unclear whether the change is determined by changes in the cash consideration or 
in the market value or number of shares to be issued. In addition, it did not disclose 
which mergers or acquisitions are concerned and thus arguably fell short of IFRS 3 
(par. 74), leading to a lack of clarity, though the current component of one acquisition 
was given. The company disclosed a cap to the maximum consideration paid exists 
that exceeded the amount it expected to be paid. 
The company applied fair value less costs to sell in impairment testing its 
goodwill, but did not disclose the allocation of goodwill to cash-generating units 
(CGUs), though the disclosures indicated different bases for investment management, 
corporate broking and other units. This disclosure fell short of IAS 36 `Impairment of 
assets' (par. 134(a)). 
Another case involving deferred consideration is the case of Northgate plc 
(2006). Northgate recognised £31.6 million goodwill on two acquisitions in the year 
and published tables in a note, giving the book value, adjustments and fair value of the 
assets and liabilities acquired, as required by IFRS 3 (par. 67(f)). 
It disclosed in liabilities £10.3 million deferred consideration for an 
acquisition in the previous year and recognised £0.5 million amortisation of the 
deferred consideration in the income statement under finance costs. It stated that, at 
the point of purchase of a subsidiary, the amount due was discounted by the group's 
cost of capital and that the carrying amount represented the actual amount payable. 
In carrying out impairment tests on cash-generating units (CGUs) including 
goodwill, if a company projects cash flows based on approved financial budgets over 
a period exceeding five years, IAS 36 `Impairment of assets' requires a company to 
explain why a longer period is justified (par. 134(iii))) Additionally, it requires an 
explanation of the use of any growth rate in value in use calculations that exceeds the 
average long-term growth rate for the products, industry or country in which the CGU 
operates, or for the market to which the CGU is dedicated (par. 134(d(iv))). 
In 2006, Northgate adopted IAS 36 and tested goodwill for. impairment at least 
annually. It disclosed four CGUs to which goodwill was allocated and stated that cash 
now periods of five years were used for two and ten years for the other two units for 
value in use calculations (par. 134(d(iii))). The company disclosed that ten year 
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periods had been used on the basis that economic benefit was expected to flow to it 
over the longer period in these instances. For one ('(IU, it disclosed an annual growth 
rate of 25% and, following IAS 36, explained that the growth rate had increased 
above the average long-term growth rate for relevant markets to reflect the immature 
market in which the company operates. The company recognised no impairments of 
goodwill in that year. Though, shareholders appeared not to share the same view in 
the growth prospects of the company, as reflected in the company's share price in 
Figure 5.2 
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5.4 Revenue Recognition 
Clearly revenue recognition is extremely important to investors. In fact, Anderson and 
Yohn (2002) conclude that when there are problems in a company's financial 
statements, investors are more concerned about revenue recognition problems- than 
any other reporting issue. The FASB and the IASB in 2008 issued it joint discussion 
paper entitled, "Preliminary Views on Revenue Recognition in Contracts with 
Customers. " The Boards requested comments on whether their proposed model for 
revenue recognition would improve the usefulness of the financial statement 
information for financial decision makers. Currently revenue recognition accounting 
policies need to comply with IAS 18. This standard specifics revenue (par. 7) as 'the 
gross inflow of economic benefits during the period arising in the course of the 
ordinary activities of an entity when those inflows result in increases in equity, other 
than increases relating to contributions from equity participants. ' In respect of 
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measurement, the standard adds that (par. 9): `Revenue shall be measured at the fair 
value of the consideration received or receivable. ' 
There are circumstances where revenue can be distorted by the recognition of 
gains on the disposal of fixed assets, especially when those assets are used as means 
of generating revenue. In order to prevent this, the IASB publication `Framework for 
the preparation and presentation of financial statements' distinguishes income into 
revenue and gains (par. 74), the latter including income arising on disposal of non- 
current assets (par. 76). Hence the scope of IAS 18 `Revenue' does not extend to such 
gains. 
An example of overriding the scope of IAS 18 is the case of Northgate. In 
2005, Northgate recognised £458 million of revenue from the hire of vehicles, sale of 
used vehicles and the supply of related goods and services. It did not address the 
timing of revenue recognition. 
In 2006, the company stated that all its revenue is from the rendering of 
services. It did not recognise in revenue the sale of used vehicles, which last year 
represented 26% of revenue. It classified its vehicle hire fleet as property, plant and 
equipment other than £14.7 million, which is classified as assets as held for sale. It did 
not disclose gains or losses on sale in the year of these items, despite the fact that the 
company reported that vehicles for hire with a carrying value of £152 million were 
sold in the year. The company adjusted depreciation on transferring vehicles to assets 
held for sale to equate these with open market values. It disclosed that revenue from 
vehicle rentals is recognised evenly over the rental period, with other sales recognised 
at the point of sale. 
IFRS 5 `Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued operations' requires 
a non-current asset to be classified as held for sale if its carrying amount will be 
recovered principally through sale rather than through continuing use (par. 6). In 
2005, Northgate classified £11.5 million used vehicles held for resale as inventory. In 
2006, the company reclassified £14.7 million of these assets to non-current assets held 
for sale. 
In 2000 Northgate was criticised by the FRRP for its revenue recognition 
policy. The matter at issue was the treatment in the consolidated financial statements 
of the credit relating to vehicle related bonuses. The company's accounting policy was 
to record such bonuses as deferred income and release them to turnover over the 
anticipated holding period of the vehicle category to which they related. The result of 
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this accounting policy was to overstate revenues and fixed assets by the amount of the 
bonuses. Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 15 `Tangible Fixed Assets' requires a 
tangible fixed asset to be initially measured at cost (par. 6) where the cost comprises 
its purchase price after deducting any trade discounts or rebates (par. 8). 
The Review Panel took the view that, to conform to FRS 15, the bonuses 
should have been credited to the purchase price of the vehicles whose purchase 
triggered the bonuses. The effect of the bonuses would then be to reduce the charge 
for depreciation over the useful economic lives of those assets. Accordingly, the 
bonuses should not have been recorded as deferred income nor released to turnover. 
Another case of overstating turnover involves the recognition of government 
grants as revenue. In 2007, the automotive consultancy Ricardo plc which relocated 
£1.1 million income from government grants, representing 9% of profit, from revenue 
to cost of sales. The company disclosed that the grants relate to its technical 
consulting segment in Europe. This brought to light non-compliance in the previous 
year with the IAS 20 20 (par. 39(b)) requirement to disclose the nature and extent of 
government grants recognised. In 2007, related government grant income of £1.1 
million for 2007 is shown as a deduction from cost of sales, with £1.2 million 
comparative figure for 2006 also disclosed. 
Another means of overstating turnover is recognising revenue prematurely. 
There are industries were the completion of a sale spans in more that one financial 
year. Thus, there is involved managerial discretion is estimating the revenue 
generated. Such an example is the construction industry, where revenue is recognised 
on the basis of the completion rate. Revenue recognition policies in construction 
contracts need to comply with 1AS 11 ` Construction Contract'. 
IAS 1I (par. 22) states that: `When the outcome of a construction contract can 
be estimated reliably, contract revenue and contract costs associated with the 
construction contract shall be recognised as revenue and expenses respectively by 
reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at balance sheet date. ' For 
the instances where the outcome of a construction contract cannot be estimated 
reliably the standard states that (par. 32): `revenue shall be recognised only to the 
extent of contract costs incurred that it is probable will be recoverable'. 
An example of premature revenue recognition in building industry is the case 
of Berkeley plc that followed an FRRP sanction. In 2002, Berkely plc adopted a new 
revenue recognition policy, which may be more prudent than its old policy, but it still 
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allowed revenue to be recognised before legal completion and was less prudent than 
the policy of other house builders which recognised on legal completion. For 
residential properties Berkeley disclosed that it used to recognise revenue when 
building work was substantially complete, defined as plastered with a completed floor 
screed. However, the new policy was to recognise when contracts are exchanged and 
the building work is physically complete. The net impact of Berkely's revenue 
recognition policy change reduced turnover by £65 million. This policy was different 
from the majority of house builders that recognised revenue on legal completion 
which, in the building industry, represented the date of payment. This is in line with 
the principle that revenue is recognised when the seller transfers all the risks and 
rewards arising from the use of the asset to the buyer. Berkeley disclosed however 
that it was not beneficial to link revenue to the actual handover of the unit thus the 
completion basis was found not appropriate. 
An example of earnings manipulation through sale and lease back is the case 
of Galliford Try plc, in 2007. The home builders recognised £l0 million gains on sale 
and lease back transactions and pension curtailment, representing 17% of profit before 
tax. Galliford Try reported in a note profit of £4.8 million on sale and leaseback 
transactions. Its disclosure of no assets held under finance leases revealed that the sale 
and leaseback resulted in an operating lease. Recognition of the £4.8 million profit 
followed IAS 17 `Leases' (par. 61) which is different from par. 59 whereby, if a sale 
and leaseback transaction results in a finance lease, any gain is deferred and amortised 
rather than be recognised as income. 
5.5 Cash flow accounting 
Many of the techniques of creative accountancy have the effect of generating reported 
profits without producing as much cash flows, so investors often test a company's 
solvency and valuation by some form of cash flow analysis. An example is the 
practice of raising acquisition or other provisions to cover restructuring costs. As 
these provisions are utilised to cover future costs, they enhance profits. But to the 
extent that the costs being incurred are cash costs such as redundancy payments, 
rather than just write-downs of asset values, removing these costs from the profit and 
loss account will mean that profits may provide an optimistic picture of the cash the 
business is generating. 
98 
Another reason why profits often diverge from cash generated is the working 
capital circle. When a company expands its sales the effect is not often to generate 
cash immediately, since it first needs to purchase inventories with which to attract 
buyers and then needs to fund the buyers for a period of credit when they become 
debtors. Companies also need to invest in fixed assets, and capital expenditure can be 
a drain on cash. For these reasons profits often deviate from the cash generated and 
IAS I requires that financial statements include a cash flow statement. 
The majority of the investors often focus on the cash flow from operations. A 
company seeking to report a favourable position is likely to include positive items 
related to investment activities in the operating cash flow. For example in 2006, 
Burberry plc classified cash flows from interest received and paid as financing 
activities. In 2007, the company reported them as operating activities. IAS 7 'Cash 
flow statements' states that interest received and paid are usually classified as 
operating cash flows for a financial institution. However, the company added that 
there is no consensus on their classification for other companies and states that they 
may be classified as operating or financing cash flows. 
5.6 Capitalisation of interest 
The most common capitalised cost is interest on property under development. 
Capitalisation is a process by which an item would otherwise be reported as an 
expense or debit in the profit and loss account is instead classified as an asset in the 
balance sheet. Capitalisation of costs is a legitimate technique. The Companies Act 
1985 allows the inclusion in the cost of production of an asset of: 
(a) a reasonable proportion of the costs incurred by the company which arc only 
directly attributable to the production of that asset; and 
(b) interest on capital borrowed to finance the production of that asset, to the 
extent that it accrues in respect of the period of production. 
Similarly, after the adoption of IFRS, IAS 23 allows the capitalisation of borrowing 
costs. The standard describes that: `The borrowing costs that arc directly attributable 
to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset are those borrowing 
costs that would have been avoided if the expenditure on the qualifying asset had not 
been made. ' (par. 13). A qualifying asset according to the standard is an asset that 
necessarily takes a substantial period of time to get ready for its intended use of sale. 
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This accounting treatment is normally associated with property development 
or the construction of properties for the use in business (i. e. stores, aircraft and stocks 
of goods which take a long time to mature such as whisky). But in a recession, 
companies that capitalised interest on property can encounter a problem. The cost of 
the property plus capitalised interest can exceed the market value, which leads to 
write-downs of the difference by which cost exceeds market value. 
An example of interest capitalisation is the case of the property developer 
Minerva plc. In 2007, although there was no change in accounting policy, 
Minerva capitalised £10.5 million of its £21 million interest and similar charges. This 
followed the alternative treatment of IAS 23 `Borrowing costs' that borrowing costs 
directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of qualifying assets 
can be capitalised. It disclosed further in notes that the qualifying assets are in respect 
of its investment and trading properties and reported also the accumulated amount of 
borrowing costs capitalised. However, whilst IAS 23 requires disclosure of the 
capitalisation rate used, the company was silent in this respect. In the previous year, 
the company recognised all of its £19 million borrowing costs as an expense. It 
should be noted that despite the significant drop in turnover from £20 millions in 2006 
to £12 millions in 2007, the company reported an increase in profit before tax from 
-£7 to £16 millions. 
A second example of interest capitalisation is the case of White Young Green 
plc. In 2007 the company disclosed that borrowing costs of £0.5 million were 
capitalised during the year and were amortised over the length of the loan. This 
follows IAS 23 `Borrowing costs' (par. 29(b)). However, the company did not 
disclose the capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of borrowing costs 
eligible for capitalisation which is required by par. 29(c). 
In the same financial year, the company increased the life of customer 
relationships from between two and four years to five and ten years and subsequently 
recognises an amortisation charge of £637,000. It stated that the impact is to decrease 
amortisation of acquired intangibles, which consisted of order books and customer 
relationships, from £4.2 million to £2.6 million for the year. In 2007, the company 
reported an increase in profit before tax from £11 millions to £13 millions. The net 
effect of capitalising interest expense and reassessing the intangibles' useful life was 
to increase profit before tax by £2.1 million. If the company had not adopted these 
accounting treatments, then it would report a decrease in profits of £0.1 million. 
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5.7 Capitalisation of Research and Development (R&D) 
Before the implementation of the IFRS, the position adopted by the Accounting 
Standards Board for the accounting treatment of research and development 
expenditure was a middle ground compared to the mandatory capitalisation of 
development costs required by the International Accounting Standards Board and the 
immediate write off position adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
for costs with no alternative use. Under SSAP 13, which was replaced by FRS 24 
"Accounting for research and development", UK companies faced a choice as to 
whether to capitalise or write off development costs with the decision ultimately left 
to directors. 
This discretion was eliminated in 2005 with the introduction of IAS 38 
`Intangible assets' which requires mandatory capitalisation of development costs 
where specific criteria are met. Although IAS 38 removed the discretion of directors it 
introduced more rigorous criteria before costs may be classified as 'development' 
within its meaning. To satisfy the criteria an entity must be able to demonstrate all of 
the following: 
the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be 
available for use or sale; 
its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it; 
its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; 
the way intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits. 
Among other things, the entity shall demonstrate the existence of a market for 
the output of the intangible asset or the intangible asset itself or, if it is to be 
used internally, the usefulness of the intangible asset; 
the availability of adequate technical, financial and other resources to 
complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset; and 
its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible 
asset during its development. 
The distinction between research and development costs can be subjective 
allowing for managerial discretion, though managerial discretion is reduced with the 
introduction of IAS 38. 
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An example of aggressive capitalisation is the case of Finelot plc. In 2001, 
Finelot reported intangible assets amounting to £1 million. In a note to the accounts, 
Finelot disclosed that the intangible fixed assets comprise contracted development 
costs for the magazine `FINE'. In its chief executives review, Finelot disclosed that all 
additional working capital requirements of the magazine will be funded by a third 
party. 
The 2001 auditors' report of Finelot included a fundamental uncertainty 
section. This section states that the validity of preparing the financial statements on a 
going concern basis depended on the success of the `FINE' magazine, which the 
directors believed, based on forecasts, that would be profitable and cash generative 
from its third issue in April 2002. 
Taking into account the working capital requirements of the magazine had 
being provided and the adoption of the going concern assumption these development 
costs had been capitalised under FRS 24 `Accounting for research and development'. 
In the basis of consolidation note, it was stated however that if a going concern basis 
was not adopted the magazine development costs may not be fully recoverable. This 
accounting treatment triggered an FRRP investigation and the company had to restate 
its accounts charging the magazine costs to the income statement. 
5.8 Intangible Assets 
Accounting for brands has its roots in takeovers, mainly within the food 
manufacturing and processing, and drinks industries. On the one hand placing a 
valuation on brands was seen as a defence against a takeover `on the cheap'. On the 
other, predators who had acquired companies with brand names but few tangible 
assets found in brand valuation a way to make their balance sheet look better, and to 
overcome technical problems caused by the intangible nature of brands. Though, the 
estimation of a brand's value includes an important amount of subjectivity, as it is 
based on assumptions on future performance. 
Accounting for brands was developed during the 1980's (Smith, 1996) and its 
history is to be found in deals such as the 1978 bid by Allie Breweries for J Lyons at a 
price which was considered too high by conventional yardsticks, but gave Allied 
control of J. Lyons' brands. Hanson's battle with United Biscuits for control of 
Imperial Group in 1986 gave Hanson the ability to sell of brand name interests at a net 
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cost of only £197 million for a business (Imperial Tobacco) which produced operating 
profits of £240 million in 1991. This bid suggests that the stock market was not 
valuing J Lyons' brand assets correctly. 
Merger acquisition and hostile takeovers continued behind the development of 
"brand accounting". In the first instance, this is because a potential target wishes to 
establish the value of its brand to prevent a predator getting them 'on the cheap' since 
they were not reflected in the company's balance sheet net asset value. An example is 
Cadbury Schweppes, with brands in confectionery and soft drinks, which faced stake 
building by the US company General Cinema, in 1988. Cadbury Schweppes' 1989 
Accounts introduced the value of brands acquired since 1985 including Trebor and 
Basset at cost, thereby doubling shareholders' funds with over £300 millions of 
intangible assets. By doing so, Cadbury also reduced its reported gearing. 
Though UK GAAP allowed a great amount of subjectivity in accounting for 
intangible assets, this subjectivity was later reduced with the adoption of IFRS. Under 
the UK GAAP (SAAP 13) the cost of developing an intangible fixed asset, should 
only be recognised in the balance sheet if. 
(1) The historical cost associate with the asset is known or ascertainable 
(2) The characteristics of the asset can be clearly distinguished from goodwill and 
other assets, and 
(3) Its cost can be measured independently of goodwill 
(4) The entity has reasonable expectations of future benefits 
IAS 38 `Intangible Assets' sets a more specific framework making 
compulsory the capitalisation of development costs. More specifically, lAS 38 (par. 
57) describes that an intangible asset arising from development shall be recognised if 
and only if, an entity can demonstrate all of the following: 
(a) The technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be 
available for use or sale. 
(b) Its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it. 
(c) Its ability to use or sell the intangible asset 
(d) How the intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits. 
Among other things, the entity can demonstrate the existence of a market for 
the output of the intangible asset or the intangible asset itself or if it is to be 
used internally, the usefulness of the intangible asset. 
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(e) The availability of adequate technical, financial and other resources to 
complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset. 
(f) Its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible 
asset during its development. 
Moreover the standard adds that internally generated goodwill (par. 48) or brands 
(par. 63) shall not be recognised as intangible assets, as expenditure on these items 
cannot be distinguished from the cost of developing the business as a whole. 
In contrast IFRS 3, allows the recognition of intangible assets in business 
combinations. More specifically, the acquirer recognises separately an intangible asset 
of the acquiree at the acquisition date if it is separable and arises from contractual or 
other legal rights. 
The transition from the UK GAAP to the IFRS revealed cases of aggressive 
recognition of intangible assets. An example is the case of the betting company 
Stanley Leisure plc. In 2005, Stanley Leisure held gaming licences within property, 
plant and equipment at valuation. Upon transition to IFRS, they were measured at cost 
and contributed to the company's net assets decreasing by £371 million. The impact 
included reclassification of £223 million licences within intangible assets; reducing 
assets held for disposal by £119 million and increased deferred tax liabilities of £96 
million. 
Measuring these assets at cost is in line with IAS 38 "Intangible assets" which 
permits a company to choose either the revaluation or the cost model and states that 
fair value is determined by reference to an active market (par. 75). However, it adds 
that it is uncommon for an active market to exist for most intangible assets (par 
78). Stanley Leisure's disclosed also that its gaming licences were considered to have 
indefinite useful lives, although no further information was published. 
The company reported that its experience was that it is unlikely an application for 
renewal would be turned down, or a licence forcibly removed. This follows IAS 38 
which requires that, if an intangible asset arises from contractual or other legal rights 
that can be renewed; the useful life of the asset shall include the renewal period only 
if there is evidence to support renewal without significant cost (par. 94). It goes on to 
say that such evidence includes experience that a contract has been renewed adding 
that significant cost is determined by reference to the cost of renewal compared to the 
economic benefits expected to flow to a company from renewal. 
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As intangible assets can form a significant part or a company's non current assets, 
IAS 38 requires a detailed disclosure of the applied depreciation rates or the estimated 
assets' useful lives, by category. An example of deviation from the requirement is the 
case of Wolseley plc. 
In 2005, except for goodwill Wolselcy did not recognise any intangible assets. On 
transition to IFRs, the company recognised £133 million as intangibles with 
E101 million, previously within goodwill, recognised as trade names, brands and 
customer relationships. Additionally, it recognised £29 million software costs as 
intangible assets that were previously within property, plant and equipment. The 
company disclosed movements during the year including £220 million customer 
relationships and £26 million trade names and brands arising from acquisitions. It 
disaggregated in a table the net book values across: £39 million software costs; 
£34 million trade and brand names; and £253 million customer relationships. 
The accounting policies note disclosed that software costs had a useful life of 3 to 
5 years, whilst trade names, brands and customer relationships had useful lives that 
range from less than 1 year to 25 years depending on the nature of the asset. however 
the general nature of Wolseley's disclosure did not follow fully the IAS 38 'Intangible 
assets' requirement that a company disclose the useful lives or amortisation rates used 
for each class of intangible assets (par. 1 18(a)). 
Another case of aggressive recognition of intangible assets is the case of 3DM 
Worldwide plc in 2004, where its auditors warned for a fundamental uncertainty. The 
company recognised intellectual property and investments of £15.2 million and £3.4 
million respectively but stated that there can be no absolute certainty that sufficient 
income will be generated to recover the carrying value of both. however, it added that 
income is being received now and that, providing current trials are successful, further 
income streams are expected. Moreover, it was the directors' view that the carrying 
value of these assets is fair and reasonable given future potential income streams. 
To this extent, the auditors' report included a fundamental uncertainty that 
referred to the adequacy of disclosures made by the company concerning the carrying 
value of intellectual property and investments. The report added that the 
appropriateness of the carrying values is dependent upon 3DM securing contracts for 
the commercial exploitation of its technology, which was uncertain. 
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5.9 Changes in Depreciation Policy 
Changes in depreciation methods, periods and policies have been widely used as a 
source of managing earnings. The definition of depreciation under both the UK 
GAAP and IFRS induces a significant amount of subjectivity. 
Depreciation is defined in FRS 15 as `the measure of the wearing out, 
consumption or other reduction in the useful life of a fixed asset whether arising from 
use, defluxion of time or obsolescence through technological or market changes. ' It is 
worth noting that it was intended as a measure of consumption, not a measure of 
change in value. FRS 15 required depreciation of all fixed assets except investment 
properties, goodwill, development costs and investments. 
The most commonly used methods of depreciation are the straight line 
method, the reducing balance method, the annuity method and the unit of production 
method. A great deal of discretion is left to the management in the choice of 
depreciation method, as FRS 15 stated: `There is a range of acceptable depreciation 
methods. Management should select the method regarded as most appropriate to the 
type of asset and its use in the business so as to allocate depreciation as fairly as 
possible to the periods expected to benefit from the asset's use. ' 
A change in the method of depreciation is allowed if the new method will 
better represent the company's results and financial position. But a change of method 
is not a change of accounting policy, and profits can be adjusted without even 
adopting a change of method, simply by altering the life of an asset over which a 
method is applied. 
In December 1995, the UITF Abstract 14 implemented a new rule that the 
material impact of changes in accounting policy, including those on depreciation, 
should be shown for both the current accounting period and the prior period. Whilst 
this is a step forward in bringing to investors' attention the impact of accounting 
policy changes, there are still some drawbacks. Companies are adept at changing 
depreciation methods just before the depreciation charge on a new asset would have a 
substantial effect on profits. Moreover, a change in the length of the depreciation 
period remains outside the definition of a change in accounting policy, so that its 
impact was still not needed to be quantified under UITF Abstract 14. 
The introduction of the IFRS removed the requirement from companies to 
restate prior year accounts after the adoption of a new accounting policy. IAS 16 
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(Property Plant and Equipment) (par. 60) describes that: 'The depreciation method 
used shall reflect the pattern in which the asset's future economic benefits are 
expected to be consumed by the entity. The depreciation method applied to an asset 
shall be reviewed at least at each financial year-end, if there has been a significant 
change in the expected pattern of consumption of the future economic benefits 
embodied in the asset, the method shall be changed to reflect the changed pattern. 
Such a change shall be accounted for as a change in an accounting estimate in 
accordance with IAS 8. ' According to IAS 8 'Accounting Policies, Changes in 
Accounting Estimates and Errors' (par. 36) the effect of a change in an accounting 
estimate shall be recognised prospectively by including it in profit or loss in: 
(a) the period of the change, if the change affects that period only; or 
(b) the period of the change and future periods, if the change affects both. 
An example of change in depreciation policy is the case of GNP plc. The financial 
review disclosed that, in order to bring the group into line with comparable 
engineering companies, GKN changed its method of charging depreciation on plant 
and machinery from a reducing balance basis to a straight line basis. The company 
stated that the effect is to increase 2004 profit by £l 1 million. This follows along the 
lines of FRS 15 ` Tangible fixed assets' which states that a change from one method of 
providing depreciation to another is permissible only on the grounds that the new 
method will give a fairer presentation of the results and of the financial position (par. 
82). In addition, GKN disclosed a £663 million exceptional profit, after charging £100 
million in respect of goodwill previously written off to reserves, arising on the sale of 
its interests in two joint ventures. 
A more aggressive approach to depreciation policy was adopted by Northgate Pic 
in 2001 and attracted FRRP's attention. During 2001, Northgate acquired freehold 
buildings with a net value of £3.5 million after revaluation (historical cost: £3.4 
million). The directors stated that they did not believe the net book value of the 
freehold buildings to be `significantly different' from their actual value. Further to 
this, in the accounting policies note, it was disclosed that, as freehold buildings were 
kept in `a continual state of sound repair' with improvements made `from time to 
time', an annual impairment review on the revaluated amount negated the need for 
depreciation as, at the end of the buildings useful economic lives, residual values 
would be greater than their present carrying values. 
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FRS 15 `Tangible fixed assets' states that the only ground for non-depreciation of 
tangible fixed assets is where the depreciation charge is immaterial (par. 90). 
However, it goes on to state that, an entity must be able to justify that the uncharged 
depreciation is not material in aggregate as well as for each tangible fixed asset. 
Where estimated residual values are material, the entity must have a policy and 
practice of disposing of similar assets well before the end of their economic lives; and 
the disposal proceeds of similar assets have not been materially less than their 
carrying amounts (par. 91). 
Another example of change in depreciation rate is EasyJet plc. In 2005, the 
company disclosed a policy of depreciating its aircraft over a period of 7 years 
although they have an expected operational life of 20-30 years. This reflected 
EasyJet's policy of using recently manufactured aircraft and expectations of holding 
them for approximately 7 years before disposal. 
In 2006, EasyJet disclosed that it has revised the depreciation period of its fleet of 
Airbus A319, which is its standard aircraft, to 23 years which was the estimated 
operational life of the aircraft. It added that it intended to hold all aircraft over any 
period up to the end of their operational lives but that this change did not have a 
material impact on depreciation and was not expected to have a material future 
impact. 
5.10 Transfers from Current to Fixed Assets 
An old saying in stock-broking is that: `A long-term investment is a short-term 
investment which went wrong', which is reflected in the behaviour of a number of 
companies during recession. Particularly, since amongst the characteristics of the 
recession was a fall in property values accompanied by an absence of liquidity to 
enable developers to realise properties, even if they were prepared to accept the fall in 
values and the inevitable loss. 
Property developers rely upon selling the buildings they develop. Even if the 
building is tenanted, the developer usually still intends to sell as higher margins are 
achieved. Unlike the property investor who arranges equity and long-term debt 
finance, a property developer is typically funded partly by short-term bank debt which 
needs to be repaid from the sale of the property. Indeed, in many cases, developers 
cannot even cover their loan interest without regular disposals. 
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A recent example is the case of Barratt Developments plc, in 2008, where a 30% 
drop in sales volume brought the developer near bankruptcy. An emergency cash call 
of £731 millions rescued the group". 
Therefore, a property developer's buildings make the company's inventory. A 
company is required to show its inventory in its balance sheet at the lower of cost or 
market value. If the market value of the inventory follows below cost, the result is that 
it would be forced to show a loss which would appear in the income statement in the 
same way as a profit on sale appears when the inventory is sold in a higher value than 
its cost. 
Though, a different treatment is usually applied to fixed assets. A company 
does not generally trade in its fixed assets. So instead of being valued at the lower of 
cost and realisable value, they are included in the balance sheet at historic cost less 
any depreciation (although, property assets held as investment are subject to periodic 
revaluations). It is possible that if the market value drops below the balance sheet 
value derived by this method, there is no loss shown through the profit and loss since 
they are not held for sale. 
This presented an opportunity for companies, such as property developers and 
transport companies, who saw a sharp fall in the value of their stock below cost level 
during recession. They avoided the resulting loss passing through the profit and loss 
account if they transferred the assets from current assets to fixed assets prior to 
writing it down. 
In fact, IAS 16 ` Property Plant and Equipment' provides a choice between the 
cost model and the revaluation model in the measurement of fixed assets. Under the 
cost model (par. 30) the standard requires that after recognition as an asset, an item of 
property, plant and equipment shall be carried at its cost less any accumulated 
depreciation and any accumulated impairment losses. Under the Revaluation model, 
the standard requires (par. 31) that a fixed asset whose fair value can be measured 
reliably shall be carried at a revalued amount, being its fair value at the date of the 
revaluation less any subsequent accumulated depreciation and subsequent impairment 
losses. 
"'Without this we would have had to continue shrinking the business to the point %%, here we could not 
recover as a national volume house builder, ' said [lob Lawson, Rarratt chairman, to Financial Times on 
23 September 2009. 
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An example of a company moving from revaluation model to cost model in a 
recession, is the case of Go Ahead Group plc. On its transition to IFRS on July 
2004, Go-Ahead adopted the revaluation model for its land and buildings. In 2008, the 
company moved back to the cost model. 
In line with IAS 8 `Accounting policies, changes in accounting estimates and 
errors', Go-Ahead applied the change of accounting policy retrospectively and 
adjusted the opening balance of each affected comparative amount. This reduced the 
closing carrying values of the land and buildings by £22.6 million, with a £6.6 million 
reduction in related deferred tax liabilities, and thus net assets decrease by £16 million 
or 11%. 
A more aggressive approach, that attracted FRRP's attention, was applied by 
Grainger plc (Figure 5.3). As a result the company was ordered to restate its results 
for the year ended 30 September 2006. During the period in question, the company 
transferred trading properties with a carrying amount, at cost, of £43.5m to a Jersey 
Property Unit Trust (JPUT), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company at 30 
September 2006. On transfer, the properties were reclassified as investment properties 
and a gain on revaluation to market value of £23.5m was recognised in the income 
statement (Table 5.3). The Panel said it was concerned about the reclassification of 
these properties. IAS 40 `Investment property' limits the circumstances in which 
transfers to, or from, investment property can be made to those circumstances, 
specified in the standard that provide evidence of a change in use. More specifically, 
IAS 40 states that (par. 5): Investment Property is property held to earn rentals or for 
capital appreciation or both, rather than or: 
(a) use in the production or supply of goods or services or for administrative 
purposes; or 
(b) sale in the ordinary course of business. 
No such change in use attended the company's transfer to the JPUT. The directors 
agreed that the transfer did not comply with the requirements of IAS 40 as it did not 
provide evidence of the required change in use, as a result of discussion with the 
Panel. 
The correction resulted in the reduction of the 2006 reported profit after tax by 
£16.5m. Together with the effect of other changes described in the company's 
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announcement, the 2006 profit after tax reduces from £50.5m to £33.5ni with net 
assets reducing by £0.5m to £250.1 m. 
Figure 5.3: Extract from the accounts of Graingcr 
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5.11 Financial Instruments 
5.11.1 Currency mismatching 
The practice involves borrowing money in low interest rate currencies and depositing 
it in high interest rate currencies. The advantage of creating un-hedged currency 
positions lie in the boost which it can provide to profits, often at the expense of the 
balance sheet. 
Barton and Simko (2001) presents evidence consistent with managers using 
derivatives, currency mismatching and discretionary accruals as partial substitutes for 
earnings management. Using 1994-1996 data for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, their 
research estimates a set of simultaneous equations that captures managers' incentives 
to maintain a desired level of earnings through hedging and accrual management. 
These incentives include increasing managerial compensation and wealth, reducing 
corporate income taxes and debt financing costs. 
An example of this practice is the case of Ilammerson plc, in 2007. The 
company published sensitivity analyses of movements on interest and currency rates 
in line with IFRS 7 `Financial instruments: disclosures' (par. 40). In respect of 
floating rate borrowings, net of interest rate swaps, the company states that a 1% 
increase in interest rates would decrease profit before tax by £22.3 million, whilst a 
similar reduction would result in a £15.9 million increase. 
For currency exposure from financial instruments alone, a 1.5% strengthening 
in sterling against the euro would reduce by £23.6 million a £131 million net loss 
recognised directly in equity, while a similar weakening would increase the loss by 
£24.3 million. Whilst IFRS 7 requires analysis of the effects of reasonably possible 
changes, actual events can differ significantly from assumptions. During that period, 
UK interest rates reduced from 5.5% to 3% since publication of the company's 
financial statements. Similarly, since publication of the financial statements, sterling 
weakened by 8.5% against the euro and has fallen by some 15% since the start of 
2008. 
5.11.2 Financial assets evaluation 
Before the introduction of the IFRS, The Companies Act 1985 permitted the 
evaluation of investments at cost, rather than their fair value. This gave the 
opportunity to the Newspaper group Daily Mail and General Trust (DMGT), in 2004 
to change its policy and recognises listed investments at cost rather than at market 
value. 
DMGT amended its policy for recognising listed investments to measure at 
cost less any impairment whereas previously it adopted a market value basis. The 
company held 12.9 million shares in Reuters which in 2003 had a market value of 
£30.7 million but, following the change in policy, its book value reduced by £10.7 
million. 
The accounts disclosed that the policy change was effected as the company no 
longer held exchangeable bonds and that this change avoided the financial statements 
showing continual fluctuations in share price. The Companies Act 1985 permitted 
both policies although the policy change DMGT has made was reversed when IFRS 
were implemented, in 2005. 
A more recent example of aggressive accounting is the case of Sports Direct, 
in 2008 that failed to adjust the treasury shares reserve to reflect share cancellations. 
This accounting treatment drew Company Reporting's attention, which red flagged 
the company. During 2008, Sports Direct bought back 152 million of its own shares 
and, following along the lines of IAS 32 `Financial instruments: presentation', 
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recognised consideration paid of £201 million directly in a newly created treasury 
shares reserve (par. 33). The company disclosed that it subsequently cancelled 79.5 
million of these shares and, in accordance with s170 of the Companies Act 1985, 
transferred their nominal value of £7.95 million from share capital to capital 
redemption reserve. 
Sports Direct did not, however, adjust treasury shares rescrve to reflect this 
share cancellation. The result is that the amount in the reserve, which was disclosed 
separately on the face of balance sheet, fell short of JAS 32 (par. 34). Company 
Reporting warned that this does not show a true and fair view of either treasury shares 
held or of distributable reserves and the auditors' report made no mention of this 
issue. 
5.11.3 Financial Assets Classification 
IAS 39 allows companies to classify financial assets in one of the three categories: 
(a) held for trade 
(b) held to maturity 
(c) available for sale 
The main difference between the three categories is that assets classified under the 
held-to-maturity are measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method 
(par. 46), whereas in assets held in the other tow categories need to be marked to 
market value with the changes being recognised through the income statement. Only 
non-derivative financial assets can be classified under the 'held to maturity' category 
and they need to have fixed or determinable payments and fixed maturity that an 
entity has the positive intention and ability to hold to maturity. In order to prevent 
opportunistic use of this category, the standard requires that an entity shall not classify 
any financial assets as held to maturity if the entity has, during the current financial 
year or during the two preceding financial years, sold or reclassified more than an 
insignificant amount of held-to-maturity investments before maturity. Though, the 
recent financial crisis changed the regulators' stance in this neater. 
During 2008 banks and insurers contended with billion-pound write downs in 
asset values, huge hits to profits and depleted capital reserves have been exerting 
pressure on the EU and IASB to relax fair value accounting rules that force them to 
`mark to market'. The resulted amendments to IAS 39 permit certain reclassifications 
out of fair value. Similar reclassifications were already permitted tinder US GAAP 
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The need for urgent action led the IASB to suspend its normal due process 
(exposure draft and comment letters, for example) so that the amendments could take 
effect in the third quarter of 2008. The amendment applied only to financial assets 
classified as available for sale or held for trading, which were measured at fair value. 
It did not apply to financial liabilities, derivatives, equity investments or financial 
assets designated as at fair value through profit and loss on initial recognition. In 
summary reclassifications were permitted in non-derivative financial assets. At the 
date of reclassification, the fair value of any financial asset reclassified under these 
provisions became its new cost or amortised cost as applicable. IFRS 7 was also 
amended to incorporate extensive disclosure requirements relating to any assets 
reclassified as a result of this amendment to IAS 39. In particular, an entity is required 
to disclose details of carrying amounts and fair values for all financial assets that have 
been reclassified until they are derecognised, together with details of the fair value 
gain or loss that would have been' recognised in the income statement or equity if the 
financial asset had not been reclassified. 
The scope of this amendment in IAS 39 according to regulators was to restore 
investors confidence and indicates how an accounting treatment that otherwise would 
have been classified as earnings manipulation, is now legitimate and within the limits 
of true and fair view. 
5.12 Pension Fund Accounting 
IAS 19 separated the accounting treatment of pensions between defined contribution 
plans and defined benefit plans, with the aim of establishing a systematic basis for 
reporting the impact on companies. At the defined contribution plans the cost to be 
recognised in the period is the contribution payable in exchange for service rendered 
by employees during the period (par. 44). For defined benefit plans, the amount 
recognised in the balance sheet should be the present value of the defined benefit 
obligation as adjusted for unrecognised actuarial gains and losses and reduced by the 
fair value of plan assets at the balance sheet date (par. 54). The rate used to discount 
estimated cash flows should be determined by reference to market yields at the 
balance sheet date on high quality corporate bonds. The standard also gives 
companies with a pension fund surplus a choice to account either by reorganising the 
surplus as a balance sheet item and create a prepayment asset as a prior year item, or 
by spreading the benefit of surplus forward in its profit and loss account over the 
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remaining service life of the scheme's members. The discretion involved in 
accounting for pension costs, is used in many instances from companies seeking to 
influence profits. 
A recent example of pension fund accounting is the case of British Airways 
(BA). In 2007, BA recognised a credit of £396 million (65% of pre-tax profit) in the 
income statement with respect to changes in a pension scheme. The company 
disclosed that it has amended the terms and conditions of one of its pension schemes 
whereby it restricted future increases in pay for pensions, to movements in the Retail 
Price Index and increased the retirement age to 65. These changes arc treated as 
curtailments which; in accordance with IAS 19 'Employee benefits', resulted in 
immediate recognition of the reduction in the defined benefit obligation (par. 109). 
5.13 Goodwill 
Goodwill is the accounting term given to the difference between the price paid for an 
acquisition and the fair value of the assets acquired. It has been an increasing feature 
of UK take-overs as the main industries have shifted gradually from manufacturing 
and other asset based activities towards service industries, consumer brand 
management and which have few fixed assets. Apart from the premium to asset fair 
values often paid for control in take-overs, the growth of business whose performance 
is not based upon assets has also increased the amount of goodwill recognised in take- 
overs. Another factor which has increased the amount of goodwill in takc-ovcrs is the 
use of pre-acquisition write-downs, discussed in the 'Acquisition Accounting' section 
of this chapter. 
After the introduction of IFRS, directors were given increased discretion in 
accounting for goodwill as the annual amortisation under FRS 10 was replaced by the 
annual impairment reviews described in IAS 38. In UK GAAP, FRS 10 'Goodwill and 
intangibles' allowed an entity to amortise goodwill over its expected useful life if that 
expected useful life was less than twenty years. There was a rebuttable presumption 
whereby an entity may consider the life of the goodwill to be more than twenty 
years. However, where an entity stated that goodwill was deemed longer than twenty 
years, the directors had to undertake an `impairment' review at the end of the first full 
financial year following the initial recognition of the goodwill or intangible asset and 
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in other periods, where events or changes in circumstances indicated that its carrying 
value may not be recoverable in full. 
Under the provisions of IAS -38 'Intangible assets' amortisation is prohibited 
and the directors must undertake an impairment review on an annual basis. More 
specifically, the standard requires that (par. 80) for goodwill acquired in a business 
combination shall, from the acquisition date, be allocated to each of the acquirer's 
cash-generating units that are expected to benefit from the synergies of the 
combination. The standard adds (par. 90) that a cash generating unit to which 
goodwill has been allocated shall be tested for impairment annually and whenever 
there is in an indication that the unit may be impaired by comparing the carrying 
amount to the unit, including the goodwill, with the recoverable amount18 of the unit. 
If the carrying amount of the unit exceeds the recoverable amount of the unit, the 
entity shall recognise an impairment loss. 
During deteriorating economic conditions, managers can influence reported 
results by making impairment tests with optimistic assumption, thus avoiding 
impairment losses. In its 2008 annual report, FRRP commented that with the 
deterioration in economic conditions it is likely that many companies will need to 
reduce their forecasts and projections of future business growth and operating 
margins, which form the basis of goodwill impairment reviews. The FRRP reviewed 
goodwill impairment disclosures made during 2007 by 32 UK listed companies. The 
review concluded that the majority of companies disclosed more generic than 
company-specific information which limited the understanding and insight that could 
have been conveyed to investors. The panel advised that the most useful and 
informative disclosures were those that provided information specific to the business. 
An example of unclear disclosure in goodwill impairment review is the case of 
Regent Inns plc, in 2007. The company made two acquisitions during that year with 
goodwill of £11.3 million and £0.7 million arising. However, whilst the company 
stated that goodwill on the smaller acquisition was provisional, it added that it was not 
tested for impairment of the £11.3 million goodwill as it undertook an exercise to fair 
value the assets and liabilities of the business combination at acquisition and 
considered impairment testing to be unnecessary. This did not follow IAS 36 
18 The recoverable amount is the higher of an asset's fair value less costs to sell (sometimes called net 
selling price) and its value in use. Fair value is the amount obtainable from the sale of an asset in a 
bargained transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties. Value in use is the continuing use of an 
asset and from its disposal at the end of its useful life 
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`Impairment of assets' which requires that, if goodwill allocated to a cash-generating 
unit relates to a business combination during the current annual period, that unit need 
to be tested for impairment before the end of the period (par. 96). 
Regent disclosed that it carried out an annual impairment review of its pre- 
existing goodwill using projected future pre-tax cash flows with an annual growth rate 
of 2.25% and a discount rate of 7.5%. The company concluded that no impairment 
was required. Following the acquisitions during the year, the company recognised 
intangible assets in addition to goodwill. It published a table showing accumulated 
amortisation and includes what was previously accumulated amortisation of goodwill 
in the schedule. This introduced lack of clarity and that could lead a non sophisticated 
reader to conclude that the company continues to amortise goodwill. For this reason 
the company was criticised by the Company Reporting. 
Another case of aggressive goodwill recognition is ITE plc, which organises 
trade exhibitions and conferences. During 2008 1TE made four business acquisitions, 
of which it considered two to be material. Following IFRS 3 'I3usiness combinations', 
it disclosed the book and fair values acquired in the two material combinations (par. 
67(1)). Their combined consideration was £16.6 million, with £6.3 million goodwill 
and £13.1 million other intangibles recognised. The goodwill and intangibles acquired 
in 2008 year amounted to 44.2% of equity, whilst total goodwill and intangibles after 
the acquisition exceeded equity and represent 40.3% of total assets. This was 
noteworthy, as one of the company's business objectives, on which management 
remuneration is partly based, is to target a 'headline' earnings figure that excluded 
goodwill impairment, intangible amortisation and gains or losses on disposal of group 
undertakings. 
The company disclosed that the acquired intangibles are principally customer 
relationships and trademarks and that the goodwill represented expected synergies and 
complementarity with its emerging market strategy. The reference to strategy gave 
new, company-specific information. 
In relation to goodwill and intangible asset impairment testing, ITC disclosed 
that it estimated cash flows over a ten year period, as this represented its average 
expectation of the period over which value will be derived from cash-generating units. 
The company disclosed contributions to revenue and profit had the acquisitions taken 
place at the start of the year indicating that, since acquisition, both businesses made 
losses. 
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5.14 Deferred Tax 
Before the introduction of the IFRS, deferred tax was governed by FRS 19 which 
superseded SSAP 15 `Accounting for deferred tax', in 2002. FRS 19 required that 
deferred tax be computed on a full provision basis where provision is required, rather 
than the partial provision basis formerly required by the SSAP. The standard was also 
explicit in its prohibitions as to the types of timing difference upon which deferred tax 
may not be provided. This prescription as to computation basis appeared to be likely 
to reduce the opportunity for earnings management via the deferred tax charge. 
Though, under the provisions of FRS 19 `Deferred taxation' a company could choose 
to `discount' its deferred tax to present day values. Under the provisions of IAS 
12 `Income taxes' a company cannot discount its deferred tax to present day 
values. Deferred tax, however, remains a relatively complex area of accounting: the 
new standard allows, indeed requires companies to form expectations concerning their 
future, apply judgment and make choices in accounting for deferred tax. An example 
of the judgment involved is that while losses incurred give rise to potential deferred 
tax assets, uncertainty about future profitability makes it very difficult to reliably 
estimate the amount, if any, of these assets that can be recognised. 
The transition from SSAP 15 to FRS 19 had negative impact in companies that 
managed earnings through the partial provision basis formerly required by the SSAP. 
An example is the case of JD Wetherspoon (JDW) plc in 2001. In its accounting 
policies note, JDW disclosed that it had changed its accounting policy in relation to 
deferred tax following the adoption of FRS 19. Following along the lines of FRS 19, 
JbW disclosed that it recognised deferred tax on a full provisions basis on all timing 
differences which had originated, but not reversed, at the balance sheet date. JDW 
disclosed further that the impact of adopting FRS 19 on 2001 profits was to reduce 
them by £12.1 million. JDW disclosed also that the effect on the previous periods' 
shareholders' funds, which was disclosed at the foot of the statement of total 
recognised gains and losses, which were reduced by £35.7 million. 
Another example of influencing reported earning through deferred tax 
accounting is the case of CLC Holidngs plc, in 2005, which Company Reporting red 
flagged for earnings manipulation. The main issue was that goodwill on property 
company acquisitions was not impaired in contrast to industry peers, as accounting 
policies move from UK GAAP to IFRS. CLS moved from preparing its consolidated 
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financial statements under UK GAAP to IFRS and disclosed that profit before tax 
increased by £37 million, which was mostly attributed to net gains from fair value 
adjustments on investment property. Net equity at 31 December 2004 decreased by 
£103 million as a result of recognition of additional deferred tax liabilities of £121 
million on revaluation gains offset by recognition of a deferred tax asset of £14 
million. During 2005, CLS acquired a German property company for consideration of 
£1.5 million, with goodwill of £0.2 million arising. The company stated the goodwill 
was attributable to the deferred tax which was expected to reverse in the future and 
that, having carried out impairment review; it concluded there was no requirement to 
impair goodwill. This contrasts with two industry peers that both acquired property 
companies during that year and recognised goodwill attributable to deferred tax 
liabilities, but chose to impair the goodwill immediately. 
5.15 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated cases of earnings management and earnings manipulation 
related to UK GAAP and IFRS, covering the following areas. First, accounting for 
mergers and acquisitions requires from the parent to bring the balance-sheet of the 
acquired company into fair value. This provides an opportunity for excess 
provisioning and write-downs, creating reserves that can be used in future periods. 
Additionally, if the acquisition involves differed consideration then a significant 
amount of subjectivity is required to estimate the future costs. 
The second area covered in this chapter is the revenue recognition. There were 
discussed cases were revenue was inflated after including government grants, disposal 
proceeds or even proceeds of sale and lease back agreements. The third area 
highlighted a case were operating cash-flows were inflated alter including items 
related to investments. 
The fourth area covered expense capitalisation, investigating interest 
capitalisation, capitalisation of R&D and intangible assets. It was found that in two 
cases of capitalisation of borrowing costs, companies did not disclose the interest rate 
applied. In the area of capitalisation of R&D it was show that IFRS introduced a 
systematic basis for reporting the impact on companies. Though, accounting for 
intangible assets still involves subjectivity in estimating the parameters used in 
impairment testing. 
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The fifth area examined property plant and equipment in terms of recognition 
and measurement. More specifically, it was examined how changes in depreciation 
policy can be used to report a more favourable position. Moreover, it was examined 
how transfers from inventories to non-current assets and vice versa can be used to 
influence reported results. 
The sixth area investigated how accounting for financial instruments was 
applied to influence earnings and how regulators relaxed the rules underpinning the 
assets-held-to-maturity category as a means of restoring investor confidence during 
times of financial turbulence. The following area covered the subjectivity involved in 
calculating pension fund liabilities and how actuarial estimations can influence 
earnings. The next area investigated cases of aggressive goodwill recognition and the 
last area explored how transitions to FRS and IFRS revealed cases of aggressive 
deferred tax recognition. 
Overall, these findings can be seen as very preliminary documented and case- 
based evidence of the existence of companies that manage or even manipulate 
earnings. In the following chapters the focus shifts to analysing empirically the 
existence of specific patterns between companies that manage and manipulate 
earnings and how financial variables can be utilised to detect earnings manipulation. 
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Chapter 6 
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses 
6.1 Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence proposes that there arc strong incentives to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. It is common for directors to emphasize the significance of 
increases in earnings in the opening lines of the directors' section of the annual report. 
For example, in JD Weatherspoon's 2007 annual report, Chairman Tim Martin opens 
the operating review section stating "I am pleased to report another year of good 
progress for the company. Operating profit increases by 9% (+12%) ". Similarly, for 
many years Tesco plc emphasized a sequence of earnings increases. In Tcsco's 2008 
annual report the Chief Executive Terry Leahy emphasises: "The results demonstrate 
that Tesco has again made strong progress. Sales, profits and returns have grown 
well... " Another example is the British American Tobacco 2007 annual report, where 
the Chairman Jan du Plessis states: "Over the past five years, our earnings have grown 
by 10 per cent compound, clearly demonstrating our ability to meet our goal of 
delivering high single-figure growth in earnings, on average, over the medium to long 
term. " Thus, much anecdotal evidence suggests directors try to preserve a pattern of 
increasing earnings. 
Several recent studies offer more systematic evidence of incentives to 
maintain earnings increases. DeAngelo et al. (1996) find that firms breaking a pattern 
of consistent earnings growth experience an average of 14% abnormal stock return in 
the year the pattern is broken. Thus, appears to be strong incentives for earnings 
management to avoid the reporting of earnings decreases, and the incentives appear to 
be increasing in the length of the preceding sequence of earnings increases. There is 
also much evidence of incentives to maintain positive earnings. Many annual reports, 
news releases and profit guidance announcements give emphasis on `consistent 
profitability', suggesting that there are incentives to avoid losses. 
Additionally, earlier research (Shen, 2005; Brown, 2005; Gore ct al., 2007) 
demonstrates that companies exercise discretion to increase earnings when the level of 
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earnings is slightly below a threshold. This study contributes to the academic 
literature investigating a more recent sample (years: 1997-2007). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide extensive systematic evidence about 
whether, how, and why, firms avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses. Section 
2 discusses the recent literature and section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 
presents the descriptive characteristics of the examined sample. Section 5 explores 
pooled cross-sectional distributions which show that the frequencies of small earnings 
decreases and small losses are abnormally low relative to adjacent regions of 
distributions, while frequencies of small earnings increases and small positive 
earnings are unexpectedly high. Section 6 suggests different approaches on how 
discontinuities in earnings distribution could be explained and Section 7 concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical Background 
6.2.1 Existing Evidence and Motivation 
Academic interest in the area of earnings management began before the corporate 
scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s and has since grown, focusing on 
investigations into why and how earnings management is conducted. One particular 
line of research centres on the finding that the empirical distribution of earnings 
relative to basic targets displays discontinuities at zero. In particular, evidence that 
small negative earnings levels, changes and surprises occur with unexpectedly low 
frequency and small positive earnings levels, changes and non-negative surprises 
occur with unexpectedly high frequency (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003,2006). One potential explanation 
of this behaviour is earnings management to meet or beat thresholds, e. g. to avoid 
losses. Consistent with this explanation, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that both 
operating cash flow and working capital accruals (WCA) rise sharply when reported 
earnings is just above zero. 
Evidence on threshold beating earnings has been used in extensively in 
subsequent earnings management research (for example, Payne and Robb, 2000; 
Beaver et al., 2003,2004; Dichev and Skinner, 2003; Beatty et al., 2002; Leuz at at., 
2003; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Philllips et al., 2003; Frank and Rego, 2004; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). However, recent research has raised doubts about whether 
earnings management does indeed explain the observed discontinuities in the 
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distribution of earnings (e. g. Dechow ct al., 2003; Dcgcorgc ct al., 1999; Durtschi and 
Easton, 2005). The contribution to current literature is twofold. First, an extensive 
non-US dataset is analysed, extending the previous UK research findings of Gore et 
al. (2007) thereby confirming that the discontinuities previously reported in the 
literature are not specific to the US setting. Second, new tests arc introduced, lending 
support on the hypothesis that the discontinuities in earnings distributions are 
associated with accrual-based earnings management in the examined sample. 
Using a variety of tests, Dechow ct al. (2003) arc unable to find systematic 
evidence of accruals management connected to discontinuities in earnings 
distributions for their US sample. When they compare small profit firm-years with all 
others, they find that the former have higher average discretionary accruals (DACC), 
cash flows and total accruals than the latter. however, when they compare small profit 
firm-years with small loss finn-years, they find insignificant differences between the 
two groups. Dechow et at. (2003) also compare zero earnings surprise Linn-years with 
all others and with small negative surprise firm-years. They find that zero surprise 
firm-years have higher DACC and WCA than all other firm-years and higher WCA 
than small negative surprise firm-years. However Dechow et al. (2003) find that the 
difference between average DACC for zero and small negative surprise Finn-years is 
statistically insignificant. They conclude that earnings management to achieve targets 
via real (operating) decisions is a more likely explanation for the discontinuities. 
Degeorge et at. (1999) suggest that the distributional irregularities could be a 
manifestation of scaling earnings. Durtschi and Easton (2005) also suggest that 
scaling is important in understanding the discontinuities in the distribution of deflated 
earnings per share. Durtschi and Easton argue that use of beginning of year stock 
price to deflate earnings per share can induce discontinuities for two reasons. First 
share price depends on earnings 
- 
the share prices for firms with small losses are 
systematically lower than stock prices for small profits. Second, loss firms are more 
likely to have missing values for beginning of year stock prices in their data, resulting 
in potential selection bias. Durtschi and Easton argue that both these effects can lead 
to `spurious' discontinuities in the distribution of scaled earnings that arc unconnected 
to earnings management. Beaver et al. (2006) suggest that the asymmetric treatment 
of profits and losses and the recognition of special items together might account for 
up to two thirds of the discontinuity. However, they do not rule out the possibility of 
other factors being important, including abnormal accruals. 
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In contrast, Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) show that fourth-quarter earnings are 
considerably more volatile. While annual earnings measured over the fiscal year 
display the expected discontinuities, these discontinuities are not evident in different 
annual periods ending in quarters one, two or three of the fiscal year. Overall, Jacob 
and Jorgensen (2005) conclude that their results are consistent with earnings 
management to meet specific thresholds. In summary, there is no clear consensus in 
the recent literature as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions reflect 
earnings management or are research design biases. 
In this chapter, a detailed examination of earnings management around 
earnings thresholds is undertaken, using a large sample of UK firms. This analysis 
focuses on earnings management involving working capital accruals. In contrast to 
Dechow et at. (2003), there are presented evidence consistent with earnings 
management to achieve targets. Earnings management through working capital 
accruals (WCA) suggests itself as a potentially popular technique for achieving 
earnings targets. Healy (1985) points out that accrual management is less costly and 
more feasible on a multi period basis than accounting method changes as a means of 
transferring earnings between periods. Further, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) view 
WCA as more susceptible to manipulation than non-working capital accruals. This 
chapter investigates the links between the discretionary component (termed 
discretionary accruals, thereafter DACC) of WCA, the frequency of earnings target 
achievement and the observed discontinuity in the distribution of earnings relative to 
basic targets. The targets considered are the achievement of positive earnings levels 
and changes and the avoidance of negative earnings. The primary objective is to 
determine whether DACC, a frequently used proxy for earnings management, 
contribute significantly to the unexpectedly high frequencies of positive, particularly 
small positive, earnings levels and changes. 
This chapter aims at gaining an insight into the overall impact of DACC on the 
distribution of earnings relative to targets, and hence to provide evidence on whether 
manipulation of the accruals process is an important earnings management tool. The 
approach in this chapter is novel because it provides specific evidence on the manner 
in which firms use DACC with reference to basic earnings targets. Prior studies have 
typically used DACC as a proxy for earnings management without specifying the 
manner in which firms use DACC to manage earnings. For example, Becker et al. 
(1998) and Francis et al. (1999), although both hypothesising that Big 4 (then big 6) 
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auditors constrain earnings management more effectively than non-Big 4 auditors, 
they interpret this prediction differently. Becker et at. (1998) imply that signed DACC 
are negatively associated with the presence of Big 4 auditors while Francis et at. 
(1999) imply that it is absolute DACC that are negatively associated with the presence 
of Big 4 auditors. This reflects different underlying assumptions about the manner in 
which firms use DACC to manage earnings. 
A further contribution of this analysis is to provide evidence on whether the 
phenomenon of discontinuities in the distribution of earnings extends beyond the US 
corporate environment and US GAAP regime. In recent years, there has been 
heightened interest in the impact of different economic environments and GAAP 
regimes on the attributes of accounting earnings (Pope and Walker 1999; All and 
Hwan'g 2000; Ball et al., 2000) and on the incidence of earnings and forecast 
management (Brown and Higgins 2001). In addition, Leuz et al. (2003) provide 
evidence of a correlation between loss avoidance and accruals-based measures of 
earnings management. This research extends and deepens this growing international 
accounting literature by reporting detailed evidence of the association between 
earnings discontinuities and accruals management based on a large sample of UK 
companies. 
The UK context is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the incentives 
for earnings management differ from those in the US (the basis of most research to 
date). Ball et al. (2000) point out that the UK has the least regulated and least litigious 
accounting environment among the common-law countries they investigate, and that 
corporate debt is primarily private in the UK. According to Ball et al. (2000), these 
factors imply a reduced incentive for timely incorporation of bad news into 
accounting earnings reported by UK firms. Such lower demand for timely reporting 
of bad news allows managers greater flexibility compared to the US to manage 
earnings through timing of recognition, Gore et al. (2007). In contrast, Brown and 
Higgins (2001) find evidence that UK managers have smaller holdings of stock 
options than their U. S. counterparts, and thus suggest that UK managers have less 
incentive to manage earnings to avoid reporting bad news that US managers. However 
in their 2005 paper, Brown and Higgins suggest that the impact of differences in the 
expectations management behaviour between countries may partially explain the 
difference in incentives for earnings management. 
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A UK specific feature is the regime change that occurred regarding the 
reporting of extraordinary items. Prior to FRS 319 (Accounting Standards Board, 
1992) the majority of extraordinary debits (reducing earnings) concerned 
restructurings of companies, whereas many extraordinary credits (increasing earnings) 
were treated as merely "exceptional" and taken as "above the line" income. FRS 3 
was issued thus to eliminate the use of extraordinary items as a means of earnings 
management. 
Another feature is the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the European Union 
(EU). This consists one of the largest regulatory experiments in financial reporting 
ever undertaken. Almost all EU listed firms are legally required to adopt IFRS in their 
consolidated statements no later than 200520. Thus it can be examined whether IFRS 
adoption had an adverse impact on earnings management to achieve thresholds. 
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, 
it provides an empirical explanation of the discontinuity observed at zero in the 
distribution of earnings relative to targets. Specifically, there is documented that 
earnings management by non-financial companies thought discretionary accruals and 
working capital elements, is a significant contributor to this discontinuity. Secondly, 
there is quantified the extent to which companies achieve earnings targets with the aid 
of earnings management. The chapter thus also contributes further to the 
methodological debate by providing support for the use of discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management. 
6.2.2 Threshold Heuristics 
Executives manage earnings to influence the perception of stakeholders - such as 
investors, banks, suppliers, perspective investors - and to reap private benefits21. 
19 FRS 3 was issued on 29 October 1992, voluntary compliance being immediately optional and 
mandatory compliance required in relation to accounting periods ending on or after 22 June 1993. FRS 
3 redefined ordinary and extraordinary activities with the effect of abolishing extraordinary items in the 
UK. 
20 EC 16/6/2002 requires all listed firms in a regulated market to comply with IFRS in their 
consolidated statements no later than 2005. Member counties can allow adoption to be postponed until 
2007 for firms that comply with US-GAAP. The UK has decided not to use this option and all listed 
firms in a regulated market are, therefore, required to comply with IFRS from 2005. 
21 Even if Earnings Management is costly, it can be argued that it may be in the interest of shareholders 
ex-ante if it increases the information available to important parties (relevance). In some cases, 
managed earnings may contain more, not less, information about the firm's true prospects. For 
example, if a firm's earnings just meet some threshold, it is likely that the figure has been inflated. But 
this implies that executives are confident that the cost of earnings management (reduced earnings next 
year by the amount of the current overstatement) will not be so large as to reduce dramatically the 
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Whereas outsiders utilise thresholds as a standard for assessing and rewarding 
executives. When executives respond to theses thresholds, distributions of reported 
earnings get distorted: far too few earnings fall just below a threshold and too many 
just above it. Executives focus on thresholds for earnings because the parties 
concerned with the company's performance do. Executives may also manage earnings 
for their own reasons if, for example, they derive personal satisfaction from achieving 
a target. 
Beyond boards, investors and analysts, earnings reports arc important to those 
people concerned with the company's viability and profitability because they make 
company-specific decisions, such as customers and suppliers, bankers and workers. 
Many of these outsiders exhibit what is called in the literature a "threshold mentality", 
for both rational and perceptual reasons. In a range of circumstances, individuals 
perceive continuous data in discrete form; indeed "the tendency to divide the world 
into categories is a pervasive aspect of human thought" (Glass and liolyoak, 1986). 
For example, we perceive the continuous colour spectrum discretely, recognising 
seven primary colours. Similarly, if a diagram shades from dark to light and then 
remains light, humans perceive a bright line where the shading to light stops 
(Cornsweet, 1974). Below there are discussed three established thresholds for 
corporate earnings. 
The understanding of thresholds arises from at least three psychological 
effects. First, according to behavioural scientists there is something fundamental 
about positive and negative numbers in human thought processes. Hence, this dividing 
line carries over for the threshold on absolute earnings. When looking at the 
benchmarks of quarterly earnings a year back and the analysts' consensus forecasts, 
there is a salient dividing line between meeting and failing to meet the target. Meeting 
the target is critical, as opposed to beating or falling to achieve it by a certain 
percentage. Meeting the analysts' consensus target makes itself a focal point. which 
reinforces its psychological properties. 
Second, as prospect theory tells us, individuals choosing among risky 
alternatives behave as if they evaluate outcomes as changes from a reference point 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The reference point is usually some aspect of the 
decision makers' current state (e. g. wealth) and it shifts over time, sometimes with 
prospect that the firm will meet the threshold next year, or draw the attention of the regulators. Thus, 
small managed earnings may contain more information than small unmanaged earnings. 
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how the decision is framed. The amount of shifting can dramatically affect director's 
decisions for two reasons: there is a discontinuity in the utility function at the 
reference point (zero change); and the overall curve is S- shaped (i. e., it is convex for 
losses and concave for gains, encouraging improvement in performance and 
discouraging deterioration). If the preferences of executives and investors are 
consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, then executives will have a 
threshold-related reward scheme and are likely to manage reported earnings in 
response. The thresholds they will wish to reach are the reference points in the value 
functions of the participants. The implication of the prospect theory is that executives 
would have positive motives to achieve earnings-related remuneration thresholds to 
maximise their payout. 
Third, thresholds are an important feature in investment decisions because 
people depend on rules of thumb to reduce transactions costs (for example cost and 
time for storing, retrieving and processing information). The use of thresholds of 
acceptable performance is promoted by the discreteness of actions, like investment 
analysts recommending sell, hold or buy, rating agencies giving letter grades, bankers 
making or refusing loans or boards approving CEO bonuses. Earnings management to 
meet thresholds can also simplify executives' relations with shareholders and boards 
of directors. A report to shareholders that earnings have been up 6 years in a row is 
easier communicated from a statement that they have been up 5 out of 6 year, and 
only fell by 1% in the last year. A report showing a break in a string of earnings 
increases is less easily understood, so that inflating earnings to show a small increase 
becomes worthwhile. When a firm falls short of analysts' earnings projections and 
shareholders' expectations, the board may think that the executives did a poor job; 
bonuses and stock option awards may suffer. Such doubts are much less likely to arise 
if the analysts' earnings are just beaten. 
Recent literature in earnings management suggests that executives care about 
three thresholds when they report earnings: 
1) to report positive earnings (report earnings that are above zero) 
2) to sustain recent performance, making at least last year's earnings; and 
3) to meet analysts' expectations, particularly the analysts' consensus earnings 
forecast. 
Due to data access limitations, this study does not explore the third threshold: 
"analyst's consensus". 
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6.3 Research Design 
Prior research has typically approached the question of whether firms use 
discretionary accruals (DACC) to achieve earnings thresholds by examining average 
DACC conditional on either earnings or non-discretionary earnings relative to target. 
For example, DeFond and Park (1999) report that firms use DACC to achieve 
earnings thresholds. Cheng (2000) also investigates the relationship between DACC 
and earnings surprises and observes that firms with non-discretionary earnings below 
forecasts report positive DACC on average, while companies with non-discretionary 
earnings above forecasts report negative DACC on average. If earnings management 
underpins observed discontinuities in earnings distributions, then earnings 
management should be used by more firms to move from below to above thresholds 
than in the opposite direction. 
This chapter first examines whether earnings levels and changes are 
distributed with a discontinuity at zero, similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
Degeorge et al. (1999). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases is likely to 
be reflected in cross-sectional distributions of earnings changes in the form of 
unusually low frequencies of small earnings decreases and unusually high frequencies 
of small earnings increases (Degeorge et al, 1999). Similarly, management to avoid 
losses will be reflected in the form of unusually low frequencies of small losses and 
unusually high frequencies of small positive earnings. Degeorge ct al. (1999) 
examined a sample of US companies for the years 1974-1996 to explore the 
discontinuities between earnings decreases and zero earnings. In this chapter, a similar 
approach is applied, to explore if UK companies manage earnings to avoid losses or 
decreases. 
Two types of evidence are presented, to explore whether earnings management 
to avoid earnings decreases and losses exists. First, frequency histograms are 
presented, illustrating the cross-sectional distributions of scaled earnings and levels of 
earnings. Second, formal statistical tests of the following four research hypotheses are 
presented: 
113: Earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases 
114: Earnings are managed to avoid losses. 
To test the statistical significance of the Iii and 112, a statistical test is 
constructed, similar to the one used by Gore et al. (2007), assuming under the null 
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hypothesis of earnings management, the cross-sectional distributions of earnings 
changes and earnings levels are relatively smooth22. The definition of smoothness 
used, is that the expected number of observations in any given interval of the 
distribution is the average of the number of observations in the two directly adjacent 
intervals23. The test statistic used to test the null hypothesis that the distribution is 
smooth is the difference between the actual number of observations in an interval and 
the expected number of observations in the interval, divided by the estimated standard 
deviation of the difference24. Under the null hypotheses, the standardized differences 
between the actual and the expected number of observations in an interval, will be 
distributed approximately Normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. If the null 
hypothesis of smoothness at zero is rejected, the standardized differences of the 
interval immediately left of zero and immediately right of zero will be simultaneously 
affected. 
To the extent that DACC largely causes the discontinuity in the earnings 
distribution, the removal of DACC from earnings is expected to reduce the 
discontinuity. Specifically, it is predicted that the distributions of non-discretionary 
earnings do not show pronounced discontinuities around earnings targets. The 
following hypothesis is tested: 
H5: The frequencies of small negative non-discretionary earnings levels (changes) 
and small positive non-discretionary earnings levels (changes) are equal to the 
frequencies expected under a smooth distribution. Further, the application of 
DACC to achieve earnings thresholds will be reflected in DACC having the effect 
of increasing the proportion of observations achieving earnings targets. This 
results to the following research hypothesis: 
22 The distribution of earnings changes and earnings levels under the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management is unknown. For this reason, no strong assumption about earnings distribution has been 
made, to avoid spurious significance, i. e. significant results attributable to violations of distributional 
assumptions rather than to a false null hypothesis. 
23 Alternative models of expectations have been considered: 1) the expected number of observations in 
an interval is the average of the observations in four adjacent intervals, and 2) the expected number is 
the average of the next to adjacent intervals, i. e. the average of the two closest intervals other than the 
two immediately adjacent intervals. These alternative methods result in qualitatively similar results to 
those reported. 
24 As the number of observations in an interval is a random variable which is approximately 
independent of the number in adjacent intervals, the variance of the difference between the observed 
and expected number of observations is approximately the sum of the variances of the components of 
the difference. Denoting the total number of observations as n and the probability that an observation 
will fall into interval i by p the variance of the difference 
between the observed and expected number 
of observations for interval i is approximately Np, (1-pJ+(1/4)N(p, 
_i+pi+i)(1-p,., -p, +, ) 
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116: The proportion of observations with positive earnings levels (changes) is 
larger than the proportion of observations with positive non-discretionary earnings 
levels (changes). 
6.4 Sample and Data 
The dataset includes all available observations on the "live" and "dead" Datastream 
database25, for the years 1990-2006 which meet minimal data requirements 
26. Banks 
and financial institutions were deleted27. In the results reported below, Published After 
Tax Profits (E) have been examined (DataStream Item #624). Though, the main 
findings were also computed for earnings before extraordinary and exceptionally 
items and the results are generally consistent for these two alternative measures of 
profitability. 
The earnings observations are drawn from a wide range for company sizes and 
are therefore scaled. A variety of approaches to scaling have been used in the 
accounting and finance literature including scaling by market value, book value, sales 
or total assets. In the reported results, the earnings variable is scaled by the beginning 
of the year market value of common equity for year t. The change in earnings variable 
(change in earnings between years t-1 and t) is scaled by beginning of the year market 
value of equity form year t-1. However, results have been also calculated using as 
scaling variable total assets at the beginning of the year or the previous year's net 
sales and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
Empirical distributions of earnings changes and earnings document a 
discontinuity at zero which is robust in applying different deflators. In figures 6.1-4, 
earnings are scaled by market value. In figure 6.13 earnings are scaled by lagged sales 
and in figure 6.14 earnings are scaled by lagged assets. 
25 Datastream is produced by Thomson Financial for commercial use and includes a vast number of 
economic, company and financial data for publicly quoted companies for over 175 countries and 60 
markets worldwide with up to 50 years historical depth. The aggregate market capitalisation of 
companies on Datastream stands at about 95% of the total value of the world's markets. The data scrics 
are supplied by various sources both nationally and internationally. Sources such as IMF, OECD. 
Eurostat and national stock exchanges supply data series. 26The minimal data requirement is information about published after tax profits and market value at the 
beginning of the related year. 27 For financial institutions, incentives to avoid earnings decreases or losses may be linked to regulatory 
oversight. To focus on cases without these complications, firms with SIC codes between 6511 and 
6720 were deleted from the sample (1,293 observations). 
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Easton et at. (2003) and Christie (1987), document that there are several 
potential advantages of deflating by lagged assets. First, scale differences largely 
disappear. Second, risk differences tend to be smaller 
. 
through time for a given 
company than across companies. Third, biases in coefficients on leverage and size 
would be inconsequential without deflating. 
Barth and Clinch (2009), use data simulated to have scale effects and find 
that market value of equity mitigates more effectively the scale effects that do the 
other potential deflators such as book value, lagged market value, lagged assets and 
lagged sales. 
DACC is estimated by applying a cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) 
model to working capital accruals. The Jones model (Jones, 1991) and its modified 
version proposed by Dechow et at. (1995) are the most frequently employed in current 
research. In the current study, a time-series version of the standard Jones model is 
used, where discretionary accruals are the residuals from regression (1) estimated for 
each year and industry combination28. 
WCA ijt/TAijt-l = ßt(l/ TAit-t) + ß2(iREV; i/TA1o-i) + ß3(PPEjt/TA1t-t) + Fit (1) 
Where i, j and t are firm, industry and time sub-scripts respectively. This regression 
facilitates partitioning of WCA into non-discretionary accruals (NDACC) and DACC. 
NDACC are measured as the predicted component of WCA29 and DACC as the 
residual resulting from this regression. Thus: 
DAC C; jt=A, jt/TA; jt- i -NDACC; j1= 
=WCAijt/TAijt-i-(ß'oijt+R'iuj4OREVi/1'Ait-1+ß'2ijt PPEic/TA1c-1) (2) 
Where (3'o and ß', are the company OLS parameters estimated above. Accruals in the 
original Jones (1991) model are modelled as a function of the change in total sales 
(OREV) and Property Plant and Equipment (PPE). The former is argued to drive short 
term accruals or working capital accruals and the latter to drive long term accruals, 
most notably depreciation. 
28 The results reported are robust to different ways of computing discretionary accruals. The analysis is 
repeated using three other models; the modified Jones model proposed 
by Dechow et al. (1995), which 
consists of estimating coefficients in the same way as the Jones model, and then replacing change in 
revenue with change in revenue less change in receivables, just to compute discretionary accruals and 
both the Jones model and modified Jones model including dummy variables to represent the different 
companies in the sample and estimating just one regression per company instead of one regression per 
year and industry sector. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Gaver et al. (1995), Teo et al. (1998), Beneish 
(1997) and Peasnell et at. (2000) applied Jones model in earnings management studies. 
29 Working Capital Accruals (WCA), calculated as the non cash difference between Profit after tax and 
Cash flow from operating activities. 
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In the use of the Jones (1991) model rather than available alternatives, 
Peasnell et al. (2000) evaluate the specification and power of alternative methods of 
estimating DACC using UK data. The results they report suggest that, on the whole, 
alternative models currently available are non superior to the Jones (1991) model in 
terms of ability to detect plausible levels of earnings management. This study's 
measure of WCA and the DACC estimation technique closely resembles those used 
by Peasnell et al. (2000). 
Having estimated DACC as described above, the next step is to measure non- 
discretionary earnings (NDE) and non discretionary earnings change (NDOE). The 
earnings levels tests and empirical distributions are conducted on an earnings level 
sample defined as all observations from the above-described main sample for which 
Earnings (E), NDE and DACC are available, and having deleted the extreme 
percentiles30 of E, NDE and DACC. The earnings change sample is defined in a 
similar manner, with E (NDE) being replaced by AE (NDAE). 
These criteria result in earnings level and change samples of 9,809 and 8,926 
observations respectively. Basic descriptive statistics on these samples are presented 
in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Table 6.1 (Panel A) shows descriptive statistics for the 
market value scaled earnings change variable31. The total number of observations is 
8,926 and the number of available observations per year increase from 340 for 1990, 
to 873 by 2006. The mean and the median earnings changes are primarily, but not 
exclusively, positive during the sample period. Table 6.1 (Panel B) shows descriptive 
statistics for level of earnings scaled by beginning-of-year market value. The total 
number of observations is 9,809 and the number of available observations per year 
increases steadily from 340 for 1990 to 875 for 2006. 
Descriptive statistics on earnings level and earnings change for the whole examined 
period, are presented in Table 6.2 Mean (median) E and AE arc 0.017 (0.057), and 
0.021 (0.008) for earnings level and change samples respectively. As expected, mean 
32 (median) DACC is zero (zero) for both the earnings level and changes samples. 
30 Data winsorised at I% 
A few observations appeared with extreme values, so the means and standard deviations throughout 
Table 6.1 are calculated after eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the observations. 32 Given that DACC is estimated as an OLS residual, the population average is zero by construction. 
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive statistics by y ear for sca led values of change in earn ings and 
earnings level 
Panel A: Scaled change in earnings 
Year N Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75% 
1991 340 
-0.019 0.092 -0.050 -0.01 0.011 
1992 364 0.001 0.087 
-0.028 0.002 0.024 
1993 370 0.030 0.129 
-0.022 0.017 0.057 
1994 374 0.032 0.125 
-0.002 0.021 0.061 
1995 382 0.035 0.127 
-0.013 0.015 0.067 
1996 398 0.017 0.105 
-0.006 0.012 0.036 
1997 420 0.032 0.114 
-0.007 0.018 0.065 
1998 442 0.012 0.114 
-0.019 0.010 0.047 
1999 545 0.017 0.112 
-0.024 0.009 0.041 
2000 593 0.000 0.124 
-0.037 0.007 0.043 
2001 637 
-0.007 0.141 -0.070 0.000 0.035 
2002 679 0.007 0.124 
-0.042 0.003 0.051 
2003 800 0.025 0.120 -0.021 0.010 0.063 
2004 844 0.042 0.136 -0.012 0.018 0.090 
2005 863 0.034 0.154 -0.034 0.019 0.100 
2006 875 0.010 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.015 
Total 8.926 
Panel B: Scaled earnings 
Year N Mean Std. dev. 25% 50% 75% 
1990 340 0.070 0.109 0.049 0.088 0.120 
1991 364 0.049 0.111 0.018 0.072 0.107 
1992 370 0.043 0.154 0.022 0.084 0.129 
1993 375 0.045 0.138 0.027 0.072 0.116 
1994 382 0.054 0.137 0.046 0.076 0.112 
1995 399 0.051 0.097 0.037 0.063 0.092 
1996 420 0.061 0.123 0.049 0.086 0.117 
1997 442 0.062 0.115 0.042 0.076 0.118 
1998 550 0.039 0.129 0.005 0.065 0.104 
1999 596 0.037 0.129 0.012 0.056 0.103 
2000 637 0.029 0.164 -0.015 0.064 0.129 
2001 679 0.015 0.133 -0.032 0.033 0.094 
2002 800 
-0.014 0.146 -0.073 0.009 0.075 
2003 844 
-0.024 0.164 -0.106 0.020 0.079 
2004 863 
-0.001 0.188 -0.091 0.053 0.126 
2005 873 0.006 0.146 -0.043 0.041 0.089 
2006 875 0.002 0.138 -0.035 0.044 0.080 
Total 9.809 
Notes: MV,: Market value at the end of year t (DataStream item MV) 
Earnings, : Pub lished after tax profits (DataStream item DS625) in peri od t. 
Scaled change in Earnings,: (Earnings, 
-Eamings,. l)/M Vt-2 
Scaled earnings,: Earnings, /MV., 
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Table 6.2 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median 03 01 Std. Dev. 
Variable 
Et 0.017 0.057 0.103 
-0.020 0.146 
AEt 0.021 0.008 0.050 
-0.023 0.123 
Curas 299,494 22,158 103,277 5,569 1,578.385 
Curliab 274,787 15,350 76,151 3,528 1,563,499 
OprCash 90,108 2,239 17,281 
-170 636.455 
MV 1,031 43 226 10 9,501 
DACC 0.000 0.000 0.035 
-0.042 0.076 
NDACC 0.053 0.056 0.116 
-0.001 0.116 
E: Earnings scaled by total assets 
AE Change In earnings scaled by total assets 
Curas : Opening current assets balance 
Curliab : Opening current liabilities balance 
OprCash : Opening balance for cash flow from operating activities 
MV : Opening market value 
Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total 
DACC assets, estimated using Jones(1991) model. 
NDACC : Non-discretionary accruals scaled by opening total assets 
The following cross-section OLS regression (Jones, 1991) model is estimated, for 
each industry-year, using all valid firm-years with available data but requiring a 
minimum of six observations per regression (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and 
Young (1999) also require a minimum of six observations): 
WCA#/TA11.1= ßat+ßij AREV1prTArii. 1 + Eiji (1) 
DACCijt= WCAijt/tajj. i - NDACCijt = 
=WCA, 1t 1TAjj. 1-(ß'olt +ß'jn AREV /TAiat) (2) 
where i, j and t are firm, industry and time subscripts respectively. This regression 
facilitates partitioning of working capital accruals (WCA) Into non-discretionary 
accruals (NDACC) and Discretionary accruals (DACC). NDACC are measured as 
predicted component of WCA and DACC as the residual resulting from the 
regression (2). Where ß', and ß', are the industry year OLS parameters estimated 
above. 
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6.5. Results 
6.5.1 Earnings management to avoid decreases in earnings 
Fig. 6.1 is a histogram of the scaled change in earnings with histogram interval widths 
of 0.01 for the range 
-0.25 to +0.25. The figure shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped 
distribution with an irregularity near zero which is consistent with H1 (hypothesis for 
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases). It appears that earnings changes 
slightly less that zero occur less frequently than would be expected given the 
smoothness of the remainder of the distribution and earnings changes slightly greater 
that zero occur more frequently than would be expected. The significance of the 
irregularity near zero is confirmed by the statistical test in table 6.3. The standardized 
difference of the interval immediately to the left of zero is 
-4.32 (The difference for 
the interval immediately to the right of zero is 6.58). Thus, under the assumption that 
the standardized differences are approximately normal, the test statistics are 
significant, rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings manipulation to avoid zero 
earnings. 
Anecdotal evidence and findings from Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that 
incentives to avoid earnings decreases become stronger with the length of the 
previous run of earnings increases. These stronger incentives should lead to a more 
intensive effect of earnings management in the intervals near to zero. To investigate, 
observations are categorised based on the length of the preceding string of earnings 
increases. The three categories are observations (a) flowing earnings decreases, (b) 
following one or two consecutive years of earnings increases, and (c) following three 
or more years of earnings increases. Fig. 6.2 shows the resulting distributions of 
earnings changes. For all three categories, the evidence of earnings management to 
avoid earnings decreases was statistically significant - the standardized differences of 
the intervals left to zero in Panels A, B and C are, respectively: 
-3.98, -4.23 and -5.89 
(and, for the interval right of zero, 3.78,4.51 and 5.41). The magnitudes of the 
standardized differences increase from Panel A to Panel B to Panel C in a pattern 
consistent with the prediction that incentives are increasing as the length of the 
previous run of consecutive earnings increases. 
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Fig. 6.1 Empirical distribution of changes in annual After Tax Profit (DataStream Item DS625) scaled by 
market value (DataStream item MV) as of the beginning of the first year, (Farnings, -Earnigs,., )/MV,.,. 
The distribution interval widths are 0.01 and the location of the zero on the horizontal axis is market by 
the dashed line. For example, the first interval to the right of zero contains all scaled changes in earnings 
in the interval [0,0.01), the second interval contains [0.01,0.02), and so on. The vertical axis labelled 
frequency represents the number of observations in each earnings change interval. 
Though, visual inspection more strongly confirms the prediction. Moving From Panel 
A to Panel B and then to Panel C, there is evidence of a pattern of both an increase in 
the proportionate change in frequency at zero (which is reflected in the standardized 
differences) and an increase in the effects of earnings management in the intervals 
near to zero. 
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6.5.2 Frequency of Earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases 
The results in section 6.2.1 imply that the null hypothesis that the density of the 
distribution of earnings changes does not changes at zero should be rejected. The next 
logical step is to turn to the problem of estimating the frequency of earnings 
management to avoid earnings decreases, i. e. calculating the difference between 
observed frequencies of earnings changes and frequencies which would have been 
expected in the absence of earnings management. It should be noted that the model of 
expectations used to test the null hypothesis of no earnings management (where the 
expected number of observations in an interval was defined as the average of the 
observed numbers in the two adjacent intervals) is not appropriate for estimating the 
frequency of earnings management because there is evidence that the null hypothesis 
does not hold. Also, while tests of significance focused on the change in density at 
zero (in order to minimize the assumptions required for the test), estimates of the 
frequency of earnings management should allow for the fact that earnings 
management is not necessarily confined to just the intervals adjacent to zero. 
After those considerations, the following model is adopted for the purpose of 
estimating the frequency of earnings management, similar to Degeorge et at. 1999. It 
is assumed that in the absence of earnings management, the distribution of earnings 
changes would be approximately symmetric and that the right half of the empirical 
distribution is largely unaffected by earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases. Using this model, the observed frequencies from intervals in the right half 
of the empirical distribution serve as measures of the expected frequencies in the 
corresponding interval in the left half of the distribution. Operationally, it is assumed 
that in the absence of earnings management, the distribution of earnings changes in 
Fig. 6.1 would be symmetric around 0.01 and that managed values of earnings 
changes do not fall to the right of 0.01. 
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Panel A: Year Subsequent to an Earnings Decrease 
460 
-r00 
- 
350 
- 
700 
-b0 
u 
- 
200 
150 
- 
100 
50 
Panel B: Year Subsequent to I or 2 Years of Earnings Increases 
480 
400 
xo 
3 00 
250 
200 
150 
100 
so 
0 
Panel C: Year Subsequent to 3 or More Years of Earnings Increases 
460 
400 
xo 
900 
C U 250 
200 
150 
50 
0 
-2 01 
.2 
Fig. 6.2 Three empirical distributions of changes in earnings scaled by market value categorised 
according to the pattern of preceding earnings changes for the firm. Panel A: the distribution 
for the years immediately following an earnings decrease; panel li: the distribution for the 
years following one or two years (hut not three) years of earnings increase; Panel C: I he 
distribution for the years following three or more years of earnings increases (Detailed 
definitions of variables are given in Fig. 6. l ) 
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The estimated number of cases where firms have engaged in earnings 
management is the difference between the expected and the observed number of 
observations. Estimates are reported for a number of cases of earnings management 
related to three regions of increasing width, i. e. Three intervals defined to include 
earnings decreases ranging form: [-0.005,0.000), [-0.010,0.00) and [-0.015,0.00). 
The estimates for the three increasingly broad intervals are, respectively, 429,764 and 
1046. Three bases of comparison are provided, to valuate the magnitude of these 
estimates. First, these estimates represent approximately 5.4%-13.3% of the 7,854 
available observations. Second, the estimates are approximately 14.9%-36% of the 
2,870 observations of negative earnings changes. Finally, focusing on just the three 
increasingly broad negative earnings change intervals closes to zero (where earnings 
management to avoid earnings decreases is expected to be least costly), the case of 
earnings management to avoid losses appear to be 23% 26% and 24% of the 
observations expected in the respective intervals in the absence of earnings 
management. As the intervals become broader and take in cases with higher expected 
costs of managing earnings to avoid earnings decreases, the estimated proportion of 
cases of earnings management is expected to decline. The sum, whatever base of 
comparison is adopted; the estimates suggest that earnings management to avoid 
earnings decreases is commonplace. 
6.5.3 Existence of earnings management to avoid losses 
Fig 6.3 shows the distribution of earnings scaled by beginning market value with 
histogram interval widths of 0.010 for scaled earnings ranging from -0.25 to +0.25. 
The histogram shows a single peaked, bell shaped distribution which is relatively 
smooth except in the area of zero earnings; Earnings slightly less than zero occur 
much less frequently than would be expected given the smoothness of the remainder 
of the distribution and earnings slightly greater than zero occur much more frequently, 
than would be expected33. The standardized difference for the interval immediately to 
the left of zero is 
-12.27 (The standardized difference for the interval immediately to 
33 Published Profit After Tax on Datastream was exactly zero for 32 observations in the sample. These 
cases where investigated further by examining published copies of the annual reports on Companies 
House, Fame and LexisNexis. In most of the cases, annual reports from alternative databases showed 
again zero profits after tax. In a few cases, small mistakes where noted. Since it is impossible to verify 
that these cases of exactly zero earnings are correct or arise from rounding differences on the accounts, 
all observations with a value exactly zero were deleted. As theses observations fall in the interval 
immediately to the right of zero, deletion of these observations likely results in a small understatement 
of earnings management to avoid losses in the reported results. 
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Fig. 6.3 The distribution of Profits After Tax scaled by beginning of the year 
market value. The distribution interval widths are 0.010 and the location of zero 
on the horizontal axis is market by the dashed line. The first interval to the right 
of zero contains all observations in the interval (0.0O. 0.010), and so on. 
"Frequency", is the number of' observations in a given earnings interval 
As with earnings decreases, there is reason to believe that incentives to avoid losses 
might be increasing in the length of the preceding sequence of positive earnings. 
Following an approach similar to the one used to examine earnings management to 
avoid earnings decreases, observations are again divided into categories. This time the 
categories are based on the preceding sequence of positive earnings. The three 
categories are observations (a) following negative earnings, (h) following one or two 
(but not three) consecutive years of positive earnings, and (c) following three or more 
years of positive earnings. Fig. 6.4 shows distributions of earnings fier each of theses 
categories. For the categories represented in all three panels, the evidence of earnings 
management to avoid earnings decreases is significant 
- 
the standardized differences 
for the intervals left of zero in Panels A, B and C are, respectively, 
-6.48, -6.87 and - 
7.47 (and, for the intervals right of zero, 4.36,5.26 and 5.84). It should be noted that 
the test statistic based on the standard differences is Subject to an important 
limitations, as measure of the extent of earnings management. Standardized 
differences by definition focus on observations concentrated in just the intervals 
immediately adjacent to zero. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect 
some effects of earnings management in other intervals near, but not immediately 
adjacent to zero. Visual inspection of' the distributions (Fig. 6.3) provides evidence 
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consistent with the limitation, though confirms the prediction for earnings 
management to avoid losses. Moving from Panel A to Panel C, there is evidence of an 
increase in both the proportion of observations managed and the extent to which 
earnings management affects intervals other than the two intervals immediately 
adjacent to zero. 
To estimate the prevalence of earnings management to avoid losses, the 
operational assumption analogous to the assumption in Section 6.5.2 is adopted, that 
in the absence of earnings management, the distribution in Fig. 6.3 would be 
symmetric around the point 0.07 and that the values of earnings which have been 
managed do not fall to the right of this point. Thus, the expected number of 
observations in an interval to the left of 0.07 is assumed to be the observed number in 
the corresponding interval to the right of 0.07. 
Estimates of the frequency of earnings management to avoid losses for three 
negative earning intervals of increasing width near zero are reported: (-0.01,0.000), 
(-0.02,0.00) and (-0.03,0.00). The estimates for three increasingly broad intervals 
are, respectively, 194,342, and 488. These estimates are approximately 2-4% of the 
9,809 observations with available earnings data. Second, these estimates represent 
approximately 7% 
- 
17% of the 2844 negative earnings observations. Finally, 
focusing on just the three increasingly broad negative earnings intervals closest to 
zero, the cases of earnings management to avoid losses appear to be 43%, 32% and 
28% of the observations expected in the respective intervals in the absence of earnings 
management. In sum, this estimation suggests that earnings management to avoid 
losses is commonplace. Additionally, earnings management to avoid losses is more 
pervasive than earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. 
These estimates also imply that the magnitude of earnings management to 
avoid losses is economically significant, especially in the light of the fact that typical 
levels of earnings are on range of 7% of the market value of equity (or an average 
price to earnings index of 14). The estimates in this section suggest that there are 
hundred more cases where earnings management has changed earnings by more that 
1% of the market value of equity34. 
34 In section 6 is also examined the relation of earnings management to firm size by classifying firms in 
to four groups with equal number of observations, based on beginning of the year market value of 
equity. There is clear statistical evidence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses for all size groups. Further, there is statistical evidence that earnings management to avoid 
earnings losses is more likely among larger firms. 
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Panel C: Year Subsequent to 3 or More Years of Positive Earnings 
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Fig. 6.4. Three empirical distributions of earnings scaled by market value categorised according to the 
pattern of proceeding earnings for the firm. Panel A: The distribution for the years immediately following a 
loss; Panel B: the distribution for the years following exactly one or two years of positive earnings; and 
Panel C: the distribution for the years following three or more years of positive earnings. (See Fig. 3 for 
detailed definitions of variables. ) 
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6.5.4 Evidence on the methods of earnings management to 
avoid losses 
Studies of earnings management typically consider a specific incentive for earnings 
management (e. g. incentives related to executive bonus plans) and then test whether 
earnings have been managed assuming a particular earnings management method (e. g. 
management of accruals). In contrast the cross sectional approach employed here 
allows identifying a large set of companies that potentially manage earnings, before 
invoking specific assumptions about motivation or methods. Consequently, 
information about the prevalence of earnings management near zero thresholds can be 
utilised to explore how earnings are managed and assess the relative importance of 
potential earnings management methods. In this section, the avoidance of losses is 
explored, because the evidence in Section 6.5.3 shows a more pervasive effect for 
management to avoid losses than for management to avoid earnings decreases. 
Two types of evidence are presented, ex ante and ex post, about the 
manipulation of earnings to avoid losses. The first type of evidence is related to the ex 
ante cost of earnings management. Holding the benefits of earnings management to 
avoid losses constant, it can be conjectured that the extent of earnings management is 
likely to be a function of the ex ante costs of earnings management. In other words, 
firms that manage earnings are likely to be the ones which faced relatively lower ex 
ante costs of earnings management. Therefore given that, firms that managed earnings 
moved from slightly negative earnings to slightly positive earnings, firms with 
slightly negative earnings likely are those which faced higher ex ante earnings 
management costs than firms with slightly positive earnings. The second type of 
evidence is related to the ex post results of earnings management, i. e. evidence 
reflected in the components of income after the earnings management. As explained 
in more detail later, ceteris paribus, it is expected the managed component of income 
to be higher for firms with slightly positive earnings as compared to firms with 
slightly negative earnings. 
6.5.5 Evidence on the ex ante costs of earnings management 
Relying on previous research that has identified the alteration of working capital 
accruals as a common method of earnings management (e. g. Gore et al., 2007), two 
proxies for the ex ante costs of earnings management are identified. Firms with high 
levels of current assets and current liabilities before the earnings management are 
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likely to find it relatively less costly to manage earnings through changes in working 
capital than firms with low levels of current assets and current liabilities. For example, 
a firm which has high levels of receivables is likely to find it less costly to manage 
earnings through changes in the provision for bad and doubtful debt. Firms that can 
manage earnings at low cost are more likely to manage earnings to move from 
negative pre-managed earnings to positive post-managed earnings. If the levels of 
current assets and current liabilities serve as proxies for the cost of earnings 
management through changes in working capital, it is expected to find lower pre- 
managed levels of current assets and current liabilities for firms in the intervals 
immediately to the left of zero post-managed earnings and higher levels in the 
intervals immediately to the right of zero. Descriptive evidence is presented bellow, in 
the form of quartiles of the conditional distributions of current assets and current 
liabilities. 
There are examined the pre-managed distributions of beginning of the year 
current assets and current liabilities conditional on the level of earnings. The 
observations are sorted on the earnings variable to form equal-sized portfolios of 200 
observations per portfolio. The portfolio boundaries are defined relative to zero: The 
first portfolio right to zero consists of the 200 smallest positive earnings observations, 
the second portfolio right of zero consists of the 200 next smallest positive earnings, 
and so on. Similarly, the first portfolio left to zero consists of the 200 smallest 
magnitude negative earnings observations. Thus, within each portfolio, the earnings 
variable is approximately constant35. 
's Construction of portfolios with equal numbers of observations reduces the variance of the quartile 
statistics across portfolios, making it easier to compare quartiles across portfolios. An alternative 
approach would be to form portfolios consisting of all observations in equally-spaced earnings intervals 
e. g. 50 portfolios defined for the 50 earnings intervals shows in Fig. 6.3. I lowever, this approach results in substantial variation in the variance of the quartile statistics. 
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Fig. 6.5 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the magnitude of scaled 
earnings. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis represent the median earnings for each 
portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25`h, 50`h and 75`h percentiles) of the distribution of beginning of the 
year current assets (DataStream item 375) scaled by market value (DataStream item MV) for each 
portfolio are plotted against the median earnings for each portfolio. 
Fig 6.5 shows the conditional distribution of the beginning of the year level of current 
assets. In the figure, the three quartiles of the distribution of current assets for each 
portfolio are plotted against the median earnings for the portfolio. Fig. 6.6 shows the 
conditional distribution of the beginning of the year level of current liabilities. Both 
figures show a clear downward shift in the conditional distributions for the portfolio 
immediately to the left of zero, and an upward shift in the distributions for the 
portfolio immediately to the right of zero, particularly for the upper quartiles of the 
distributions. Thus, firms which had a higher level of beginning of year current assets 
or current liabilities were more likely to manage earnings from a negative to a positive 
level. This suggests that changes in working capital play a role in earnings 
management to avoid losses. 
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Fig. 6.6 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the magnitude of 
scaled earnings. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis represent the median earnings for each portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25x, 50`h and 751h percentiles) of the distribution of beginning of the year current liabilities scaled by market value for each portfolio are plotted 
against the median earnings for each portfolio. Beginning of the year current liabilities are 
defined as the DataStream item DS389 
6.5.6 Evidence on the ex post results of earnings management 
For purposes of this analysis, earnings are decomposed in the three exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive components, closely related to components considered in previous 
research: Cash flow from operations and accruals. Accruals are decomposed to their 
discretionary and non discretionary components. As the discretionary and non- 
discretionary components of total accruals cannot be directly observed (Healy, 1985), 
researchers have proposed a series of models to obtain approximations. 
The next logical step is to examine the conditional distributions of each of the 
three components of earnings for ex post evidence of a role in earnings management 
to avoid losses. If earnings management to avoid losses is concentrated in a 
component of earnings, then it is expected the conditional distributions of the 
managed component for slightly positive earnings levels to reflect a larger proportion 
of income increasing values. Thus, it is expected to sec an upward (income 
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increasing) shift in the distribution for slightly positive earnings relative to the 
conditional distributions for firms with slightly negative earnings and possibly (but 
not necessarily because of the overall positive relation between earnings levels and 
the components of earnings considered) relative to the conditional distributions for 
firms in the adjacent regions with more positive earnings. 
6.5.6.1 Cash flow from operations 
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Fig. 6.7 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the magnitude of 
scaled earnings. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis represent the median 
earnings for each portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25th, 50th and 75 percentiles) of the 
distribution of cash flow from operations scaled by market value for each portfolio are plotted 
against the median earnings for each portfolio. Data Stream item DS1015 
Jones (1991) estimates discretionary accruals assuming that earnings consist of three 
components: operating cash flows, non-discretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals. Operating cash flows could be subject to real activities manipulation. Real 
activities manipulation is defined by Bens et al. (2003) as: "management actions that 
deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of 
meeting certain earnings thresholds". Figre 6.7 documents the effect of real-activities 
manipulation on operating cash flows. Operating cash flow (IAS 7) is calculated as 
earnings before interest and tax adjusted for depreciation and working capital 
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movements. Subsequently, earnings management through real activities (i. e. apply a 
heavy discount policy) would increase both operating cash flows and earnings. 
Fig. 6.7 shows quartiles of the conditional distributions of cash flow from 
operations for portfolios formed on the earnings variable. Consistent with the 
prediction, the quartiles of the distribution shift upward between the portfolio 
immediately to the left of zero and the portfolio immediately to the right of zero, 
particularly for the median and the upper quartile. Thus, there is evidence consistent 
with the management of cash flow from operations to effectively move observations 
from small losses to small positive earnings. Interpreting this evidence as combining 
features of both the results and the costs of earnings management, the firms that 
manage earnings through increases in cash flow from operations are likely to be the 
firms with the highest pre-managed cash flow from operations, i. e. these firms are 
likely to be concentrated in the upper half of the conditional distributions. The move 
of these firms from slightly negative earnings to slightly positive earnings explains the 
upward shift in quartiles between the left and the right side of zero. The reduced 
number of the firms that manage earnings from the portfolios of slightly negative 
post-managed earnings of the upper quartile, explain the almost flat distributions of 
cash flows for these portfolios. This interpretation is further supported after 
examining conditional distributions of cash flows from the previous year (Fig. 6.8). 
Medians and upper quartiles of conditional distributions of cash flows from the 
previous year show the same downward shift for intervals immediately left of zero, 
suggesting that firms which did not manage earnings tend to have lower levels of cash 
flows and presumably faced higher costs to manage earnings upwards. 
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Fig. 6.8 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the 
magnitude of scaled earnings. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis 
represent the median earnings for each portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25th, 50th and 
75th percentiles) of the distribution of cash flow from operations at the beginning of 
the year, scaled by market value for each portfolio are plotted against the median 
earnings for each portfolio. 
6.5.6.2 Changes in Discretionary Accruals 
Fig. 6.9 shows the quartiles of the conditional distributions of changes in discretionary 
accruals. Consistent with the prediction, there appears to be an upward shift of the 
conditional distribution between the portfolio immediately to the left of zero and the 
portfolio immediately to the right of zero, for the upper end of the conditional 
distribution. A possible explanation for the pattern of results for changes in 
discretionary accruals could be clientele effects. Some firms choose to manage 
earnings through methods reflected in a marked increase in cash flow from operations, 
and the increase tends to be accompanied by a decrease in changes in working capital. 
For example, some firms increase cash sales which increases cash from operations but 
decreases non-cash working capital because of the decline in inventory. 
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Fig. 6.9 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the magnitude of scaled 
earnings by total assets. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis represent the median 
earnings for each portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25th. SO and 75" percentiles) of the distribution of discretionary accruals for each portfolio are plotted against the median earnings for each portfolio. 
The discretionary accruals are calculated with the Jones (1991) model. 
These firms tend to appear in the upper ranges of the conditional distribution of cash 
flows in Fig. 6.7, and in the lower ranges of the distribution of changes in 
discretionary accruals in Fig. 6.9 which explains the less intensive increase for the 
lower quartile of Fig. 6.9. Alternatively, other firms choose to manage earnings 
through increases in working capital. For example, some firms make additional credit 
sales which do not affect cash from operations but increase receivables and decrease 
inventory for a net increase in working capital (assuming that sales arc made on a 
positive profit margin). These firms tend to appear in the upper ranges of the 
distribution of Fig. 6.8, where there can be observed evidence of earnings 
management using changes of working capital, and in the lower quartiles in Fig. 6.7, 
where the evidence of earnings management through cash flow form operations is less 
pronounced. 
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6.5.6.3 Non-discretionary Accruals 
Fig. 6.10 shows the quartiles of conditional distribution of non discretionary accruals 
by earnings portfolio. Other accruals are defined here as total accruals minus the 
discretionary accruals calculated through the Jones (1991) model. The evidence shows 
a pronounced downward shift in the distribution of the nön-discretionary accruals. A 
downward shift would not be expected if non-discretionary accruals are used to 
manage earnings upward. 
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Fig. 6.10 Earnings portfolios of 200 observations each are formed based on the magnitude of 
non-discretionary accruals. Median portfolio earnings on the horizontal axis represent the 
median earnings scaled by total assets for each portfolio. Three quartiles (the 25th, 50`h and the 
75`h percentiles) of the distribution of the non discretionary accruals value of each portfolio are 
plotted against the median earnings for each portfolio. Non-discretionary Accruals= Working 
Capital Accruals- Discretionary Accruals. 
6.5.7 Discretionary Accruals to achieve earnings thresholds 
It is predicted in H3 that the exclusion of discretionary accruals from current period 
earnings will cause the discontinuity around zero to significantly decline. The 
evidence on this hypothesis is reported in Table 6.3. Table 6.3 reports the Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) standardised difference statistics relating to the classes at both 
immediate sides of zero in the distributions reported in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.3. 
The distribution of earnings levels, shown in Figure 6.3 reveals a distinct 
discontinuity at zero. The frequency at the immediate left of zero is low and that on 
the immediate right of zero is high relative to expected frequencies under a smooth 
distribution. As predicted, Table 6.3 shows that the distribution of non-discretionary 
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earnings levels is relatively smooth around zero. There is little disparity between the 
frequencies immediately adjacent to zero. 
More specifically, Table 6.3 Panels Al and A2 confirm the 113 regarding the 
impact of DACC around zero earnings. Panel Al indicates that the actual frequency 
of the class to the immediate left to zero in the earnings distribution is significantly 
less that the expected frequency of the class under the null hypothesis of a smooth 
distribution. On the other hand, Panel A2 indicates that the actual frequency of the 
class to the immediate left of zero in the non-discretionary earnings distribution is 
insignificantly different from its expected frequency. This confirms the 111,112 and 
H3 research hypotheses that earnings are distributed discontinuously around zero 
while non-discretionary earnings are not. 
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of earnings changes. This histogram 
reveals a discontinuity at zero, caused by the frequency at the immediate right of zero 
appearing to be higher and that at the immediate left of zero lower than expected. As 
predicted, the distribution of non-discretionary earnings changes shown in Table 6.3 
Panels BI and B2 does not have a similar discontinuity at zero. The difference in 
frequencies at the immediate sides of zero declines significantly after extracting the 
discretionary element of earnings. 
Evidence confirming HI and H3 research hypothesis regarding the effect of 
DACC on the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes is presented in 
Table 6.3. Panel BI indicates that the frequency of the class to the immediate left of 
zero in the earnings change distribution is significantly less than expected had the 
distribution been smooth. However, this is not the case in the distribution of non- 
discretionary earnings changes. Panel B2 shows that the frequency to the immediate 
left of zero is insignificantly different from that expected under a smooth distribution. 
In summary, therefore, it is found that earnings levels and changes are 
distributed with visible and statistically significant discontinuities around zero. 
Specifically, in each of these distributions, the frequency to the immediate right of 
zero is greater than expected and the frequency to the immediate left of zero lower 
than expected under a smooth distribution. It is found, further, that the distributions of 
non-discretionary earnings levels and changes are not significantly discontinuous in 
this manner around zero. This suggests that the discontinuity in the distribution of 
earnings relative to basic targets is caused by DACC. 
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Table 6.3 
Distribution of adjacent to zero earnings and non-discretionary earnings relative to targets 
Panel Al 
Earnings level 
N= 9,809 
Panel A2 
Non-discretionary earnings level 
N= 9,809 
Class 
-0.01 <Et s0 0<E, 5 0.01 Class -0.01 <NDEE 50 0<NDEg 5 0.01 
Al 198 322 n 284 297 
Std. Std. 
_ Diff. 
-3.962 2.154 Diff. -0.972 0.1943 
p value 0.002 0.058 p value 0.791 0.192 
Panel B1 Panel B2 
Earnings Change Non-discretionary earnings change 
N= 8,962 N= 8,962 
Class 
-0.01 <EE 50 0<EE 5 0.01 Class -0.01 <NDEE 50 0<NDEE s 0.01 
N 582 820 n 434 514 
Std. Std. 
Diff. 
-2.9934 3.125 Diff. -0.512 -0.712 
p value 0.002 0.013 p value 0.612 0.491 
E: Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
tE : Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDtE : Non-discretionary earnings change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
This table shows the Burgstahler and Dhichev (1997) standardised difference statistic for the classes at 
the immediate left and right of zero in the distributions of actual and non-discretionary earnings levels 
and changes scaled by opening total assets. This statistic is measured as the difference between the 
actual and expected frequencies in the class concerned, standardised by the standard deviation of this 
difference. The expected frequency of each class is assumed to be the mean of the two immediately 
adjacent classes. If the number of observations in class i is denoted by n;, the probability of an 
observation occurring in class i denoted by pi, and the total number of observations in the sample 
denoted by N, the test statistic for class i is given by: 
ßn; 
_1 
+ n, +ý ) n; 
- 2 
NPD(1-P. )+N(P1-, +P,, )(1-Pr-1 -P, +i) 
4 
This statistic is evaluated against the standardised normal distribution and all p values reported are two 
tailed. Discretionary working capital accruals scaled estimated using Jones (1991) model 
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6.5.7.1 Proportions of observations achieving and missing 
earnings thresholds as a result of DACC 
It is predicted in H6 that DACC have the effect of increasing the proportion of 
observations reporting positive earnings levels and changes. Prclimi nary evidence on 
this prediction is obtained from Figures 6.9 and 6.10. These figures indicate that 
DACC increase the proportion of positive earnings, consistent with prediction. Also 
consistent with prediction, DACC reduce the proportion of small negative earnings 
levels. 
Table 6.4 reports the results of formal tests of the prediction in lii. Panel A 
shows that DACC have the effect of significantly increasing the proportion of positive 
earnings levels from 72.3% to 81.3%. In the case of positive earnings levels within 
this range, the proportion increases from 21.4% to 24.2%. In the case of negative 
earnings levels within the same range, the proportion decreases from 11.4% to 4.2%. 
These changes are consistent with the prediction that DACC are used to manage 
earnings to achieve positive earnings level and, in particular, to transform small 
negative earnings into small positive earnings. 
Table 6.5 shows the impact of DACC in arriving at the earnings reported by 
firms. It takes the form of transition matrices (one each for levels and changes): rows 
show broad classes of non-discretionary (pre-managed) earnings, columns show such 
classes of reported earnings. Intersections of rows and columns show the number of 
observations (and proportion of the total) moving from a particular NDE, (NDMC.,, 
NDESI) class to a particular Et (DE, ) class. 
Panel A presents details of the frequency with which firms move from specific 
classes of non-discretionary earnings, e. g. NDEI 
-0.1, to specific classes of actual 
reported earnings, e. g. 0<I0.05. It would be expected that companies use DACC to 
shift from negative non-discretionary earnings to positive reported earnings, and for 
this to be particularly so for observations close to targets. Panel A shows that 15%36 
of the entire sample move from negative non-discretionary earnings to positive 
earnings as a result of DACC. This compares to only 4%37 of the same moving in the 
36 The 15% comprise of those observations in the upper right quadrant of the pancl. Those companies having negative NDE, but reporting positive E (108+147+481+49+69+186+114+63+222+653+524+1183)/9,809 
" The 4% comprise those observations in the lower left quadrant. i. e. those having positive NDE but 
reporting negative E (20+20+20+39+20+20+147+49+98)19,809. 
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opposite direction, i. e. from positive non-discretionary earnings, to negative earnings 
as a result of DACC, thus emphasising the direction in the use of DACC. Focusing 
particularly on those firms falling just short of target, i. e. in the range -0.05<NDE<<0, 
the effect is even more pronounced: 75% of such firms report positive actual (post 
DACC) earnings ((481+186+222)/1,183), whereas only 9% of those companies with 
NDEt just above break even, i. e. 0< NDE<<0.05, move to negative earnings 
((20+39+147)/2,183). Of particular interest is the movement of firms nearest to break 
even. Here 4.9% of the entire sample moves from negative non-discretionary earnings 
within 0.05 of opening TA to positive earnings within the same range, (i. e. the 481 
observations in the lower left comer of the upper right quadrant). Although only a 
small proportion of the total sample, these 481 observations represent 41% of the 
1,183 observations within this range. 
Table 6.5 Panel B reports the impact of DACC on the proportion of 
observations achieving and missing positive earnings changes. DACC significantly 
increase the proportion of observations achieving positive earnings changes from 52% 
based on NDOE1 to 56% based on reported earnings, i. e. row totals 
1,212+1,326+2,106 as a proportion of the total of 8,962 compared to the proportion 
represented by the column totals 2,877+1,273+905. As with earnings levels, focusing 
specifically on those firms falling just short of target, i. e. -0.025<NDAE<<0, reveals 
that 71% of such firms report positive actual (post DACC) earnings changes ((565 + 
99+ 18)/956)), whereas only 16% of those firms with NDAEt, just above target, i. e. 0< 
NDOE, <_0.025, move to negative actual earnings changes ((36+63+101)/1,212)), again 
confirming a clear directional bias in movements. DACC also significantly increase 
the proportion of observations with small positive earnings changes, i. e. within 0.025 
of opening TA from 14 % to 32% i. e. row total of 1,212 for 0<NDAE<<0.025 
compared to column total of 2,877 for 0<DE<<_0.025. 
These results are consistent with DACC being used to achieve positive 
earnings changes. DACC significantly increase the proportion of negative earnings 
changes within 0.025 of opening TA from 11 % (row total of 956 for - 
0.025<NDOE<: 50) to 24%. (equivalent AEt column total of 2178). 
One potential reason for DACC increasing the proportion of observations with 
small negative earnings changes is the use of DACC to smooth earnings. Income 
smoothing would be reflected by the use of DACC to amortise fluctuations in 
earnings, i. e. to reduce the magnitude of earnings changes (volatility). Table 6.5 Panel 
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B shows that 1,058 (i. e. 571 + 487 ), or 48%, of the 2,178 observations with actual 
negative earnings changes within 0.025 of opening TA use DACC to reduce the 
magnitude of a larger negative earnings change. If these observations were excluded, 
the proportion of firm-years with small decreases would decline from 24% to 12 % 
(the 
-0.025<NDAE, <_0) column total of 2178 minus the 1058 firm-years specified 
above) as a result of DACC. Table 6.5 Panel B also indicates that 20%38 % of the 
entire sample use DACC to move from negative to positive earnings changes, i. e. the 
cases in the top right-hand quadrant. These 1,792 observations represent 41 % of all 
firm-years with negative non-discretionary earnings changes, (i. e. 1,792 as a 
proportion of the relevant row totals of 2,130+1,230+956). Again focusing 
specifically on those companies close to the target, in this case matching the prior 
year's result; of the entire sample, 6% of all observations move from negative non- 
discretionary earnings changes within 0.025 of opening TA to positive earnings 
changes within a similar range (i. e. the bottom left figure in the upper right quadrant). 
Of the 956 observations with small negative non-discretionary earnings changes 
within this range, 71% actually report positive earnings changes with the aid of 
DACC ((565+99+18)/956)). 
In summary, DACC significantly increase the proportions of observations 
publishing positive earnings levels and changes, as predicted. DACC also have the 
effect of significantly increasing the proportion of observations reporting small 
positive earnings and changes. This is consistent with DACC being used to achieve 
positive earnings levels and changes and with DACC causing the discontinuity in the 
distribution of earnings. However, DACC result in increases in the proportions of 
observations with small negative earnings changes. It is shown that this is mainly 
because DACC also serves the purpose of amortising the magnitude of large negative 
earnings changes in significant numbers of firm-years. 
38 Sum of observations in the top right-hand quadrant: 439+323+565+152+72+99+9+117+18=1,792. 
1,792: 8,962=20% 
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Table 6.4 
Proportion of observations missing an earnings threshold before and after discretionary accruals 
Panel A 
Earnings levels 
N= 9,809 
Class Proportion z p value 
NDEt >0 0.723 
Et>O 0.813 22.135 0.000 
0<NDE, 5 0.05 0.214 
0<Et 5 0.05 0.242 9.315 0.000 
-0.05<NDEE 50 0.114 
-0.05<EE 50 0.042 -14.185 0.000 
Panle B 
Earnings Changes 
N= 8,962 
Class Proportion z p value 
NDDEt >0 0.454 
AEt>0 0.593 18.135 0.000 
0<NDLt EE 5 0.025 0.184 
0<dEE5 0.025 0.135 34.245 0.000 
-0.025<ND 1 EE 50 0.125 
-0.025<hE, 50 173 9.134 0.000 
E : Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE : Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
AE Change in earning scaled by opening total assets 
NDAE : Non-discretionary earnings change in earning scaled by opening total assets 
Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total assets are estimated using Jones 
(1991) model. This table evaluates the impact of DACC on the frequency of observations of positive, 
small positive and small negative earnings levels and changes. The Z statistic shown relates to the Z 
test for correlated proportions described by Kanji (1993,48-49). This test has been used also by Gore 
et al. (2007). This test evaluates the impact of a given intervention on the proportion of observations 
satisfying a given criterion by measuring and comparing the proportion immediately before and 
immediately after the intervention. If the number of observations moving from negative to positive 
relative to the criterion of interest is denoted by b, the number moving from positive to negative 
denoted by c, and the total number of observations denoted by N, the test statistic is given by: 
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Table 6.5 Transition matrices indicating the frequency of movement of observations form classes of non- 
discretionary earnings to classes of earning relative to target. 
Panel A 
Earnings level sample 
class Et :s 
-0.1 -0.1 <E, s- 0.05 
-0.05<Et s0 0<E, s 0.05 0.05<Et s0.1 Et >0.1 Total 
NDEtS-0.1 206 88 88 108 49 114 653 
0.021 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.067 
-0.1 <NDEt s- 0.05 59 88 98 147 69 63 524 
0.006 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.053 
-0.05<NDEts0 59 78 157 481 186 222 1183 
0.006 0.008 0.016 0.049 0.019 0.023 0.121 
0<NDEt s 0.05 20 39 147 951 628 398 2183 
0.002 0.004 0.015 0.097 0.064 0.041 0.223 
0.05<NDEt s0.1 20 20 49 
! 
598 1099 564 2349 
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.061 0.112 0.057 0.239 
NDEt>0.1 20 20 98 304 1,442 1,034 2917 
0.002 0.002 0.010 0.031 0.147 0.105 0.297 
n 383 334 638 2,590 3,472 2,393 9809 
proporion 0.039 0.034 0.065 0.264 0.354 0.244 1 
Panel B 
Earnings change sample 
AE, s- 
class 0.05 
-0.05<pE, s- 0.025 
-0.025<AEt 5o O'AEt s 0.025 0.025<AE4 s0.05 AEj>0.05 Total 
NDAEt s 
-0.05 618 341 571 439 152 9 2,130 
0.069 0.038 0.064 0.049 0.017 0.001 0.238 
-0.05<NDAEts- 0.025 108 125 487 323 72 117 1231 
0.012 0.014 0.054 0.036 0.008 0.013 0.137 
-0.025<NDAEts0 63 108 105 565 99 18 956 
0.007 0.012 0.012 0.063 0.011 0.002 0.107 
0<NDAEts0.025 36 63 101 556 215 242 1,212 
0.004 0.007 0.011 0.062 0.024 0.027 0.135 
0.025<NDAEt 50.0 5 27 36 188 511 233 332 1326 
0.003 0.004 0.021 0.057 0.026 0.037 0.148 
NDAE1>0.05 152 54 726 484 502 188 2106 
0.017 0.006 0.081 0.054 0.056 0.021 0.235 
N 1,004 726 2,178 2,877 1,273 905 8962 
rortion 0.112 0.081 0.243 0.321 0.142 0.101 1 
E : Earnings sca led by opening total assets 
NDE : Non discretio nary earnings scaled by opening total assets Change in earnings scaled by opening total AE assets 
NDAE : Non discretio nary earnings change in earnings sca led by opening total assets 
Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by openin g total assets are estimated usin Jones (1991) model. 
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6.6 Alternative Explanations for the Discontinuity 
6.6.1 Management Taking Real Actions to Improve 
Performance 
One of the objectives 'of a company is to produce a profit. Managers could set targets 
and employees could work harder when there is a clearly defined objective (i. e., to be 
profitable). When companies are assessed on earnings and profitability related ratios, 
there can be observed the effect of this incentive in the data at the zero earnings 
reference point. The discontinuity could be reflecting efficient contracting. The first- 
order effect of setting a target is people work harder to achieve the target. The second- 
order effect is earnings management. 
6.6.2 Scaling by Market Value 
Investors could use different valuation approaches for loss versus profit firms. For 
example, investors could place more weight on the. balance sheet and liquidation 
values when a firm reports a loss (e. g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). This could in 
turn affect the denominator (market value) used to create the distribution of earnings. 
In their research Eason and Sommers (2003) suggest that scaling by market 
value can induce heteroscedasticity into the modelling process due to the "scale 
effect" of the largest firms. This effect arises due to the non-linearity in the relation 
between market capitalisation and the financial statement variables. To analyse the 
impact of scaling by market value on the distribution of earnings, four earnings 
distributions have been drawn, one for each of the market value quartiles (Figure 
6.11). Panels A, B, C and D show the earnings distribution for the first, second, third 
and fourth market value quartiles, respectively. It can be observed that the fourth 
quartile shows a higher degree of discontinuity, comparing to the A, B 
and C. 
To investigate further this finding, a separate histogram is plotted, for the 
observations with earnings scaled by market value in the region of (0, +0.07) (Figure 
6.12, panel C). It can be inferred from the previous analysis in section 5.2 that the 
specific region contains a high number of companies that managed earnings to move 
from negative to small positive earnings. In panel C, it is shown that companies from 
the top quartile, by market value, are more likely to be found at the earnings region of 
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(0, +0.07) than companies in the smaller quarters. Panel C shows that companies with 
high market value are more likely to appear on the examined earnings region. 
To assess the robustness of the findings in the sections 6.5.1,6.5.2,6.5.3 and 
6.5.4, alternative scale measures to market value are utilised. The same plots have 
been drawn using Total Assets and Sales as scaling variables, in figures 6.12 and 6.13 
respectively. The observed discontinuity remains robust in alternative scaling 
variables. 
6.6.3 Time evolvement of earnings discontinuity 
In their survey Choi et at. (2007) report a consensus view that the general 
quality of earnings improved over the last years, while earnings thresholds might be a 
widespread phenomenon, firms are now less likely to use discretionary accounting 
choices to meet thresholds. The evidence of Choi et al. (2007) suggest that a 
substantial proportion of the 500 largest UK listed non-financial firms (over 70%) 
exploited the option to disclose alternative earnings per share (EPS) on core earnings 
supports this concern. 
Panel B in Figure 6.11 shows a distribution by year for the observations with 
earnings level scaled by market value in the region of (0,0.07). The previous analysis 
in this chapter suggests that this region has a high frequency of companies with 
managed earnings, as a result of the discontinuity at the zero level. Panel B shows that 
firms in latest years are more likely to appear in this region, as there are more than 
300 observations from the year 2006 and less than 100 from the year 1990. The 
increased number of observations from the last years (after 2005) suggests that the 
introduction of the IFRS has not deteriorated the use of earnings management to move 
from small negative earnings to small positive. 
This is consistent with Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) that analyse the effect 
of the mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on earnings management. They find 
that the pervasiveness of earnings management did not decline after the introduction 
of IFRS. Aisbitt (2006) analyses the reconciliations of equity presented as part of the 
transition from UK GAAP to IFRS by the FTSE 100 companies and finds that the 
overall effect on equity is not significant. The research concludes that "UK accounting 
practice is generally regarded as coming from a similar model of development to 
IFRS (the 'Anglo-Saxon' model), so users may not expect companies to make high 
levels of adjustments to their reported figures. " 
161 
6.6.4 Accounting Rules and Conservatism 
Another reason a discontinuity could be observed in earnings is because of accounting 
rules that encourage immediate loss recognition but prorate gain recognition 
(accounting conservatism). An example of this is asset impairment tests. If a firm 
purchases an asset that is expected to earn a high return, this gain is not recognised 
immediately, but instead is recognised as earned over the life of the asset. However, if 
the same firm purchases an asset that is not productive (i. e., will result in small future 
losses over its life), the firm is required to recognise the full extent of the losses 
immediately. More specifically IAS 36 (par. 60) states that "An impairment loss shall 
be recognise immediately in profit or loss. " 
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Fig 6.11: Four empirical distributions of earnings scaled by market value categorised according to the pattern of 
quartiles in the market value, from Panel A to Panel D 
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Panel D: Distribution of Earnings Scaled by Market 
Value for observations in the fourth inter-quartile 
market value range. 
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Panel A: Empirical Distribution of frequency by year for observations in the (0, +0.01) interval of 
earning increases scaled by Market Value. 
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Panel B: Empirical Distribution of frequency by year for observations in the (0, +0.07) interval of earning 
scaled by Market Value. 
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Panel C: Empirical Distribution of frequency by market value quartile for observations in the (0, +0.07) 
interval of earning scaled by Market Value. 
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Fig 6.12: Analysis by year and size for the intervals with high likelihood of earnings management. Panel A: 
Distribution of earnings changes scaled by market value in the interval (0, +0.001) for the years 1990-2006. 
Panle B: A distribution of earnings level scaled by market value in the interval (0, +0.07) for the years 
1990-2006. Panle C: A distribution of the 4 quartile ranges of market value (lower 25%/,, 25%-50%, 50%- 
75%, 75%-100%) for the (0,0.07) interval of earnings scaled by market value. 
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Similarly, the lower of cost or market value for inventory results in prorating profits 
but immediate recognition of future losses. More specifically lAS 2 (par. 9) states that 
"Inventories shall be measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value" Net 
realisable value is the estimated selling price in the ordinary course of business less 
the estimated cost of completion and the estimated costs necessary to make the sale 
(IAS 2, par. 6). The effect of these asymmetric accounting treatments is to shift 
potential small loss firms to the left tail of the distribution and profitable firms to the 
small profit region. One of the limitations of this research is that no formal tests are 
provided for this explanation. 
6.6.5 Financial Assets 
The presence of financial assets on the balance sheet could contribute to a 
concentrated mass of small profit firms. Financial assets earn dividends or interests, 
neither of which can be negative. A company treating a financial asset as "held to 
maturity" can "lock" on a targeted income stream that remains unaffected from the 
market fluctuations, achieving a positive impact in the income statement. More 
specifically, lAS 39 (par. 9) defines "held to maturity investments" as: "Non- 
derivative assets with fixed or determinable payments and fixed maturity that an 
entity has a positive intention and ability to hold to maturity". Regarding their 
measurement: "held to maturity investments as defined in paragraph 9, shall be 
measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method" 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter a large sample of UK firm-years is studied and is documented that 
earnings are distributed discontinuously around basic thresholds while non- 
discretionary earnings are not. This chapter provides empirical evidence that earnings 
decreases and losses are frequently avoided thought earnings management. Evidence 
suggests a significant percentage of the companies with small pre-managed earnings 
decreases or losses exercise discretion to report earnings increases or profits. 
Moreover it is found that earnings management to avoid losses is more pervasive than 
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. The results are robust to alternative 
methods of scaling earnings and various ways of subdividing the population. 
Examining earnings management to avoid losses, evidence suggests two components 
167 
of earnings: cash flow from operating activities and changes in working capital, are 
used to manage earnings. 
Concentrating on discretionary accruals, evidence suggest that non- 
discretionary earnings are not distributed discontinuously around basic targets. It is 
reported that discretionary accruals have the effect of increasing the frequency of 
positive earnings levels and changes. This evidence confirms the hypothesis that 
discretionary accruals are used in managing earnings to achieve threshold. The 
specific manner in which firms use discretionary accruals should be considered when 
using them to proxy for earnings management. As firms may use, discretionary 
accruals to reduce earnings in order to reduce the impact of a significant loss expected 
in the future. 
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Chapter 7 
The characteristics of FRRP 
- 
investigated companies 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter four discussed the organisation responsible for enforcing accounting 
standards in the UK being the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). It is 
responsible for reviewing apparent departures from the accounting requirements of 
the Companies Act or the IFRS and forcing remedial action where the financial 
statements in question appear to be defective. Prior research suggests that the FRRP is 
perceived to have a positive impact on the quality of financial reporting in the UK 
since it began operations in 1991 (Hines et al., 2001; Peasnell et al., 2004). Yet little 
work has been conducted on the characteristics of companies whose published 
financial statements have been concluded by the FRRP to be defective. 
This chapter compares companies whose financial statements were publicly 
censured by the FRRP between January 1994 and December 2007 to a control sample 
of companies, matched by industry SIC code. The research findings can be 
summarised as follows: FRRP companies are characterised by significantly poorer 
performance during the period in which the defective financial statements were 
published. The comparative weak financial condition of FRRP firms is manifested in 
a number of ways. They have a higher frequency of losses and earnings decreases, 
they are more leveraged, with a higher frequency of dividend decreases and 
deteriorating return on assets. Further examination, however highlights that the 
performance difficulties experienced by the FRRP sample are largely concentrated at 
the defect year. Especially, their earnings performance is generally indistinguishable 
from that of the control sample in the years adjacent to the violation year. 
This chapter also examines the characteristics of certain control mechanisms 
that companies might be expected to employ, to maintain the integrity of their 
financial statements. It is found that FRRP companies are significantly less likely to 
have a Big Four auditor and significantly more likely to have a new auditor at the 
defect year and more likely to pay higher audit fees that the control sample. There is 
also provided evidence that FRRP firms have weaker corporate governance structures, 
as reflected in a lower average proportion of non-executive directors. 
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The results of this chapter confirm many of the findings from the growing 
number of US studies that examine the characteristics of firms found to have issued 
defective financial statements. This is despite some important differences between the 
characteristics of the examined sample of UK companies and those that feature in US 
studies of poor or defective accounting. For example, the cases examined by Beasley 
(1996) and Agrawal et al. (1999) deal with instances of outright fraudulent financial 
reporting. The companies in most of the US studies tend to be small IPOs that have 
adopted aggressive earnings recognition methods. In the UK, companies engaging in 
fraudulent reporting would regularly fall within the scope of the Theft Act 1978 and 
Fraud Act 2006 and as such would not be the responsibility of the FRRP. 
Additionally, the average size of the companies in the FRRP sample is much larger 
than those in the US studies 
- 
the FRRP has censured some of the country's major 
companies (e. g. British Gas plc) 
- 
and accounting defects are generally less serious. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
provides further details of the FRRP and the financial reporting environment in which 
it operates. Section 3 presents the motivation and research questions. Section 4 
describes the sample of FRRP cases and provides details of the research design. 
Section 5 provides a comparison of the characteristics of the FRRP and control 
samples while Section 6 explores a multivariate test. Section'7 summarises the main 
findings and discusses their implications. 
7.2 Institutional Background 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of high profile accounting scandals and 
unexpected corporate failures raised concerns about the integrity of UK financial 
reporting and the effectiveness of accounting regulation (Shah, 1996; Smith, 1992). In 
the absence of a formal mechanism for enforcing accounting standards, creative 
accounting was perceived to be commonplace (Shah, 1996; Tweedie and Whittington, 
1990) and while auditors, analysts, and the popular press partially constrained such 
activity, their impact appeared to be weak and inconsistent (Shah, 1998) 
Chapter four discussed how the FRRP started operating in 1991 as part of a 
fundamentally restructured accounting standards-setting system39. The FRRP is an 
39 This restructured system saw the body previously charged with developing accounting standards, the 
Accounting Standards Committee, replaced by the Financial Reporting Council and its subsidiary 
bodies, the Accounting Standards Board, the Urgent Issues Task Force, and the FRRP. In addition, 
company law was also amended to give accounting standards statutory recognition for the first time. 
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enforcement agency whose role is to examine material departures from the accounting 
requirements of the Companies Act 1985 and IFRS. Its jurisdiction is restricted to 
companies' annual reports and its remit encompasses all public limited and large 
private companies. The agency recently adopted a proactive approach to the detection 
of defective financial reporting in the sense that it routinely scrutinises company 
reports falling within its remit. It also relies on complaints made by third parties and 
the public, to identify cases of defective accounting. The three primary sources of 
complaint that trigger an investigation are (i) a qualified audit report or disclosed non- 
compliance with accounting standards or other requirements, (ii) referral by an 
individual or a corporate body, and (iii) press comment. The FRRP never reveals the 
identity of the complainant, or in what context the complaint was made. The Panel's 
investigations may address not only the original subject of the complaint but also any 
additional financial reporting issues that come to light during the review process. 
In the event that the FRRP deems the accounting treatment under question not to be 
justified on the grounds of providing a true and fair view, remedial action is required. 
This usually takes the form of either a revision or retrospective restatement of the 
published figures. In attempting to resolve cases requiring remedial action, the FRRP 
first seeks to persuade the company in question to voluntarily accept the decision and 
implement the required corrective action. Failing that, the FRRP has the legal power 
to apply to the court of an order requiring the financial statements to be restated. In 
the event that the court upholds such a request, all legal costs, together with any 
reasonable expenses incurred by the firm in revising its accounts, must be borne by 
the directors who approved the defective statements (Companies Act 1989). 
In all cases to date, a voluntary solution has been agreed, although 
preparations for an application to the court have been at an advanced stage on several 
occasions. At the conclusion of a case where remedial action has been taken, the 
FRRP normally issues a public statement providing details of the cases and the 
method of resolution. In addition to simply reporting the details of a case, these public 
statements also play a wider role by providing information and guidance on 
contentious accounting treatments, often with the objective of deterring others 
(McBamet and Whelan, 1999). For those firms investigated by the FRRP but against 
which no action is brought, neither the details of cases nor the identity of firms are 
publicly disclosed. The set off adverse public rulings issued by the FRRP therefore 
represents the only observable output of the whole process. 
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As discussed in Chapter four, the way the FRRP identifies firms for 
investigation is similar to the approach adopted in the US by Securities and 
Exchanges Commission (Feroz et al., 1991). However, the FRRP has fewer resources 
than the SEC and is therefore probably even more reliant on complaints from third 
parties, with the subsequent biases this involves40 (Peasnell et al., 1991). Additionally, 
it is possible that considerations outside the scope of financial reporting influence the 
likelihood of an adverse ruling by the FRRP. For example, some academics have 
suggested that company size is an important consideration in the FRRP's decision to 
issue an adverse ruling because smaller companies represent `softer' targets, in the 
sense that they are less likely to challenge the FRRP's decision (Brandt et al., 1997). 
On the other hand, the FRRP has also been accused of preferring to target large, high 
profile companies to enhance external perceptions of its work (Hines et al., 2001). 
The FRRP has always been keen to promote the notion that its decision making 
process to issue an adverse ruling is based merely on defective accounting practice. 
7.3 Motivation and research questions 
7.3.1 Motivation 
The majority of the current research on the FRRP directly examines its procedures 
and activities as a means of assessing its effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism 
and its resulting impact on the quality of UK financial reporting (Fearnley et al., 2000; 
Hines et al., 2001; Brandt et al., 1997). In contrast, this chapter adopts a different 
perspective as it focuses on the outputs of the process (i. e. the set of firms censured by 
the Panel). Firms censured by the Panel are interesting for several reasons. First, an 
examination of censured firms may help to shed light on the drivers of low accounting 
quality. In the same way, Beneish (1999), Dechow et al., (1996), and Beasley (1996) 
use firms subject to SEC Enforcement Actions to investigate why and how US 
managers manipulate earnings. Publicly censured companies represent exogenously 
determined examples of poor accounting and as such help to overcome the 
measurement problems that confound other more commonly used earnings 
management proxies (i. e. discretionary accruals). 
40 One of the major problems of reliance on complaints is that the motivation of the "whistle blower" 
may be other than the simple desire to promote good accounting. For example, Butte Mining (press 
notice #43) was referred to the FRRP by Roberson Group who held a 4% stake in Butte at the time but 
Butte were pursuing over a claim for f 
-100m. McBarnet and 
Whelan (1999) point out that another 
common situation producing referrals is a contested takeover. 
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Companies censured by the FRRP are also interesting because they represent 
the only visible aspect of the enforcement process in the UK. Evidence on the 
characteristics of companies subject to adverse ruling may also provide a source of 
information about the way accounting standards arc enforced in the UK. It should be 
recognised that this aspect of enforcement process also limits the inferences that can 
be formed from studying such companies. Especially, these unobservable aspects of 
the FRRP's operations create potential selection biases, the result of which is that the 
censured companies may not be representative of the population of defective 
reporters. Similar research of SEC Enforcement Action companies faces identical 
issues. Accordingly, while systematic differences between censured and non censured 
firms are expected to be observed, the extent to which those differences reflect the 
causes of low accounting quality, as opposed to the procedures of the censorship 
decision or the probability of referral, remain an open question. 
7.3.2 Research Questions 
Prior research has identified a number of causes that create motives for directors to 
manipulate and violate the GAAP. These include poor performance (Degcorge et al., 
1999; Burgtahler and Dichev, 1997), high leverage (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) 
and the desire to raise equity finance at low cost (Dcchow ct al., 1996). For the 
purpose of this research, these factors are labelled `financial motives' and is predicted 
that they will be positively associated with the incidence of defective financial 
reporting. It is also predicted that these factors could also capture the increased 
probability of triggering a FRRP investigation. Especially, the financial statements of 
poorly performing companies, highly geared companies and companies seeking to 
raise equity from the capital markets are likely to have been subject to greater scrutiny 
by external parties, thereby increasing the probability that a specific reporting defect 
will be drawn to the FRRP's attention. 
Academic research (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) and policy 
initiatives (Cadbury Report, 1992, Greenbury Report, 1995) emphasise the 
importance of effective corporate governance for ensuring directors' accountability to 
shareholders. Dechow et al., (1996) and 13caslcy (1996) present evidence that firms 
violating US GAAP tend to have weak corporate governance structures. It is therefore 
predicted that FRRP censure will be positively related to weak corporate governance 
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structures. Similar to Dechow et al., (1996), the following governance mechanisms 
are examined: 
(i) Boards: Management is monitored by the board. Financial statements are 
significant tools in the monitoring process and their integrity is the 
responsibility of the board. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards are less 
likely to monitor management effectively and are easier for the CEO to 
control. Both Yermack (1996) for the US and Conyon and Peck (1998) for 
the UK present evidence consistent with the view that larger boards are 
less effective monitors of directors. It is therefore predicted that FRRP 
companies will be more likely to have larger boards. Outside directors 
(non-executive directors) are hypothesised to be key agents in the 
monitoring process (Fama and Jensen, 1985). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Peasnell et al., (2001 and 2000) report a significant association 
between board composition and within-GAAP accruals management 
(earnings management) for UK companies. Thus, it is predicted that FRRP 
companies will have a lower proportion of outside directors. Finally, in 
addition to these measures of board quality, directors' remuneration is 
tested. This analysis is motivated by recent debates in the directors' 
remuneration domain (Conyon et al., 2006) concerning the possible link 
between directors' compensation and motivation for violating GAAP. 
However, given their uncertain relationship with director quality, there is 
offered no explicit prediction for this variable. 
(ii) Auditing: The role of the audit is to assure the true and fair view of the 
financial statements. FRRP censure is prima facie evidence of defective 
financial reporting and therefore audit failure. Reputation considerations 
suggest that Big Four auditors may have more to lose from being 
associated with poor auditing (Lennox, 1999). Other things being equal, 
good audits also cost more (Craswell et at., 1995). It is therefore predicted 
that FRRP firms are more likely to be audited by a non Big Four firm and 
to switch auditor in the period surrounding the defect year either because 
of director-auditor disagreements over the accounting issue in question, or 
because of the perceived failure of the auditor to defend the agreed and 
reporting decision. 
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For the purpose of this research, these factors are referred to as `governance 
constraints'. 
The empirical analysis described in the next sections aims to test the following 
hypotheses, as stated in chapter three: 
Hs: FRRP companies are characterised by deteriorating performance in the 
defect year. 
H9: Corporate governance in FRRP companies is of a lower quality comparing 
to the control sample. 
Hio: The financial variables described in M-Score model are correlated with 
the likelihood of earnings manipulation. 
7.4 Sample and research design 
Based on a review of the earnings management literature, there are identified seven 
models that are commonly used to capture earnings management (Dechow et al. 1995; 
McNichols 2000; and Kothari; et at. 2005). The models examined are described below: 
Jones Model 
TA;, = ßo + ßl(1/AT, t. 1) + ß20REVit + ß3PPE +cit (1) 
TA; 1 is total accruals estimated as the difference between income and operating cash 
flows for year t; AT; 1.1is assets at the beginning of the year; AREV;, is the change in 
sales from year t-1 to t; and PPE is gross property plant and equipment. In model (1) 
TA, OREV and PPE are scaled by AT; 1.1. 
Modified Jones Model 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), the modified Jones model is estimated as follows: 
TA; 1= ßo + Ri(1/ATiº-I) + ß2 (AREV; 1- DARM) + R3PPEjc +c11 (2) 
AAR is the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to t and other variables are the 
same as defined before. Dechow et al. (1995) point out that the Jones (1991) model 
implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either in the 
estimation period or the event period. The modified Jones model assumes that all 
changes in credit sales in the event period are due to earnings management. 
Modified Jones Model with Boot-to-Market Ratio and Cash Flows 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) add the book-to-market ratio (BM) and operating 
cashlfows (CFO) to model (2) to mitigate measurement error associated with the 
discretionary accruals. BM controls for expected growth in operations and if 1eß 
uncontrolled, growth will be picked up as discretionary accruals. CFO controls for 
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current operating performance. Controlling for performance is important because 
Dechow et at. (1995) find that discretionary accruals are likely to be misspecified for 
firms with extreme levels of performance. Larker and Richardson (2004) note that 
their model is superior to the modified Jones model in several ways: it has a far 
greater explanatory power, it identifies discretionary accruals that are associated with 
lower future earnings and lower future stock returns, and the estimated discretionary 
accruals detect earnings management identified in SEC enforcement actions. 
TA1t = ßo + R1(1/AT1c-1) + P2 (OREV; t - AAR1i) + (33PPE; 1 +ß4BM1c + ß5CFO1º +c it (3) 
Where BM equals to book value of common equity over the market value of common 
equity and CFO is operating cash flows over ATt_i. Other variables are the same as 
defined before. 
Modified Jones Model with ROA 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that accruals of firms that have experienced unusual 
performance are expected to be systematically non-zero, and therefore, firm 
performance is correlated with accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) examine two ways to 
control for performance in estimating discretionary accruals. A performance variable 
such as ROA could be included as an additional independent variable in the 
discretionary accrual regression. Alternatively, performance matched discretionary 
accruals can be calculated by first matching the firm-year observation of the treatment 
firm with the firm-year observation for the control firm from the same two-digit SIC 
code and the year with the closest ROA in the current year or the prior year and then 
subtracting the control firm's discretionary accruals from the treatment firm's 
discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) find that matching based on the current 
year ROA performs better that matching on the prior year ROA and this performance- 
matched approach is superior to including a performance variable in the discretionary 
accruals regression. 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), Jones et al. (2007), develop a measure of 
discretionary accruals to control for performance. Model (4) includes current year 
ROA, where ROA1 is income for year t over AT; t_1. 
TA; t = ßo + p1(1/ATit-i) + (32 (OREV; t - iAR1t) + ß3PPE11 +04ROA11 + cig (4) 
Measures of Accrual Quality 
The next model is Dechow and Dichev's (2002) model of accrual estimation errors. 
Dechow and Dichev estimate the following firm-level time-series regression to derive 
a measure of working capital accrual quality: 
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AWC,, = ßo + 01CFO, 1. I + (CFO,, + II3CFO,, 
.i+ co (5) 
OWC is the change in working capital from year t-1 to year t. All variables in model 
(5) are deflated by beginning total assets. Dcchow and Dichcv (2002) use the standard 
deviation of the residuals from model (5) as a Pan-specific measure of accrual 
quality. Dechow and Dichev require at least eight years of data to estimate model (5). 
McNichols (2002) presents evidence that model (5) can be enhanced by 
including OREV and PPE. The variables in the model arc scaled by beginning total 
assets: 
OWC, t = ßo + ßICFO,, 
-i + ß: CFO + 03CFO,,. i+f, AREV + psPPC + C.,, (6) 
Margin Model 
Peasnell et al. (2000) test the standard-Jones (Jones. 199! ) and modified-Jones 
(Dechow ei al.. 1995) models in the UK setting; they also develop and test a new 
specification, labelled the 'margin model". The model is specified as follows: 
WCA = ßo + ß1 REV;, + NCR,, + rj (7) 
REV is total sales, CR is total sales minus the change in trade debtors and WCA is 
working capital accruals. The I3' coefficient represents an estimate of the sales margin 
and is predicted to be positive, while the fh coefficient represents an estimate of the 
cash margin and is predicted to be negative. Regarding their relative performance, the 
standard-Jones and modified-Jones models arc found to be more powerful for revenue 
and bad debt manipulations. In contrast, the margin model appears to be more 
powerful at detecting non-bad debt expense manipulations (Pcasncll ct al., 2000). 
In this thesis discretionary accruals arc estimated using Jones (1991) model 
rather than available alternatives, guided by Peasncll ct al. (2000b). They evaluate the 
specification and power of alternative methods of estimating DACC using U. K. data. 
The results they report suggest that, on the whole, alternative models currently 
available are not superior to the Jones (1991) model in terms of ability to detect 
plausible levels of earnings management. The measure of WCA and the DACC 
estimation technique in this thesis closely resemble those used by Peasncll et al. 
(2000b). 
The process used to identify the sample of FRRP adverse rulings is 
summarised in Table 7.1. From 1994 to 2007 FRRI' investigated 871 cases. of which 
581 (67%) were pursued beyond an initial investigation. From those cases pursued 
beyond an initial investigation, 108 (12%) were publicly censured for issuing 
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defective financial statements. Two further cases (First Choice Holidays plc and Isoft 
plc), while not the subject of a press statement, was discussed in the 1995 and 2006 
Progress Reports and are therefore included in the population of adverse rulings. Of 
the remaining cases 338 were judged not to have been defective, while 9 were 
outstanding pending further investigation. These cases represent the starting point for 
the sample of defective annual reports. Five cases are not included in this initial 
population because they relate to private companies, for which the necessary data 
(including the matched control companies) could not be gathered, resulting in a final 
sample of 98 defective rulings issued against 92 companies. 89 companies received a 
single adverse ruling while 3 received two separate adverse rulings for unrelated 
matters41. 
The 98 public statements report 203 separate financial reporting issues in total. 
In only 21 cases (21%) were the defective statements accompanied by a qualified 
audit report, 3 of which are for reasons other than those investigated by the FRRP42. 
Many of the defects relate to the introduction of new accounting standards43 
. 
The 
defective accounting treatments impacted directly on reported earnings or equity in 93 
cases (95%). In the majority of theses cases, the defective accounting treatment had a 
positive impact on earnings, increasing profits. The remaining 5 cases related to 
disclosure and classification issues. Remedial action was agreed in 91 cases, in the 
most cases was in the form of correcting the defect retrospectively in the subsequent 
year's accounts by restating comparatives or improving disclosure. 
The companies discovered to manipulate earnings were matched with a 
control sample by industry code. Since earnings management literature suggests that 
industry membership is reported to influence the likelihood of earnings management 
(Stice, 1991), earnings manipulators were matched with control companies based on 
their SIC code. Focusing in industries with increased risk of financial reporting 
41 The four companies with two adverse rulings are: Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust plc, Butte 
Mining plc, Associated Nursing Services plc and Stratagem plc. In the subsequent tests, adverse rulings 
for the same company are treated as independent events. In additional tests, all analyses are repeated 
restricting the sample to a single adverse ruling per company. Results bases on this restricted sample 
were not materially different from those reported using the full sample and are therefore not reported. 
42 In the cases where a defect is identified that is not referred to the auditors' report, the FRRP must 
also report the case to the audit firm's regulatory body (usually the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales), which may then take disciplinary action against the auditor. The ICAEW 
disciplines auditors involved in FRRP cases (Fearnley et al., 2000). 
For example, three cases associated with the reporting of cash flow statements followed soon after 
the introduction of FRS 1, two cases of non-consolidation of subsidiaries followed the redefinition of 
subsidiaries in FRS 2, and five cases dealing with the analysis of shareholders' funds followed the 
introduction of FRS 4. 
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misstatement is an approach applied in both US and UK earnings management 
research. In the US Bonner et al. (1998), Summer and Sweeney (1998), Kothari et al. 
(2005), Banov et al. (2001) investigate the characteristics of companies engaging into 
earnings manipulation, comparing them to an industry matched sample. In the UK 
Peasnell et al. (2000) investigate earnings manipulation in the UK comparing a 
sample of manipulators, to a control sample matched by industry. Athanasakou ct al. 
(2007,2010) explore earnings management in the UK applying a similar approach, 
investigating earnings management in cross sectional samples, matched by industry 
type. 
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In only 7 of the cases was the company required to issue statements to their 
shareholders, restating their current year accounts. Table 7.2 reports the distribution of 
adverse rulings by industry classification and calendar year. Results rcportcd in Panel 
A provide no evidence of any significant industry clustering, with 29 Datastrcam 
level-6 industry groups represented in the final sample, General Engineering has the 
highest number of adverse rulings with 9 cases followed by Industrial Components 
with 8 cases. The lack of any specific industry patterns among censured firms 
contrasts with the sample of SEC Enforcement Actions examined by Dcchow ct al. 
(1996) and Beneish (1999). In those US studies, sample companies tend to cluster in 
certain industries (e. g. electronics, computing and financial services). These 
differences may be driven by the SEC's proactive focus on recognition issues that 
offer significant opportunities for earnings management (Dechow ct al., 1995). 
Panel B of Table 7.2 presents the frequency of defective financial statements 
across time. The earliest balance sheet date in the FRRP sample is 31 December 1992 
and the latest is 30 June 2007. Except for 2001 with 11 defective reports (11%). there 
is little evidence of any substantial accumulation of events in calendar time, although 
there is some slight suggestion that the number of cases may have fallen in recent 
years. 4 In the subsequent sections, the period covered by the defective financial 
statements is referred to as 'defect year ()'. 
Consistent with the approach used by Dcchow et al., (1996) and Lenz ct al., 
(2008) to study the characteristics of firms subject to SEC Enforcement Actions, a 
similar research design is applied; using a control sample matched by the four digit 
SIC code. The 98 FRRP cases in the final sample are matched with a control sample 
of 3,691 observations. Results presented in Table 7.3 indicate that the matching 
procedure has been successful in identifying control companies of similar 
characteristics. FRRP companies have medial total assets of £546m. compared with 
£745 for the control sample. A paircd-Wilcoxon test fails to reject the null h)pothcsis 
that these values differ. Results presented in Table 7.3 also indicate that equity of the 
two samples does not differ significantly: median equity for the FRRP sample is 
260m, compared with 328m for the control sample. Overall. FRRP companies appear 
"The higher frequency of adverse ruling in 2001 is consistent with the hypothc%c% that the Panel was 
especially keen to establish its authority as an effective enforcement mechanism during the catty part of its operation (Styles, 1909). 
181 
Table 7.2 
Size, time and industry characteristics for a sample of 98 cases subject to adverse rulings by the FRRP. 
Panel A: FRRP companies by Datastream 6 industry classification 
Code Name Observations Code Name Observations 
AERSP Aerospace 2 LEISR Leisure facilities 5 
BANKS Banks 1 MEDPD Medical prod. & suppl. 3 
BMERC Builders merchants 3 MIFIN Mining I 
BRCAS Broadcasting I MINES other mining 1 
BUSUP Business support 3 OILIN Oil, integrated I 
CHAIN Chain stores 5 OTHBM Other building materials 3 
Industrial 
DCOMP components 8 OTHCN Other constructions 4 
Diversified 
DIVIN industrials 6 PAPER Paper & packaging 4 
ELETR Electronic equipment 3 RLDEV Property 6 
ENGIN General engineering 9 PUBLS Publishing 4 
FDPRD Food producers 3 TELCM Telecommunications 3 
Hospital 
HOSPM management 4 TEXOT Textiles & leather goods 2 
HOTEL Hotel 3 WASTE Waste control 1 
INSNL Insurance (non-life) 4 WINES Spirits, wines & ciders 2 
INVTR Investment trusts 3 To tal 98 
Panel B: Calendar year of defective annual report 
Year Number of cases Year Number of cases 
1994 7 2001 11 
1995 6 2002 10 
1996 3 2003 9 
1997 5 2004 8 
1998 2 2005 6 
1999 8 2006 5 
2000 7 2007 2 
2001 9 Total 98 
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Table 73 
Company financial characteristics, measured at beginning of defe ct year. The sample of the "manipulators" Is compared azk; a 
the control sample. 
f'OOOs t'OOOs 
FRRP Control I RRP Control 
(n=98) (n=3,691) (n-98) (n-3,691) 
Variable Median Median Variable Median Median 
(Mean) (Mean) p-value (Mean) (Mean) p-tiahx 
Total assets 546,454 744,658 0.224 Plant and 11.197 19,955 0113 
employed (63,417) (20.723) 0.315 Vehicles (1,534) (58) QOK4 
242,461 381,980 0.152 Total Current 235,666 364,475 Q1 
Revenue (13,512) (47,315) 0.104 Assets (26,161) (7,265) 0.161 
118,749 200,136 0.070 51,150 6.985 00x 
Cost of Revenue (4,367) (8,927) 0.041 Inventory (972) (52) QCaw 
Sell. Gen. Admin 145,272 169,490 0.007 57,842 36.171 0-025 
Expenses (7,391) (15,556) 0.003 Trade Debtors (4.889) (1,300) 0.013 
7,917 9,866 0.153 259.749 328.397 0348 
Dividend expense (0) (447) 0.125 Equity (25,709) (9,153) 0256 
7,746 3,255 0.002 439,469 112,937 0- 
Tax liability (463) (0) 0.001 Long term debt (802) (1.594) 0.017 
Cashflow from 1,072 22,173 0.000 Current 158.359 139,846 Q=, 
operations (2) (2,557) 0.001 Liabilities (6.645) (19.193) 0.012 
Depreciation 11,327 14,037 0.027 1.801 880 p.. (L; 9 
Expense (747) (360) 0.021 Audit ices (45) (75) 0.091 
1,027 30,307 0.000 266 609 0-148 
Profit after tax (1,340) (1,269) 0.013 Non Audit fees (20) (25) 0.1 2 
17,576 18,937 0.413 Directors 12.030 11.620 0, OL\) 
EBITDA (2,918) (1.201) 0.318 Remuneration (71K) (427) Q= 
Land and 71.881 921,187 0.004 Ca%h & Ca%h 35,996 76,800 (1, 
Buildings (63) (952) 0.002 equivalents (980) (4,518) Qtll. l 
N 98 3,691 
A paired t-Wilcoxon testis used to evaluate the difference in means (medians) for the financial %ariahles examined. 
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Five years of data beginning one year prior to and ending three years after the defect 
year were collected for the companies in each of the FRRP and control samples. The 
primary data source was FAME, supplemented by information from DataStream. 
Table 7.4 reports the frequency of various types of GAAP violation. There 
were 98 instances of UK GAAP and IFRS violation identified for 92 companies. The 
most frequent type was the failure to comply with the revenue realisation principle (9 
cases). Examples of revenue recording violations include creating false invoices, 
keeping the books open past the end of the accounting period, and recognising 
revenues before products were completed, shipped or contracts signed. The matching 
principle was also violated, by recording fictitious inventory, failing to write off or 
provide for impaired assets and capitalising expenses. Examples include the 
overstatement of inventory via double counting, treating non-existent inventory as in 
transit, failure to write off uncollectible debtors or obsolete inventory, and capitalising 
research costs. 
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Table 7.4 
Type and Effect of GAAP Violation in the sample of 98 true and fair view Violators 
Panel A: Type of Violation 
Revenue principle 
Recording fictitious revenue 
Recording unearned or unrealisable revenue 
Failing to book sales returns 
Improperly using the percentage of completion method 
Reporting on-time gains as ordinary income 
Matching principle 
Recording fictitious inventory 
Failure to write off uncollectibles and obsolete inventory 
Capitalisation of marketing and R&D costs 
Understating liabilities 
Understating expenses 
Number of 
companies 
7 
6 
7 
6 
4 
Other 
Reporting non-existing assets 
Fraudulent scheme involving lease transactions 
No disclosure of transactions with directors 
Misleading reporting of inter-company transactions 
Failure to provide for known warranty expenses 
Failure to warn of contingent liabilities 
Misclassification of financial assets held to maturity 
Total 
7 
8 
6 
5 
6 
8 
5 
6 
6 
5 
4 
2 
98 
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7.5 The characteristics of censured firms 
7.5.1 Univariate analysis 
7.5.1.1 Financial motives 
Firstly, it is examined the profitability of the FRRP and control samples is analysed 
over the period surrounding the defect year. Panel A of Figure 7.1 reports median 
earnings levels from year 
-1 to year +3, while Panel B reports median earnings 
changes. Two graphs are presented in each Panel, one using the original reported 
earnings for the FRRP sample and the other using the year 0 restated figures for the 
FRRP sample. 5 The control sample series are the same for both graphs in each Panel. 
Both level and change specifications are scaled by beginning of period book value of 
shareholders' equity. A steep decline in both the level and change in earnings is 
clearly evident for the FRRP sample in the defect year, using either the published or 
the restated earnings figures. Additional examination of Panels A and B reveals that 
the performance issues experienced by the FRRPP sample appear to be largely 
confined to the defect year, their performance is similar to that of the control sample 
in years 
-1, +1 and +2 As such, their poor profitability appears to 
be related to short- 
term difficulties than any inherent long-term weaknesses. Furthermore, as the decline 
is evident for the as-published series in Panel A, it suggests that any efforts by 
directors of FRRP companies to use GAAP violations as a means of masking their 
company's deteriorating profitability were not successful. 
45 The restated figures are obtained from the revised accounts and the retrospectively restated 
comparative figures presented in firms annual reports in year +1. 
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Figure 7.1 
Median level and change in reported earnings, scaled by beginning of year equity, for the F RRP and control 
samples. Separate plots are presented using the Profit after to:, before and after the violation (restated figures in 
year 0 and published in years 
-1, +1, +2, +3) for the F IZRP sample. The F UIRP companies are matched %Ith a 
control sample on the basis of their 4 digit SIC code. The solid line represents the F RIM sample and the broken 
line represents the control sample. 
Panel A: Earnings Levels 
The solid (broken) line is the FRRP (Control) sample 
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Table 7.5 
Financial performance for FRRP and control samples. FRRP c ompanies are matched with ac ontrol sa mple on the basis of 
their 4 digit SIC categorisation. 
Year relative to defect year 
Year-1 Year 0 Year 1 
Variable FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value 
N 98 3,691 98 3,691 98 3,691 
Panel A: Earnings performance 
Earnings (published) 
Mcan 0.094 0.215 0.094 0.019 0.041 0.098 0.46 0.023 0.068 
Median 0.113 0.127 0.515 0.021 0.061 0.081 0.072 0.028 0.075 
Earnings (restated) 
Mean n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.005 0.041 0.071 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Median n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.051 0.061 0.063 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
yearnings (published) 
Mean 0.027 0.039 0.292 0.017 0.003 0.315 0.028 0.011 0.083 
Median 0.011 0.015 0.214 0.000 0.006 0.047 0.018 0.017 0.095 
Panel B: Earnings relative to targets 
Earnings (published) <_ 0 (%) 21.20 12.78 0.438 26.41 10.78 0.023 24.51 12.85 0.31 
Earnings (restated) <_ 0 (%) n. a. n. a. n. a. 32.40 10.78 0.006 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
AEarnings (published) <0 (!: ) 52.15 28.42 0.012 51.32 30.12 0.015 51.46 29.15 0.27 
AEarnings (restated) <0 (%) n. a. n. a. n. a. 55.21 30.12 0.004 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Panel C: Additional characteristics 
Dividend increase 
-I (%) 
Leverage 
Mean 0.824 0.695 0.015 0.727 0.582 0.082 0.764 0.724 0.086 
Median 0.718 0.615 0.012 0.612 0.488 0.094 0.687 0.685 0.091 
Operating cash flows 
Mean 0.002 0.035 0.092 0.001 0.041 0.129 0.012 0.041 0.072 
Median 0.000 0.030 0.081 0.000 0.040 0.081 0.011 0.039 0.068 
Probability values relate to one-tailed tests. Difference in means (medians) are assessed using a paired t test (Wilcoxon). Difference 
in sample proportions are assessed using a Chi-square test. 
Earnings (Acarnings) are scaled by sharehold ers' equity measured at the begin ning of the period 
Two earnings targets are explored: avoid repo rting a) a loss (Earnings >_ 0 and b) an earnings decrease (AEarnin s> 0)). 
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Panel A of Table 7.5 reports scaled earnings levels and changes for the FRRP 
and control samples in years 
-1,0 and +1. Mean (median) scaled earnings for the 
FRRP sample in year 0 arc 0.019 (0.021) using the published figures and 0.005 
(0.051) using restated data, compared with 0.041 (0.061) for the control sample. 
Similarly, the FRRP sample also displays lower earnings changes using both the 
published and restated data, although only the median differences are significant. In 
contrast, there is little evidence that earnings levels and changes for the FRRP sample 
differ from the control sample in year 
-1. Overall the earnings patterns reported for 
the FRRP sample in figure 7.1 and Panel A of Table 7.5 imply that they arc more 
likely to experience weaker earnings performance in the defect year. In general. 
though, these companies appear average performers experiencing a temporary drop in 
reported performance as opposed to persistent underperformancc. 
Evidence presented by Degeorge et al. (1999) and Durgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) suggests that consideration of thresholds such as zero levels and zero changes 
in earnings may be important in the context of poor performance and low quality 
accounting. First, these thresholds provide a simple heuristic procedure for 
discriminating between 'good' and 'bad' performers. Secondly. the likelihood of 
failing to achieve these thresholds may be associated with the incidence of GAAP 
violations. Specifically, not achieving theses targets may impose significant costs on 
directors (e. g. lower compensation, increased scrutiny from external shareholders and 
lenders and a higher probability of dismissal), thus motivating them to manage 
earnings in an effort avoid such costs (Dcgcorgc ct al., 1999). 
Panel B of Table 7,5 reports evidence on the frequency of losses and earnings 
decreases for the FRRP and control samples. Results suggest that FRRP companies 
arc characterised by a higher frequency of losses and earnings decreases in the defect 
year. Specifically, while only 11 % of companies in the control sample report losses in 
the defect year, the equivalent figure for the FRRP sample is 26% using the published 
data and 32% using the restated data. In both cases the differences arc significant at 
the 0.05 level. Similarly, 51% of the FRRP sample report a decline in earnings in the 
defect year (55% using the restated data) compared with only 30% of the control 
sample. These differences arc again significant at the 0.05 level. Results therefore 
suggest that FRRP companies arc in fact characterised by poor performance in the 
defect year when earnings arc bcnchmarkcd against standard performance thresholds. 
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Overall, losses and earnings declines appear to be important characteristics 
distinguishing FRRP companies from their peer group. 
Further evidence of the performance difficulties and related pressures faced by 
FRRP companies in the defect year is presented in Panel C of Table 7.5. FRRP 
companies appear to be higher leveraged than the control sample, with weaker 
operating cash flows. Consistent with results reported by Dechow et al. (1996) for 
their sample of companies subject to SEC Enforcement Actions, FRRP companies are 
also more highly leveraged than companies in the control sample. All of theses 
differences are significant at the 0.05 level or better under a one-tailed test. Mutually, 
these findings provide additional evidence for the view that censured companies are 
characterised by deteriorating financial performance in the defect year. 
7.5.1.2 Governance constrains 
Table 7.6 reports descriptive statistics for a range of governance related characteristics 
including auditor characteristics and board structure. Auditor characteristics are 
presented in Panel A of Table 7.6. The frequency of Big Four auditors is significantly 
lower among FRRP companies compared with the control sample. For example, 
although 61% of FRRP companies have a Big Four Auditor in year 
-1, the equivalent 
figure for the control sample is 81% (p<0.05). Similarly, the frequency of Big Four 
auditors among the FRRP sample is 64% in the defect year, compared with 87% for 
the control sample (p<0.05). These results support the prediction that the frequency of 
Big Four auditors will be smaller in the FRRP sample and are consistent with the 
positive association between auditor size and audit quality documented in prior 
research (e. g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Palmrose 1988; DeAngerlo 1981). It 
should be noted that of the 35 companies in the FRRP sample with a non-Big Four 
auditor, 10 cases (28%) received a qualified audit report. In contrast, only 12 out of 63 
cases (19%) involving Big Four auditors received qualified opinions. 
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Table 7.6 
Corporate Governance characteristics for FRRP and control samples. FRRP companies are matched with a control sample on 
the basis of their 4 digit SIC categorisation. 
Year relative to defect year 
Year-1 Year 0 Year I 
Variable FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value 
N 98 3,691 98 3,691 98 3,691 
Panel A: Audit characteristics 
Audit fee (£000's) 
Mean 1,151 692 0.221 1,801 880 0.114 2,438 942 0.291 
Median 39 72 0.214 45 75 0.112 57 86 0.172 
Non Audit fee 
Mean 227 519 0.414 266 609 0.614 372 714 0.324 
Median 18 21 0.142 20 25 0.042 27 28 0.061 
Big4 % 61.23 81.42 0.061 64.49 87.49 0.081 62.17 89.72 0.072 
Switch % 10.92 4.91 0.241 17.87 5.17 0.000 19.72 5.12 0.214 
20 181 33 191 36 189 
Panel B: Board characteristics 
Board size 
Mean 8.87 7.24 0.037 8.42 7.16 0.039 8.12 7.27 0.031 
Median 8.00 8.00 0.064 8.00 8.00 0.990 8.00 8.00 0.990 
% Independent Outsiders 
Mean 0.31 0.38 0.942 0.32 0.41 0.821 0.37 0.43 0.814 
Median 0.40 0.40 0.990 0.40 0.40 0.990 0.40 0.40 0.990 
Directors Renumeration 
Mean 10,497 10,815 0.432 12,030 11,620 0.824 10.762 11,982 0.272 
Median 647 317 0.062 712 427 0.072 691 541 0.094 
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The final row of Panel A presents the frequency of auditor switches for the 
two samples. While the frequency of switches for FRRP companies is higher in both 
the defect year and year 
-1, the differences are not significant. The aggregate number 
of auditor changes occurring during the full four year sample window (yeas 
-1 to +2) 
is higher than expected in the FRRP sample. In particular, 82 FRRP cases were 
associated with a single auditor change, with 4 others changing auditor twice. A chi- 
square test rejects the null hypothesis that the aggregate changes are equal at the 0.05 
level (one-tailed). This evidence, suggest that the aggregate frequency of switches 
over the four-year sample window is higher in the FRRP sample. These findings are 
consistent with those reported by Brandt et al. (1997) and Peasnell et al. (2001), who 
conclude that the frequency of auditor changes among FRRP companies appeared to 
exceed that presented for other UK companies. One of the limitations of this research 
is that it is not examined whether these changes are the cause, or the result, of 
defective financial reporting. 
Panel B of Table 7.6 reports board related data. The findings provide no clear 
evidence that the board structure in the FRRP sample is inferior to that of the control 
sample. The average board comprises approximately eight members in both samples, 
of which 40% are outsiders. Independent outsiders hold roughly 10% of board seats in 
both cases. The univariate results for board composition are not consistent with those 
of Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996), both of whom report a lower incidence 
of outside directors on the boards of US companies charged by the SEC with serious 
GAAP violations. Similarly, no significant differences in the director-specific 
variables such board remuneration is apparent. While FRRP companies appear to 
have a higher expense for directors' remuneration, the difference is not significant. 
Director's remuneration for FRRP companies is £12m (0.7m) mean (median), while 
for the control sample is LII1.6m (0.4m). 
7.6 Multivariate analysis 
7.6.1 Variable Description 
This research relies on three sources for choosing explanatory variables based on 
financial statement data. First, there are considered signals about future prospects that 
appear in the academic and practitioner literature. The presumption is that earnings 
manipulation is more likely when companies' future prospects are poor (Peasnell et 
al., 2001). Second, there are variables based on cash flows and accruals (Healy 1985; 
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Jones 1991). Third, there are variables drawn from prior literature on earnings 
management (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). 
Jones et at. (2007) examine the association between the existence and the 
magnitude of earnings manipulation and nine models of discretionary accruals, 
accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002 and McNichols 2002), and the 
Beneish (1999) M-score model. They find that while total accruals arc associated with 
the existence of earnings manipulation, discretionary accruals derived from the Jones 
model, the modified Jones model and performance-matched models are not associated 
with earnings manipulation. Their research documents that the M-score has 
explanatory power for earnings manipulation beyond total accruals. They also find 
that the M-score is associated with the magnitude of earnings manipulation. Based on 
this evidence, this thesis builds on and is complementary to Beneish (1997,1999). 
Earnings management literature in the UK [Ferguson et al. (2004); Pcasncll et 
al. (2005); Frankel et al. (2002); Pcasnell et al. (2000)] suggests that earnings 
management models implemented under the US GAAP can be applied in the UK 
setting. Atwood et al. (2010) in their research investigate whether earnings 
persistence and the association between current accounting earnings and future cash 
flows differ for firms reporting under IFRS versus firms reporting under U. S. GAAP. 
Using samples comprised of 58,832 firm-year observations drawn from 33 countries 
from 2002 through 2008, they find that positive earnings reported under IFRS arc no 
more or less persistent than earnings reported under U. S. GAAP. Moreover, they find 
that earnings reported under IFRS are no more or less persistent and arc no more or 
less associated with future cash flows than earnings reported under U. S. GAAP. This 
evidence is indicative of the similarities between U. S. GAAP and IFRS 
The result of the search for variables based on financial statement data was the 
construction of two models that are based on Beneish (1999). The variables measured 
data from the financial year prior the violation. Variables arc designed as indexes 
because they are intended to capture distortions that could arise from manipulation by 
comparing financial variables in the year of the first reporting violation with those in 
the year prior. The computation of each variable is documented in the Table 7.7. 
Days Sales in Receivable Index (DSRI): The DSIU index is the ratio of days' 
sales in receivables in the first year in which earnings manipulation was discovered 
(year t) to the corresponding value in year t-1. This variable tests whether receivables 
and revenues are in line between two consecutive years. A large increase in days' 
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sales in receivables could signal a change in credit policy to increase sales in response 
to increased competition, but disproportionate increases in receivables relative to sales 
could also be associated with an aggressive revenue recognition policy (Beneish, 
1999). Thus it is expected that a large increase in the DSRI to be related to a higher 
likelihood that revenues and earnings are overstated. 
Gross Margin Index (GMI): The GMI is the ration of the gross margin in year 
t-1 to the gross margin in year t. When the GMI is greater than 1, gross margin is 
deteriorated. A declining gross margin is a negative signal about a company's future 
performance (Beneish, 1999). So, if companies with poor prospects are more likely to 
engage in earnings manipulation, it is expected a positive association between GMI 
and likelihood of earnings manipulation. 47 
Asset Quality Index (AQI): Asset quality in a given year is the ratio of non- 
current assets other than property plant and equipment (PP&E) to total assets and 
measures the proportion of total assets for which future benefits are potentially less 
certain. The asset quality index (AQI) is the ratio of asset quality in year t to asset 
quality in year t-1. The AQI is an aggregate measure of the change in asset realisation 
risk, which was suggested by Siegel (1997). If the AQI is greater than 1, the company 
has potentially increased its involvement in cost deferral. 48 An increase in asset 
realisation risk indicates an increased likelihood to capitalise expenses (i. e. marketing 
costs) and thus, defer costs (Beneish, 1999). Therefore, it is expected to find a positive 
association between the AQI and the probability of earnings manipulation. 
Sales Growth Index (SGI): The SGI is the ratio of sales in year t to sales in 
year t-l. High growth companies are viewed by professionals as more likely than 
other companies to commit earnings manipulation because their financial positions 
and capital requirements put pressure on directors to achieve earnings thresholds 
(Beneish, 1999). In addition, concerns about internal controls and reporting policies 
tend to lag operations in periods of high growth (Eining and Willingham 1989). 
Depreciation Index (DEPI): The DEPI is the ratio of the rate of depreciation in 
year t-1 to the corresponding rate in year t. The depreciation rate in a given year is 
equal to Depreciationl(Depreciation + Net PP&E). A DEPI greater than 1 indicates 
that the rate at which assets are being depreciated has declined 
- 
raising the possibility 
47 Manipulation of inventories and other production costs could lead to increasing gross margins. Thus 
either increased or decreased gross margins could be related to earnings manipulation. 
48 Part of the increase could be attributable to acquisitions involving goodwill, but companies censured 
by the FRRP undertake few acquisitions. 
194 
that the company has extended the estimates of assets' useful lives or adopted a new 
policy that is income increasing (Bencish, 1999). It is thus expected a positive 
association between the DEPI and the probability of earnings manipulation. 
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI): The SGAI is the 
ratio of sales, general and administrative expenses to sales in year t relative to the 
corresponding measure in year t-I. The use of this variable follows the 
recommendation of Lev and Thiagrajan (1993) that analysts interpret a 
disproportionate increase in sales as a negative signal about a company's future 
prospects (Beneish, 1999). It is expected to find a positive association between the 
SGAI and the probability of manipulation. 
Leverage Index (LVGI): The LVGI is the ratio of total debt to total assets in 
year t relative to the corresponding ration in year W. An LVGI greater than I 
indicates an increase in leverage. This captures incentives in debt covenants for 
earnings manipulation. The change in leverage in a company's capital structure is 
used on the basis of evidence in Bencish and Press (1993) that such changes are 
associated with the technical default of a company. 
Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA): Total accruals arc calculated as the 
change in working capital accounts other than cash less depreciation (Bcneish, 1999). 
Either total accruals or a partition of total accruals was used in prior literature to 
assess the extent to which managers make discretionary accounting choices to alter 
earnings (Jones 1991). Total accruals to total assets (TATA) arc used to proxy for the 
extent to which cash underlines reported earnings. It is expected to lind that higher 
positive accruals (less cash) arc associated with a higher likelihood of earnings 
manipulation. 
Return on Assets Index (ROAI): Is calculated as the ratio of profit Aver tax for 
the year t, to the year W. A value less than one, suggest that for the year t. the 
company has employed less efficiently the assets appearing on its balance sheet, 
comparing to the previous year. Prior literature suggests that companies applying 
aggressive accounting practices usually fail to conduct impairment tests on fixed 
assets and write-off obsolete stock (Beneish, 1999). Avoiding writing down assets on 
time, has a positive impact on profitability, though return on assets is expected to 
deteriorate. 
Effective Tax Rate Index Index (EITAXI): Is calculated as the ratio of 
effective tax rate for year t, to effective tax rate for year t-1. Effective tax rate is 
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calculated as the ratio of the tax paid, to the profit before tax. Tax accounting gives 
less discretion to directors, comparing to financial accounting. Thus it is expected that 
manipulators will appear to have lower profits under the tax accounting, comparing to 
the non-manipulators (Dhaliwal et al., 2004). Consecutively, manipulators are 
expected to account for taxe charges in a lower effective tax rate. Thus, it is expected 
a negative association between EFTAXI and the likelihood of earnings manipulation. 
The estimation of tax expense in the EFTAXI variables accounts for 
deferred tax and it measures the extent of adjustment to prior year tax. Holland and 
Jackson (2002) find evidence of systematic differences between actual and required 
levels of deferred tax provision that are related to earnings management. This is 
consistent with Dhaliwall et al. (2004), they fmd evidence that changes from third- to 
fourth-quarter effective tax rates are negatively related to whether and how much a 
firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a 
proxy for target earnings. Dhaliwall et al. (2004) estimate effective tax rate as a ratio 
of tax charge to pre-tax income. 
Dividend Signal Index (DIVSI): Is the ratio of dividend for year t divided by 
dividend in year W. Companies that manipulate earnings are expected to have poor 
liquidity, thus they are more likely to decrease dividend payments (Peasnell et al., 
2001). Subsequently DIVSI is expected to be negatively associated with earnings 
manipulation. 
Directors Remuneration to Sales Index (DIRSI): DIRSI is the ratio of the 
proportion of director's remuneration for the sales generated on year t, divided by 
prior year's remuneration to sales figure. Highly paid directors, in terms of their 
remuneration as a portion of the revenue generated, are expected to be more inclined 
to manage earnings, in order to maximize their bonuses (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
Companies that manipulate earnings are expected to have a higher DIRSI (higher than 
one), as the directors pay becomes more related to the underlying performance. Thus 
directors are more inclined to mask possible inefficiencies in order to secure 
performance related bonuses. 
Audit Risk Index (AUDI): Audit Risk Index (AUDI) is calculated as the 
portion of audit fees to total assets for year t, to previous year's audit fees scaled by 
total assets. Practitioners suggest that the detection risk is the product of the inherent 
risk of a company multiplied by the audit risk (Larcker and Richardson, 2004). In 
order for the external auditors to assure the true and fair view of the financial 
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statements, the detection risk has to remain low, at immaterial levels. An increase in 
external audit risk could compensate deterioration in internal controls, where more 
audit work is needed to cover problematic areas (Larckcr and Richardson, 2004). 
Audit fees scaled by total assets are used as a proxy for audit risk. Thus it is expected 
that there would be a positive association between Audi and the likelihood of earnings 
manipulation. 
The explanatory variables in the model arc primarily based on year-to-year 
changes and this introduces a potential problem when the denominator is small. To 
deal with this problem, the data is winsorised at the 1% and 99% percentiles for each 
variable. In addition, there were cases where the denominator of the Asset Quality 
Index variable was zero, as assets in the reference year (period t-1) consisted 
exclusively of current assets and PP&E. Since in such cases the Asset Quality Index 
was not defined, its value was set to one (its neutral value) instead of treating the 
observation as missing. Similarly, DEPT and SGAI indices were set to one, when 
elements of the computation (Depreciation and Amortisation. Sales and General 
Administrative Expenses, were not available on the FAME database). 
7.6.2 Full Sample Analysis 
Table 7.8 compares GAAP violators to the control sample along the variables 
suggested in Beneish's (1999) model and the ratios proposed in Models 3 and 4 of 
Table 7.8. The comparisons made in the financial year prior to GAAP violation 
revealed differences along three of these dimensions. Firstly, GAAP violators had a 
lower effective tax index (0.764 while the control sample 1.019), as they paid less 
taxes as ratio to the profits earned, comparing to the previous year. Secondly, GAAP 
violators had a deteriorating Asset Quality Index (AQI) (1.092 while for the control 
sample is 1.021), as their balance sheet included a lower portion of PP&E and current 
assets, probably due an increase in intangible assets or good will. Thirdly, GAAP 
violators appear to have an increased Audit Risk Index (Audi) (1.148 while for the 
control sample is 1.031), as they incur higher audit fees scaled by assets, comparing to 
the prior year. 
To evaluate the marginal effect of performance factors on the probability of 
censure by the FRRP, a series of logistic regressions is estimated, similar to ßcncish 
(1999). The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the 
company is from the FRRP sample and zero otherwise. 
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Explanatory variables include measures of performance, liquidity and balance 
sheet strength. Results for logistic regressions estimated using data from the defect 
year presented in Table 7.9. To start, in Model 1 examines the association between 
earnings manipulation, using the ratios in the 5 variable Beneish's model, and the 
probability of censure by the FRRP. Model luses the variables: SGI, GMI, DSRI, 
AQI and DEPI. The AQI and DEPI variables are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level 
respectively, in a one-tailed test and the positive coefficient indicates that FRRP 
companies are more likely to be manipulating depreciation charges and aggressively 
capitalise costs. 
Model 2, uses the ratios applied in Beneish's 8 variable model; i. e. variables 
SGAI, TATA and LVGI are added to Model 1. The estimated coefficient on TATA in 
Model 2 is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, thereby confirming the univariate 
results which indicate that FRRP companies are more likely to experience operating 
cashflow shortages in the defect year. 
Model 3 includes ROAI, DIRSI and Audi to assess the marginal association of 
each with the probability of censure. Audi is significant at conventional levels, 
suggesting that audit fee increases as a ratio on total assets, have an incremental 
positive association with the probability of a company manipulating earnings, thus 
receiving an adverse ruling from the FRRP. Model 4 uses EFTAXI and DIVSI. The 
resulting coefficient estimate on EFTAXI is negative and highly significant, The 
coefficient estimate on DIVSI is also negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that companies censured by the FRRP are more likely have decreased dividends. 
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Table 7.7 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Performance-Profitability related variables 
SGI* Sales growth index 
GMI* Gross Margin Index 
SGAI* Sales general expenses index 
ROAI Return on assets index 
ROEI Return on equity index 
EFTAXI Effective tax rate index 
DIVSI 
DIRA! 
DIRSI 
TA 
TATA" 
Formulas: 
Dividend signal index 
Directors remuneration to sales index 
Liquidity 
- 
Leverage 
LVGI" Leverage Index 
Balance sheet strength 
DRSI Days in receivable index 
AQI* Asset quality index 
DEPI* Depreciation index 
Audi Audit fees to total assets index 
Directors remuneration to total assets index 
Accruals 
Accruals to total assets index 
SGh 
= 
-sales-4 
sales,, 
GA1I 
= 
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_, 
-cgsg_, )sales_, 
(sales 
-cgs)sales 
SGAI 
= 
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sga,, j I sales_, 
RDA/ 
= 
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 /Togas" 
Pat,, /Totas,, 
ROEJ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 / Fqui[v 
Pat 1/ Fquity_, 
DIISI 
=DJI. /DlJ'ý, 
LVG! a 
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_, +Lon. Dcbt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- 
rI 
_ 
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 + PPE Xl- Cuen[Assets_i + 
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 TotaUssets, N, 
DEPI 
-_ 
Depreciation,, Depreciation. 
Depreciation,, + PPE,,, Depreciation + PPE 
EPTAXI a 
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Aud1R = (_AuditfeeR AuditfeeA_, 1 TA T4 _ ) TotalAssetsR TotalAssets, 1 Tows. 
TA 
= ACurrcn Assets. 
- 
Cash 
- 
ACurrent L. 
- 
Dcpr& Amorta 
where: 
cgs: Cost of goods sold 
sga: Sales and Administrative Expenses 
Pat: Profit after tax 
Totas: Total Assets 
Tax] : Tax liability 
Taxexp : Tax Expense 
Pr: Profit before tax 
Div: Dividend 
Expense 
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Table 7.8 
Financial characteristics for FRRP and control samples. FRRP companies are matched with a control sample on the basis of 
their 4 digit SIC categorisation. 
Year relative to defect year 
Year-1 Year 0 Year 1 
Variable FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value FRRP Control p-value 
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon Wilcoxon 
N 98 3,691 Z 98 3,691 Z 98 3,691 Z 
Mean (Median) 
Performance-Profitability related variables 
1.317 1.104 1.521 1.146 1.414 1 124 SGI* . (1.152) (1.051) 0.072 (1.327) (1.094) 0.000 (1.172) 1.113 0.021 
GM I* 1.142 1.057 1.241 1.051 1.113 1.042 
(1.072) (1.018) 0.152 (1.152) (1.027) 0.002 (1.051) 1.061 0.014 
SGAI* 1.211 1.251 1.162 1.246 1.194 1.262 
(0.74) (1.154) 0.421 (0.742) (1.174) 0.000 (0.948) 1.172 0.072 
TATA* 0.031 0.023 0.047 0.025 0.038 0.023 
(0.039) (0.006) 0.351 (0.051) (0.012) 0.000 (0.027) 0.014 0.084 
ROEI 1.184 1.121 1.427 1.127 1.184 1.132 
(1.072) (1.043) 0.657 (1.372) (1.051) 0.004 (1.091) 1.072 0.142 
ROAI 1.012 1.049 0.7123 1.051 1.001 1.031 
(0.972) (1.036) 0.421 (0.618) (1.027) 0.007 (0.972) 1.017 0.072 
DIVSI 1.014 1.128 0.811 1.172 1.001 1.147 
(0.091) (1.071) 0.084 (0.716) (1.057) 0.004 (0.991) 1.072 0.241 
DIRAI 1.214 1.147 1.352 1.158 0.954 1.101 
(1.154) (1.067) 0.071 (1.153) (1.043) 0.006 (0.901) 1.072 0.024 
DIRSI 1.242 1.172 1.623 1.192 0.901 1.153 
(1.142) (1.091) 0.147 (1.527) (1.104) 0.000 (0.842) 1.084 0.014 
EFTAXI 0.764 1.019 0.616 1.024 1.241 1.142 
(0.672) (1.051) 0.031 (0.516) (1.017) 0.000 (1.124) 1.051 0.047 
Liquidity 
- 
Leverage 
1.151 1.067 1.162 1.057 0.951 1.042 LVGI* (1.117) (1.042) 0.092 (1.153) (1.021) 0.312 (0.851) 1.021 0.018 
Balance sheet strength 
1.342 1.152 1.827 1.072 1.242 1.127 DSRI (1.142) (1.042) 0.153 (1.414) (0.997) 0.000 (1.154) 1.078 0.247 
AQI* 1.092 1.021 1.351 1.031 1.151 1.027 (1.012) (1.003) 0.031 (1.213) (1.001) 0.037 (1.072) 1.051 0.072 
DEPI* 1.072 1.004 1.152 1.012 1.062 1.054 (1.012) (1.003) 0.076 (1.047) (1.004) 0.057 (1.042) 1.032 0.149 
Audi 1.148 1.031 1.634 1.027 1.142 1.014 (1.092) (1.024) 0.024 (1.253) (1.012) 0.000 (1.042) 1.007 0.020 
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Table 7.9 
Logistic regressions relating the probability of censure by the F RiP to measures of firn 
performance, leverage and balance-sheet strength. The sample comprises 98 FRIO firms and 
3,691 control firms matched by Industry. 
Model I Modelt Modc3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Marginal 
N( value) (p-value) (p-value) 
-value effect 
Performance-Profitability related variables 
SGI* 0.746 0.721 0.681 0.674 0.268 (0.521) (0.183) (0.942) (0.524) 
GMI* 0.694 0.621 0.584 0.578 0.304 (0.832) (0.391) (0.637) (0.518) 
SGAI* . 0.157 -0.122 -0.116 
-0.125 (0.532) (0.417) (0.484) 
ROAI . 0.117 "0.101 
-0.212 (0.416) (0.316) 
EFTAXI -0.182 
-0.318 (0.001) 
DIVSI . 0.147 
. 
0.294 
(0.072) 
DIRSI 0.253 0.274 0.241 (0.481) (0.026) 
TATA* 4.247 4.142 3.842 0.431 
(0.001) (0.81) (0.114) 
Balance sheet strength 
LVGI* 0.272 0.157 0.124 
-0.294 (0.721 (0.542) (0.520) 
DSRI* 0.842 0.761 0.612 0.517 0,419 (0.712) (0.128) (0.657) (0.221) 
AQI* 0.482 0.427 0.394 0.371 0.214 (0.011) (0.041) (0.514) (0.425) 
DEPI* 0.242 0.154 0.127 0.104 0.171 
(0.050) (0.080) (0.917) (0.871) 
Audi 0.169 0.181 0.278 (0.002) (0.012) 
Intercept 1.246 1.348 1.513 1.425 
(0.327) (0.302) (0.284) (0.251) 
Model x2 25.521 27.262 29.135 35.612 
value 0.011 (0.009) 0.007 0.003) 
Marginal effect of the regressors on the probability of censure computed using coefficient estimates 
from Model 4. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the regressors as follows: p(y)[ 1- 
«here is ixen h I/ I+e "ý and is the a ro riate cariTicient estimate tram Model 4. 
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7.6.3 Sample characteristics 
FRRP companies are not homogenous with respect to the gravity of the reporting 
defect. While in some cases the defect relates to relatively minor disclosure issues 
with no immediate asset measurement or earnings recognition implications, other 
cases are associated with a material impact on reported earnings and shareholders' 
equity. Although the FRRP emphasizes on its mission statement that all cases 
involving an adverse ruling represent defect, that in its approach, are materially 
misleading to investors (McBarnet and Whelan 1999), heterogeneity among the 185 
cases raises the possibility that pooling all observations in a single group may not 
generate econometrically robust results. 
To explore whether the results are affected by the nature of the accounting 
defect, a dummy variable (MAT) is created, set equal to "1" if the defect identified by 
the FRRP impacted on reported earnings and/or shareholders' equity and "0" 
otherwise. There are 162 (87%) cases involving accounting treatments that affected 
either reported earnings or shareholders' equity. The remaining 23 cases where MAT 
equals zero relate to disclosure and classification issues. The logistic models in Tables 
8 and 9 are re-estimated, after interacting MAT with each of the explanatory 
variables. No material differences for the two defect sub-samples are found. Thus, 
these findings suggest that the sample model is applicable to all companies censured 
by the FRRP regardless of the defect type. 
7.7 Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of firms judged by the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel to have issued defective financial statements. Two 
main findings are reported. First, FRRP companies are characterised by weak 
earnings performance in the defect year. As further evidence of the performance 
difficulties facing censured companies, additional tests reveal that FRRP companies 
are more leveraged, less likely to decide dividend increases, more likely to have lower 
effective tax rate and more likely to have increased audit fees. The coefficient of the 
variable that measures changes in effective tax rate is statistically significant, in 
contrast to the coefficients of the variables that measure leverage and dividend 
changes that appear not to be statistically significant. Both Beneish (1999) and 
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Dechow et al. (1996) find that companies subject tot SEC Enforcement Actions for 
violating US GAAP are characterized by poor performance in the violation year 
relative to a size, industry and time matched control sample. Though, while the 
profitability of the FRRP sample is weak in the defect year, they do not appear to be 
persistent underperformers. One interpretation of these results is that short-term 
performance problems are an important cause of poor accounting quality to the extent 
that they engage to earnings manipulation. This is consistent with the work of 
Degeorge et al. (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Pcasncll et al. (2001), who 
provide evidence of earnings management to avoid losses and earnings declines 
between companies in general. 
The second main result relates to the impact of the internal control 
mechanisms on the likelihood that a company is censured by the FRRP. Consistent 
with prior work examining US companies charged with serious GAAP violations, it is 
found that FRRP companies are characterized by weaker internal controls. In 
particular, while univariate tests indicate no difference in the use of outside directors 
between FRRP and control companies, multivariate tests reveal that the FRRP sample 
is associated with higher paid directors and higher audit fees. 
There are several limitations that need to be addressed. First, an inherent 
limitation of this research is the lack of information concerning the identities of 
companies referred to the FRRP but not subsequently subjected to censure. This 
makes it difficult to rule out the possibility that the observed relationship between 
poor performance and censure is simply due to defective financial reporting being 
more likely to be discovered during periods of weak financial performance as 
shareholders and other stakeholders engage in additional monitoring activity. 
Likewise, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that the lower incidence of Big Four 
auditors in the FRRP sample may reflect aspects of the censure process. For example, 
it may be capturing the FRRP's preference for avoiding confrontation with the large 
audit firms because of a higher perceived risk that the case will be challenged (and it 
could be lost). Alternatively, it may reflect the Big Four firms' superiority at 
managing the investigation process and negotiating a resolution that does not result in 
public censure. Similar problems arise in interpreting the results of US studies that 
have examined the enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) (e. g. Beneish, 1999; Dcchow ct al., 1996). 
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Second, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting these results. For 
example, based on these findings it could be concluded that poor performance is a key 
cause of defective financial reporting. However, to the extent that the companies 
initially referred to the FRRP for considerations represent only a sub-sample of the 
total population of the defective companies, this research may simply be exploring 
aspects of the referral process. In particular, the FRRP relied heavily on complaints, 
especially the first years of its operation, before taking a proactive role from 2003 and 
afterwards. The observed link between poor performance and an adverse ruling may 
reflect higher detection (and referrals from third parties) rates resulting from the 
increased scrutiny of published accounting data by disaffected stakeholders. While 
weak monitoring structures increase the likelihood that managers will violate GAAP 
(increased audit risk), other explanations are possible. For example, Hines et al., 
(2001), McBarnet and Whelan (1999) and Styles (1999) characterise the enforcement 
activities of the FRRP as a political process in which considerations other than those 
of a purely technical accounting issue influence the likelihood of an adverse ruling. 
From this perspective, the fact that FRRP appears less likely to criticise companies 
with Big Four auditors may simply reflect a preference for avoiding confrontation 
with the large audit firms because of a higher perceived risk of losing the case in a 
court and the greater resources that a Big Four firm can bring to bear to achieve a 
private settlement in order to avoid negative publicity. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that this study does not explicitly attempt to 
measure the costs (for auditors and their clients) related to an FRRP investigation: 
therefore there are not examined the reasons why companies and auditors might seek 
to avoid censure. Finally, it is important to recognise that this study includes the first 
years of the FRRP's operations; several authors suggest that attempts to establish its 
authority as an effective enforcement mechanism may have influenced the activities 
of the Panel during this initial period (McBarnet and Whelan, 1999; Styles, 1999). If 
the Panel's censorship rulings made during this `start-up' phase are not representative 
of its subsequent enforcement decisions, the research findings may not necessarily 
form a reliable basis for predicting future FRRP cases. 
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Chapter 8 
The Detection of Earnings Manipulation 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. The first objective is to develop a sample of 
companies discovered manipulating earnings and matched controls for the UK. The 
second objective is to analyse the characteristics of companies that manipulate 
earnings. Based on this analysis, a model is developed, improving the one suggested 
by Beneish (1999) for detecting earnings manipulation. The model provides an 
associated scaled probability that can be used to assess the likelihood of earnings 
manipulation. 
For the purpose of this research, earnings manipulation is defined as an 
instance where directors violate either IFRS or UK GAAP, in order to beneficially 
represent the company's financial performance (Chapter 2). Financial statement 
variables are used to capture the effects of manipulation and preconditions that may 
lead companies to engage in such activity. Since manipulation usually results from a 
false inflation of revenues or depression of expenses, it is documented that variables 
that measure the simultaneous increase in asset line items have predictive content 
(Beneish, 1999). It is also found that a common characteristic of sample manipulators 
is that they have high revenue growth prior to the public discovery of the earnings 
manipulation (Beneish, 1999). 
Statistical tests are conducted using a sample of 185 companies discovered to 
manipulate earnings and a control sample that consists of all public listed FAME 
companies matched by four-digit SIC for which data arc available in the period 1994- 
2007. It is found that sample manipulators frequently overstate earnings by 
recognising fictitious or future revenue, recording overstated inventory or 
aggressively capitalising expenses. The sample of 185 manipulators consists of 98 
companies censured by the FRRP and 87 companies flagged by the company 
Reporting as companies for no compliance with the IFRS. 
The model is estimated using a sample manipulators and a sample of industry- 
matched companies covering the period 1994-2003. The performance of the model is 
tested on a holdout sample in the period 2004-2007. The model discriminates 
manipulators from controls and has pseudo-R2 of 25.1% and 31.8% for two different 
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estimation methods. The evidence indicates that the likelihood of manipulation 
increases with: (i) unexpected increases in receivables, (ii) declining gross margins, 
(iii) deteriorating asset quality, (iv) high revenue growth, (v) increasing accruals and 
(vi) increasing debt. It is documented that the model detects manipulators from 
controls in the holdout sample. The results are found to be robust to different 
estimations of the prior probability of earnings manipulation. The results are also 
robust to the choice of different estimation and holdout samples. 
In an effort to enhance the discriminating ability of the models suggested by 
Beneish (1997,1999) three additional financial ratios are proposed. These variables 
indicate that the probability of manipulation increases with: (i) unusual increases in 
audit fees, (ii) unusual decreases in the effective tax rate and (iii) unusual increases in 
directors' remuneration. It is documented that the enhanced model discriminates more 
accurately manipulators from controls in the holdout sample. The results are also 
robust to different estimations of the prior probability of earnings manipulation and 
the choice of estimation and holdout samples. 
The findings need to be interpreted considering possible sample selection 
biases. The estimation sample is based on a group of publicly discovered 
manipulators. It is likely that there are successful manipulators that have not been 
identified yet, and the results need to be interpreted assuming that sample 
manipulators represent a significant share of the manipulators in the population. 
However, given this limitation, the evidence suggest a systematic relation between the 
likelihood of manipulation and financial statement variables inferring that accounting 
ratios can be utilise in detecting manipulation and measuring the reliability of 
accounting earnings. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly recapitalises the 
existing literature on earnings manipulation 49. Section three describes the data used in 
the empirical analysis. Section four presents the empirical methodology and the model 
to be used in the econometric analysis. Section five reports the estimation results and 
predictions for Beneish's model. Section six presents an eleven variable model for 
detecting earnings manipulation and section seven concludes. 
49 A more extensive discussion can be found in Chapter 2. 
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8.2 Previous Literature 
Describing and predicting the types of companies that will manipulate financial 
statements or commit fraud is an extensive area of research. Many studies in the US 
have used samples that include companies subject to SEC enforcement actions, or 
FRRP sanctions in the UK. This section, briefly discusses some of the key findings, 
but does not attempt to document all literature examining characteristics of 
manipulating companies. 
Feroz et al. (1991) examine 224 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AEERs) issued between April 1982 and April 1989. Feroz et at. (1991) 
provide a detailed description of their sample of 188 companies of which 58 have 
stock price information. They document that receivables and inventory are most 
commonly misstated. 
Two pioneering papers analysing manipulating companies are Beneish (1997, 
1999). Beneish (1997) analyses 363 AAERs and obtains a sample of 49 companies 
that violate GAAP. He also collects a sample of 15 companies whose accounting was 
questioned by the news media between 1987 and 1993. Both sets of companies are 
classified in the manipulators sample. He creates a separate sample of companies he 
labels ` aggressive accruers' using the modified Jones model to select companies with 
high accruals. His objective is to distinguish the manipulators from companies that 
have high accruals and appear to be applying GAAP aggressively. Bcneish (1997) 
finds that accruals, day's sales in receivables and prior performance are important for 
explaining the differences between the two groups. Beneish (1999) matches the 
sample of manipulators to 2,332 Compustat controls by two-digit SIC industry and 
year for which the financial statement data used in the model were available. For 
seven of the eight financial statement ratios that he analyses, he calculates an index. 
Higher index values indicate a higher likelihood of earnings overstatement. Beneish 
shows that the days' sales in receivables index, gross margin index, asset quality 
index, sales growth index and accruals (measured as the change in non-cash working 
capital plus depreciation) are important. He provides a probit model and analyses the 
probability cut-offs that minimise the expected costs of manipulation. 
This present research supports and extends Beneish (1997,1999). In addition 
to applying his model in the UK setting, this research extends it, by including 
financial statement variables related to earnings manipulation that increase the 
model's effectiveness in discriminating instances of earnings manipulation. 
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In other concurrent research, Ettredge et al. (2006) examine 169 AAER 
companies matched by size, industry and whether the company reported a loss. They 
find that deferred taxes can be useful for predicting manipulations, along with auditor 
change, market-to-book value, revenue growth and whether the company is an OTC 
company. Brazel et al. (2006) examine whether several non-financial measures (e. g., 
patents, trademarks) can be used to predict manipulation in 77 AAER companies. 
They find that growth rates between financial and non-financial variables are 
significantly different for AEER companies. Bayley and Taylor (2007) study 129 
AAER companies and a match sample based on industry, company size and time 
period. They find that total accruals are better than various measures of unexpected 
accruals in identifying material accounting manipulations. In addition, they find that 
various financial statement ratio indices are incrementally useful. They conclude that 
future earnings management research should move away from further refinements of 
discretionary accrual models and instead consider supplementing accruals with other 
financial statement ratios. 
Dechow et al. (1996) analyse 436 AAERs released between April 1982 and 
December 1992. Their final sample after eliminations consists of 92 companies. Each 
company is matched in the year prior to manipulation to a control company in the 
same three-digit SIC industry and with similar asset values. The authors provide some 
evidence that accruals appear to be high at the time of manipulation. However, the 
paper focuses primarily on showing that various corporate governance factors appear 
to be correlated with manipulation. For example, they find that manipulating 
companies have a higher number of insiders on the board and a CEO who is more 
powerful and entrenched. They provide matched-pairs logit analysis; however, they 
do not report how effective their model is at predicting manipulation. Skousen and 
Wright (2006) analyse 86 manipulation companies matched by industry and sales. 
Similar to Dechow et al. (1996), they focus on corporate governance variables. They 
find that manipulators tend to have managers with higher stockholdings (higher than 
five percent), have less effective audit committees, have more powerful CEOs and are 
more likely to have recently switched auditors. 
Richardson et al. (2002) examine 255 companies that restate earnings between 
1971 and 2000 and compare them to 133,208 non-restating companies. They obtain 
their sample through a Nexis-Lexis search using variations on the words `restate'. 
They exclude restatements due to changes in FASB accounting rules, stock splits, 
208 
merger and acquisitions, etc. They test for differences in means for restating 
company-years relative to non-restating company-years and find that restating 
companies have lower earnings to price and book to market ratios, raise more 
financing, and have larger total accruals. They also find that restating companies have 
longer consecutive strings of growth in quarterly EPS. Similar to Dechow ct al. 
(1996) they suggest that capital market pressures are likely to be a motivating factor 
for earnings management that results in restatements. 
In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2001) examine the characteristics of companies 
judged by the FRRP as having published defective financial statements. They find 
that relative to a pair wise matched control sample, FRRP companies arc associated 
with weak performance in the defect year. FRRP companies are less likely to have a 
Big Four auditor, less likely to have an audit committee and a high proportion of 
outside directors. Holland and Jackson (2004) examine the association between 
deferred tax provisions and earnings management. Using a sample of 58 companies 
they find that companies take an overall view in determining the required level of 
provision of deferred tax in order to manage earnings. They also find weaker evidence 
of the relationship between the levels of under/over provision and companies' levels 
of gearing and effective tax rates. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on accounting manipulation on three 
dimensions. First, prior literature examining accounting manipulations has relied on 
either small samples of accounting manipulations or is based on US samples. This 
research, investigates a large sample of UK manipulators composed of 98 FRRP 
sanctions and 87 cases identified by Company Reporting. Second, this research 
systematically examines a comprehensive set of prediction variables that relate to 
accrual quality, performance and market related incentives. Finally, this research 
extends and improves the model proposed by Beneish (1997,1999) for detecting 
earnings manipulation, by adding three additional financial ratios. By testing this new 
model in a large population of companies, detailed evidence is provided on the 
number of Type I and I1 errors. 
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8.3 Characteristics of the dataset 
The sample of earnings manipulators is obtained either from companies subject to 
FRRP censures or from Company Reporting `Red Flagged companies50'. Companies 
subjected to FRRP censures are published on the FRRP's website. Between 1994 and 
2007 there are published 98 relevant press notices. The characteristics of the FRRP 
companies are examined in more detail in the previous chapter. The sample of 
manipulators is extended with 87 companies criticised in Company Reporting51. A 
comparison between the two sub-samples of manipulators, documented in Panel A of 
Table 8.1, suggests that both sub-samples are not drawn from different populations. 
Wilcoxon Z and median chi-square tests are applied to examine the association 
fundamental financial characteristics, between the two samples. The financial 
characteristics explored are related to the size of the companies (total assets, sales and 
market value), leverage (working capital to total assets, current ratio and total debt to 
total assets) and performance (return on assets and sales growth). These test yield p- 
values smaller than 5%, suggesting that the two sub-samples of manipulators are not 
drawn from different populations. Hence, the final sample consists of 185 companies 
that manipulated earnings and 3,961 control companies matched by 4-digit SIC 
industry and year. 
Panel B of Table 8.1, compares the financial characteristics of manipulators to 
those of industry-matched controls. It is found that, in the financial year prior to the 
public disclosure of earnings manipulation; manipulators are less profitable and more 
leveraged. The median sales growth of manipulators (31%) is significantly larger than 
that of controls (8%). This raises the question whether growth is exogenous or results 
from manipulation. This profile of manipulators, as companies with high growth 
prospects could explain why it is found that manipulators have, on average, lower 
total assets (median total assets for manipulators is 22,347 whereas for controls is 
63,713) but similar market value of equity. 
50 Company Reporting warns with a Red flag when: Attention is required: (i) there is a significant 
compliance failure, or there are multiple compliance failures, or the accounting treatment differs from a 
company's peers, or there is a lack of adequate disclosure, or in some way Company Reporting's team 
does not agree with the company's treatment or presentation; and (ii) the impact is sufficiently large 
that investors should be alerted. 
51 An interview with the FRRP revealed that the regulatory body uses the companies criticised by the 
Company Reporting, as part of its proactive approach. This is confirmed by the fact that in many cases 
Company Reporting alerted investors earlier than the FRRP. According to FRRP this lag is due to the 
bureaucratic procedures that need to be followed and they can take up to several months. 
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Table 8.1 
Panel A: Comparing characteristics between the two sub-samples of manipulators: companies censured by the FRRP and 
comnaniies red tlaQ2ed by Company RenortinQ 
Company Reporting Companies Median 
FRRP companies (n=98) (n=87) Wilconxon z chi-square 
p-Value p-value (two 
Characteristic Mean Median Mean Median (two tailed) tailed) 
Size 
Total assets 429,203 17,975 517,942 27,271 0.006 0.012 
Sales 207,856 15,848 314,724 19,172 0.004 0.008 
Market Value 84,314 89,437 86,173 91,472 0.021 0.027 
Liquidity/everage 
Working capital to 
total assets 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.36 0.002 0.008 
Current ratio 2.01 1.94 1.98 1.89 0.001 0.004 
Total Debt to total 
assets 0.97 0.72 0.95 0.67 0.007 0.011 
Profitability/Growth 
Return on Assets 0.50% 1.60% 0.42% 1.32% 0.027 0.032 
Sales Growth 42% 32% 37% 29% 0.018 0.024 
Panel B: Comparing Characteristics of 185 manipulators vs. 3,691 controls matched by 2-digit SIC Industry in the year prior 
the year containine the earnings manipulation 
Control Companies Median 
Manipulators (n=98) (n-3,69I) Wilconxon z chi-square 
p-Value (two p-value (two 
Characteristic Mean Median Mean Median tailed) tailed) 
Size 
Total assets 470,934 22,347 420,131 63,713 0.002 0.005 
Sales 258,113 17,411 337,023 62,983 0.003 0.005 
Market Value 85,188 90,394 95,375 115,724 0.034 0.052 
Liquidity/average 
Working capital to 
total assets 0.28 0.35 0.22 0.10 0.351 0.385 
Current ratio 2.00 1.92 2.15 1.30 0.152 0.274 
Total Debt to total 
assets 0.96 0.70 0.64 0.50 0.124 0.197 
Profitability/Growth 
Return on Assets 0.46% 1.47% 3.54% 4.32% 0.428 0.579 
Sales Growth 40% 31% 5% 8% 0.581 0.627 
n= the number of companies 
Note: The Wilcoxon rank-sum and median x2 tests were used to evaluate the null hypothesis that the size, liquidity, 
profitability and growth characteristics of manipulators and controls indicate that the groups were drawn from the same 
population. 
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8.4 Method 
This section discusses the estimation of the earnings manipulation detection model 
and the selection of the model's variables, similar to Beneish (1997,1999). The model 
is written as follows: 
M; =ßX; +c; 
Where M is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for manipulators and 0 otherwise, X is 
the matrix of explanatory variables, and Ei is a vector of residuals. 
The estimation of the probit model is made under the following four assumptions 
(Wooldridge, 2008): 
Assumption 1 
The model in the population can be written as: 
y=ßo+ß1xß+P2xz+... +iKX+e(1) 
where ßo, (3I, (32,..,, ßg are the unknown parameters (constants) of interest, and u is an 
unobservable random error or random disturbance term. 
Assumption 2 
There is a random sample of n observations, [(xii, Xi2, ... XGk, yy), i=l, 2, ..., n] from the 
population model described in (1) 
Assumption 3 
The error u has an expected value of zero, given any values of the independent 
variables, in other words, 
E(uJXI, xz, 
..., 
xk) =0 
Assumption 4 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables is 
constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent variables. 
Earnings manipulators are over represented relative to the true percentage in 
the population of public listed companies, as they are matched by industry rather by 
the whole population. The econometric justification for such an industry-based 
sample is that a random sample would likely generate a lower number of manipulators 
(as it could include industry sectors not examined in this study), consequently making 
the estimation of a model that classifies earnings manipulation more difficult. 
Though, as estimation of a dichotomous state model that ignores the industry-based 
procedures yields asymptotically biased coefficient estimates, there is applied a 
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weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood probit (\VESh1L)52. The estimation 
sample spans the period 1994-2003 and consists of 132 manipulators and 2,636 
controls. 
Estimating WESML requires an approximation of the percentage of 
companies in the population that manipulate earnings. Assuming that the population 
from which the companies are sampled is the population of the UK listed companies, 
one estimate of the percentage of manipulators in the population equals 0.0228 
(185/8,115). Where 8,115, is number of all available observations for the examined 
period. To assess the validity of this assumption, the model is also estimated and 
tested applying an un-weighted likelihood probit model. 
The empirical analysis in the next sections aims to test the following research 
hypotheses, as described in chapter three: 
Hi 1: A probit model based on M-score's variables can be used as a classification tool 
for signalling earnings manipulation. 
H12: The inclusion of the three additional variables will increase the ability of the 
model to identify manipulators and decrease misclassification errors. 
8.5 Beneish's Model 
8.5.1 Variables 
Similar to the Chapter Seven, firstly a model for detecting carnings manipulation is 
estimated based on ©eneish's (1999) variables and secondly an improved version with 
three additional variables is proposed. The first model includes eight variables: Days 
in Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), 
Sales Growth Index (SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPT), Sales General and 
Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI), Total Accruals to 
Total Assets (TATA). The proposed improved version of Iicneish's model includes 
Audit Fees to Total Assets Index (AUDI), Efficient Tax Rate Index (EFTAXI) and 
Directors' Remuneration to Sales Index (DIRSI). The definition of the eleven 
variables is discussed in the previous chapter. 
The explanatory variables in the models are primarily based on annual 
changes and this introduces a potential issue when the denominator is very small. 
To 
52 WESML accounts for state-based sampling by weighting the likelihood function according to the 
proportion of earnings manipulation in the sample and in the population. Prior research has cmploycd 
weighted probit models to predict audit qualifications (Dopuch et a. (1987) and bankruptcy (7m)ewski. 1984)). 
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minimise distortions from extreme values, the data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles for each variable. In addition, in the instances where the denominator of 
the Asset Quality Index variable was zero, as assets in the prior year (period t-1) 
consisted only of current assets and property plant and equipment, Asset Quality 
Index was not defined. In these cases this value was defined as one, instead of treating 
the observation as missing. A similar approach was applied for DEPI and SGAI ratios 
and they were defined as one, when the denominator was missing. It was found that 
estimating the models after excluding those observations yielded similar results. 
Table 8.2 compares the distribution of these variables for manipulators and 
controls in the estimation sample. The results indicate that on average, manipulators 
have significantly higher increases in days' sales in receivables, greater deterioration 
of gross profit margins, asset quality, larger growth, higher accruals and increased 
leverage. 
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8.5.2 Estimation Results and Holdout Sample Tests 
Table 8.3 Panel A, documents the results of the WESML probit and unweighted 
probit estimations of the model. The likelihood ratio test indicates that for both 
estimations the model has significant power, with x2 statistics (p-values) of 28.42 
(0.00) and 57.25 (0.00). The model has descriptive validity with pseudo-R2s of 
0.251% and 0.318% for WESML and unweighted probit respectively. 
The results of the unweighted probit estimation show the variable Days Sales 
in Receivables Index (DSRI) has a positive coefficient, 0.207 and is significant at the 
5% level with an asymptotic t-statistic of 3.15. This is consistent with unexpected 
increases in receivables increasing the likelihood that a company has overstated sales 
applying an aggressive credit policy. The variable Gross Margin Index (GMI) has a 
positive coefficient of 0.72 that is over two standard deviations from zero. This is 
consistent with companies facing poor market conditions, under increased 
competition, having increased incentives for earnings manipulation. The Asset 
Quality Index (AQI) also has a significant positive coefficient (0.55, t-statistic 4.51), 
consistent with the likelihood of earnings manipulation raising when companies 
increase the capitalisation of expenses. A company that starts to capitalise expenses, 
will have increased profitability through deteriorating AQI index. The sales growth 
index (SGI) has a positive coefficient that is over two standard deviations from zero, 
consistent with growth companies facing declining growth having increased 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Growth companies usually have high pressure for 
external financing, comparing to the mature ones. Thus, they are more likely to resort 
in earnings manipulation when the underlying cash flow is not adequate to support the 
projected growth. The Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA) index has a significant 
positive coefficient which is consistent with the notion that manipulators have weaker 
operating cash-flows to comparing to the reported accounting profits. 
. 
The coefficients on the leverage (LVGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI) and Sales 
General Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) are not statistically significant. One 
possible explanation is that these variables are related more closely with earnings 
management rather with earnings manipulation. Earnings management allows 
companies to achieve earnings targets without overriding accounting principles 
whereas earnings manipulation violates the true and fair view principle. Thus a 
company is more likely to apply all the means within GAAP to achieve an earnings 
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threshold (earnings management) before engaging into earnings manipulation, as it 
could lead to significant costs if it is publicly discovered. An example of earnings 
management would be a change from accelerated depreciation to straight line or a 
revision that increases useful lives. Such a change would have a positive impact on 
earnings, without overriding accounting principles and would result in increased 
values of the depreciation index. This is an instance of earnings management and the 
company would not be included in the sample of manipulators but in the sample of 
controls. Similarly, for the leverage ratio, incentives to comply with debt covenants 
may be an insufficient motive to resort in earnings manipulation. Another explanation 
would be that a company could avoid reporting increased leverage if recognises 
finance leased assets as operating lease, breaking the total period of the agreement 
into shorter and renewable periods. Thus, a company can recognise future obligations 
arising from the leased equipment in the notes of the accounts rather in the balance 
sheetS3. Regarding the Sales and General Administrative Expenses, it is negatively 
associated with the probability of earnings manipulation. For example a company that 
increases the useful life of the goodwill (lAS 38), will report higher profits and lower 
Sales and General Administrative Expenses. Though, such a change in accounting 
estimate can be made within the limits of earnings management, without overriding 
accounting principles. 
Panel B of Table 8.3, reports the estimated probabilities of earnings 
manipulation for both the estimation and holdout samples. For the estimation sample, 
the model estimated using WESML predicts higher average (median) probability of 
earnings manipulation 0.125(0.084) for manipulators than for controls 0.004 (0.008). 
Similarly, the model estimated using un-weighted probit predicts higher average 
(median) probabilities for manipulators 0.201 (0.102) than for controls. Wilcoxon and 
median tests reject the null hypotheses that estimated probabilities for manipulators 
and controls are drawn from the same population. Results for the holdout sample of 
53 manipulators and 1,055 controls are similar to the estimation sample findings. The 
model predicts that manipulators are, on average, about 9 times more likely to 
manipulate earnings. The distributions of estimated probabilities for manipulators and 
controls based on unweighted probit illustrate these differences. For example, in the 
53 Considering alternative definitions of leverage, alternative leverage measures yielded similar results. The alternative definitions used were: total debt to equity, long-term dcht to total assets as well as using leverage level variables instead of changes. 
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estimation sample, nearly all the controls (90.5%) have an estimated probability of 
manipulation less that 0.05 compared to the average probability of 12.5% that the 132 
manipulators have. Similarly, in the holdout sample, 55.3% of the controls, had an 
estimated probability of manipulation of less than 0.01, compared with 26.4% of the 
manipulators. 
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8.5.3. Robustness Test 
The robustness of the results is assessed in three ways, similarly to Beneish (1999). 
Up to five variables are dropped from the model to assess the stability of the 
coefficient estimates. Dropping the DEPI, SGAI, LVGI, TATA, GMI one at the time 
and in combination yields similar results for the remaining variables. Second, the 
sensitivity of the WESML is assessed, to the specification of the prior probability of 
manipulation. In addition the model is estimated with three alternatives prior 
probabilities of earnings manipulation, specifically 0.006,0.008 and 0.009. The three 
new estimations yield similar results with x2 statistics ranging between 30.14 and 
49.51 and pseudo 
- 
Res ranging from 22.72% and 29.42%. Moreover, the coefficients 
estimates are similar in size and significance across the four new specifications of the 
prior probability of manipulation. 
Third, while the holdout sample is selected to be independent from the 
estimation sample, the sensitivity of the results is assessed to the choice of estimation 
of holdout samples. The assessment is made applying the Bootstrap function in 
STATA. There were generated 100 random samples of 132 manipulators and 2,636 
controls to estimate the model 100 times. Similarly, there were obtained 100 random 
holdout samples by treating the complement of 53 manipulators and 1,055 controls as 
holdout sample and reproduce tests on estimated probabilities. The results are 
reported in Table 8.4 and evidence suggests findings are not sensitive to the choice of 
estimation/holdout samples. 
The technique of bootstrapping is used to obtain a description of the sampling 
properties of empirical estimators using the sample data themselves, rather than broad 
theoretical results (Greene, 2002, Efron, 1979 and Efron Tibshirani, 1993). Suppose 
that 0 is an estimate of a parameter vector 0 based on a sample X =(xi, 
... s Xn) An 
approximation to the statistical properties of 0 can be obtained by studying a sample 
of bootstrap estimators O(b)m, b=1, 
..., 
B, obtained by sampling n observations, with 
replacement, from X and recomputing 0 with each sample. After a total of B times, 
the desired sampling characteristicis computed from: 
O= [0(1)m,..., O(B)m] 
For example, if it were known that the estimator were consistent and if n were 
reasonably large, then one might approximate the asymptotic covariance matrix of the 
estimator 0 by using: 
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This technique was developed by Efron (1979) and has been appearing with 
increasing frequency in the applied econometrics literature. [Veall (1987,1992), 
Vinod (1993,1994). ] The bootstrap method has also appeared in accounting research. 
Clatworthy et al. (2007) apply a bootstrap technique to assess the reliability of prior 
studies of analysts' forecasts. Their results suggests that deflation may not be a 
successful method of correcting for hetcroskedasticity, providing a strong rationale for 
using the bootstrap method. 
To conclude, the estimation results provide evidence of a systematic 
association between the likelihood of manipulation and specific financial ratios. Since 
the model distinguishes manipulators from controls, its applicability as a classification 
tool is assessed below. The next section presents evidence on the probability cut-offs 
associated with different costs of making classification errors. 
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8.5.4 The Model as a Classification Tool 
In order to estimate a model for classifying manipulators from non-manipulators, an 
assumption needs to be made, that the sample of controls contains no manipulators. 
Given the possibility that the control sample could include companies that manipulate 
earnings without being discovered, there is assumed that their proportion in the 
control sample is immaterial. Hence, thereafter the sample of controls is treated as it 
comprises of non-manipulators. 
A model used as a classification tool makes two types of errors: it can classify 
a company as a non-manipulator when it manipulates its earnings (Type I error) and it 
can classify a company as a manipulator when does not manipulate (Type 11 error). 
The probability cut-offs that minimise the expected costs of misclassification depend 
on costs associated with the relative costs of making an error of either type. 
Classification error costs are likely to differ among users of financial statcmetns. For 
example, a shareholder is likely to have high Type I error costs since the share price 
loss associated with the discovery of the manipulation is significant whereas the Type 
II error cost could be low given the availability of alternative companies for 
investment. On the other side, a regulator has to balance the protection of the 
investors against the costs of falsely censuring a company. Their relative costs cannot 
be measured precisely but it is likely that Type II error costs of regulators are higher 
than those of shareholders (Beneish, 1999). 
As there is no accurate measurement for the cost of Type I and Type Il errors, 
there are considered relative costs ranging from 1: 1 to 100: 1. For investors, however, 
the relevant range is likely between 20: 1 and 30: 1. To justify this range, following 
Beneish (1999), the typical manipulator in the UK, loses approximately 30% of its 
market value in the quarter containing the discovery of the manipulation (Pcasnell ct 
al., 2000). Assuming that, on a similar basis, a typical company's equity appreciates 
between I and 2% per quarter, it takes 20 to 40 non-manipulators in the shareholder's 
portfolio to recover the loss from a single manipulator in that quarter (Bcncish, 1999). 
Considering this assumption, one possibility is that investors view a type I error as 20 
to 40 times as costly as a type II error. 
Table 8.5 presents the probability cut-offs that minimise the expected costs of 
misclassification. The results are similar across estimation methods. Panel 13 
documents the results of the unweightcd probit model. In the estimation sample, at 
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relative error costs of 10: 1, the model classifies companies as manipulators when the 
estimated probabilities exceed 0.073 (a score greater than 
-1.14); it misclassifies 
48.3% of the manipulators and 8.4% of the non-manipulators. Similarly, at relative 
error costs of 20: 1 the model classifies companies as manipulators when the estimated 
probabilities exceed 0.043 (a score greater than 
-1.52); it misclassifies 42.1% of the 
manipulators and 17.2% of the non-manipulators. At the relative error costs of 30: 1 
the model classifies manipulators when the estimated probabilities exceed 0.041 (a 
score greater than 
-1.58); it misclassifies 37.8% of the manipulators and 19.4% of 
non-manipulators. 
In the holdout sample, at relative error cost of 20: 1, the model classifies 
companies as manipulators when the estimated probability exceeds 4.3% (a score 
greater than 
-1.62); it misclassifies 48.3% of the manipulators and 8.9% of the non- 
manipulators. Similarly, at relative error cost of 30: 1 the model misclassifies 43.2% of 
the manipulators and 9.8% of the non-manipulators. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 report the performance of the un-weighted probit model. 
The figures present the following information: (1) the probability cut-offs associated 
with each relative error cost assumption, (2) the percentage of correctly classified 
manipulators, and (3) the percentage of incorrectly classified non-manipulators. For 
the estimation sample in Figure 8.1, percentage of correctly classified manipulators 
ranges from 51.7% to 62.2%, while the percentage of incorrectly classified non- 
manipulators ranges from 8.4% to 19.4%. For the holdout sample in figure 8.2, the 
percentage of correctly classified manipulators ranges from 41.6% to 56.8%, while 
the percentage of incorrectly classified non-manipulators ranges from 7.2% to 9.8%. 
While these results suggest that the model identifies potential manipulators, it 
does so with error rates in the range of error costs those are likely to be of relevance to 
investors. In order to improve the model's performance, three additional variables are 
introduced. The next session explores the performance of the improved model. 
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Table 8.5 
Cut-off probabilities and Probability of Type land Type If Errors for Various Levels of Relative Costs in the Estimation Sample (132 
manipulators and 2,636 controls) and in the Holdout Sample (53 manipulators and 1,055 controls) ' 
Panel A: WESML 
Relative costs of Type 
and Type 11 errors 
Cut-off 
Probability 
Estimation Sample 
Probability of Classification errors 
Type I Type I1 
holdout Sample 
Probability of Classification Errors 
Type I Type 11 
1: 1 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10: 1 0.328 0.913 0.001 0.924 0.002 
20: 1 0.061 0.551 0.038 0.661 0.033 
30: 1 0.058 0.542 0.041 0.628 0.037 
40: 1 0.032 0.476 0.057 0.512 0.042 
60: 1 0.016 0.382 0.157 0.517 0.072 
100: 1 0.009 0.279 0.183 0.537 0.087 
Panel B: Unweighted Probit 
Relative costs of Type Cut-off 
I and Type 11 errors Probability 
Estimation Sample 
Probability of Classification errors 
Type I Type 11 
holdout Sample 
Probability of Classification Errors 
Type I Type II 
1: 1 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10: 1 0.073 0.483 0.084 0.584 0.072 
20: 1 0.043 0.421 0.172 0.483 0.089 
30: 1 0.041 0.378 0.194 0,432 0.098 
40: 1 0.038 0.356 0.217 0.427 0.099 
60: 1 0.031 0.327 0.227 0.418 0.112 
100: 1 0.026 0.284 0.248 0.391 0.128 
'A Type I error is defined as classifying an observation as a control when it manipulates. A type 11 error is defined as classifying and 
observation as a manipulator when it is a control. 
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Figure 8.1: The Classification Performance of the Unweighted Probit Model 
for Different Relative Error Cost Assumptions (Estimatin Sample) 
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Figure 8.2: The Classification Performance of the Unweighted Probit Model 
for Different Relative Error Cost Assumptions (Holdout Sample) 
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8.6 Specification of the Enhanced Model 
8.6.1 Variables 
Based in the Benish (1997,199) model, an improved version that includes three 
additional financial variables is suggested. The financial variables introduced are: 
Audit Fees to Total Assets Index (AUDI), Effective Tax Rate Index (EFTAX), 
Directors Remuneration to Sales Index (DIRSI). In the previous chapter it was 
documented that these variables are associated with earnings manipulation as FRRP 
censured companies tend to have increased audit fees scaled by assets, decreased 
effective tax rate and increased directors' remuneration, in the year of the censure. It 
is expected that a similar pattern will be observed with the `red flagged' companies by 
the Company Reporting. 
The independent variables used in the process of defining a model for 
detecting earnings manipulation are defined as financial ratio in the year t deflated by 
the value of the ratio in the year t-1. Easton et al. (2003) and Christie (1987), 
document that there are several potential advantages of deflating financial variables 
by their lagged values. First, scale differences largely disappear. Second, risk 
differences tend to be smaller through time for a given company than across 
companies. Third, biases in coefficients on leverage and size would be 
inconsequential without deflating. 
Additionally, these parameters appear to be related to exogenous factors, less 
related to the accounting cycle of the company. More specifically, as audit fees are set 
by the auditors to compensate for the audit work needed, they are expected to be a 
reliable proxy for increases in the internal risk of a company. Earnings manipulation 
is more likely to occur in an environment of low internal controls and lack of 
segregation of duties (Larcker and Richardson, 2004). 
Similarly, the effective tax rate is related to the tax accounting system that is 
less flexible in recognising revenues and expenses. For example a revision in the 
asset's useful lives, will not affect tax profits at the same magnitude as the financial 
accounting profits. Additionally, a company seeking to increase profits after tax 
would attempt to decrease the tax charge of the year. Holland and Jackson (2004) 
examine the association between deferred tax provisions and earnings management, 
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and find that companies take an overall view in determining the required level of 
provision of deferred tax in order to manage earnings. 
Directors' remuneration (excluding bonuses) is usually agreed at the beginning 
of the financial year and is likely to be associated to performance (Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005). An increase in the remuneration to sales index can signal an 
unexpected drop in sales. As sales are directly connected to profitability, directors' 
might engage into earnings management in order to cover the unexpected decline. If 
the business environment continues deteriorating, escalating earnings management 
can result to earnings manipulation. An alternative explanation for the Directors' 
remuneration to sales index could be that the higher a board is paid, the more focused 
is on earnings targets and analysts' expectation, thus suffering heavier costs in the 
case of missing an earnings target. 
8.6.2 Estimation Results and Holdout Sample Tests 
Panel A of Table 8.6 documents the results of the WESML probit and unweighted 
probit estimations of the improved model. The likelihood ratio test indicates that for 
both estimations the model has significant power, with x2 statistics (p-values) of 48.57 
(0.00) and 69.72 (0.00). The model has descriptive validity with pseudo-R2s of 42.1% 
and 58.1% for WESML and unweighted probit respectively. 
Discussing the results of the unweighted probit estimation, the variables: Days 
Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI) Asset Quality Index 
(AQI), Sales Growth Index (SGI) and Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA) have 
positive coefficient and all of the are statistical significant. Similarly to the previous 
analysis in Table 8.3, the coefficients on the leverage (LVGI), Depreciation Index 
(DEPI) and Sales General Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) are not significant. 
The variable Audit Fees to Assets Index (AUDI) has a positive coefficient of 
0.421 that is over four standard deviations from zero. This is consistent with 
companies having increased detection risk having higher possibilities to manipulate 
earnings. The Effective Tax Rate Index (EFTAXI) also has a significant negative 
coefficient (-0.391, t-statistic -3.24), consistent with the likelihood of earnings 
manipulation increasing when companies' profits recognised under the tax accounting 
are lower. The Directors' Remuneration to Sales Index (DIRSI) has a positive 
coefficient that is over three standard deviations from zero, consistent with the notion 
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that highly paid directors having more incentive to manipulate earnings when sales 
fail to reach the expected levels. 
Table 8.3 Panel B, reports the estimated probabilities of earnings manipulation 
for both the estimation and holdout samples. For the estimation sample, the model 
estimated using WESML predicts higher average (median) probability of earnings 
manipulation 0.85(0.142) for manipulators than for controls 0.004 (. 002). Similarly, 
the model estimated using un-weighted probit predicts higher average (median) 
probabilities for manipulators 0.228 (0.143) than for controls. Wilcoxon and median 
tests reject the null hypotheses that estimated probabilities for manipulators and 
controls are drawn from the same population. Results for the holdout sample of 53 
manipulators and 1,055 controls are similar to the estimation sample findings. The 
model predicts that manipulators are, on average, about 12 times more likely to 
manipulate earnings. The distributions of estimated probabilities for manipulators and 
controls based on unweighted probit illustrate these differences. For example, in the 
estimation sample (not reported in the tables) nearly all the controls (93.5%) have an 
estimated probability of manipulation less that 0.12 compared to the average 
probability of 18% that the 132 manipulators have. Similarly, in the holdout sample, 
63.5% of the controls, had an estimated probability of manipulation of less than 
. 
01, 
compared with 21.4% of the manipulators. 
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8.6.3 Robustness Test 
The holdout sample is chosen to be independent from the estimation sample. Table 
8.7 assesses the sensitivity of the results to the choice of estimation and holdout 
samples. With the Bootstrap function in Stata there are generated 100 random samples 
of 132 manipulators and 2,636 controls and the model is estimated 100 times. 
Similarly, there are constructed 100 random holdout samples, by treating the 
complement of 53 manipulators and 1,055 controls to each random estimation sample 
as a holdout sample. Thus the model is re-estimated 100 times, in order to reproduce 
the tests on estimated probabilities. The results are reported in Table 8.7 and the 
evidence suggest that the results are not sensitive to the choice estimation and holdout 
samples. 
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Table 8.7 
Sensitivity Analysis to the choice of Estimation and Holdout Samples. Descriptive Statistics for Estimation Based on 100 Random 
Samples of 132 Manipulators and 2,363 Controls (Panel A), and Descriptive Statistics on the Estimated Probabilities of 100 
Holdout Samples of 53 Manipulators and 1,055 Controls (Panel B) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on 100 Estimation Samples 
Mean St. Dv Max Median Min %+% Sign. at % Signi. at % Sign. 10% 5% at 2.5% 
Constant 
-5.123 0.512 -4.002 -5.01 -6.427 0 100 100 100 
Days in 
Receivables Index 0.182 0.062 0.251 0.204 0.184 100 100 100 100 
Gross Margin 
Index 0.517 0.081 0.801 0.421 0.281 100 84 81 76 
Asset Quality 
Index 0.402 0.103 0.721 0.381 0.301 100 96 92 87 
Sales Growth 
Index 0.351 0.181 0.584 0.381 0.201 100 95 91 87 
Depreciation 
Index 0.211 0.154 0.384 0.201 
-0.241 83 38 26 12 
SGA Index 
-0.108 0.058 0.384 -0.084 -0.034 58 28 11 6 
Accruals to Total 
Assets 2.881 0.767 5.81 2.491 2.724 100 98 96 93 
Leverage Index 0.554 0.189 0.724 0.482 0.213 100 99 94 92 
Audit Fees to 
Assets Index 0.374 0.094 0.517 0.342 0.211 100 99 96 94 
Effective Tax Rate 
Index 
-0.415 -0.116 -0.108 -0.351 -0.724 0 98 96 95 
Remuneration to 
Sales Index 0.267 0.074 0.384 0.224 0.0987 100 97 93 89 
Pseudo 
- 
R2 0.43 0.057 0.55 0.196 0.113 
- - - - 
x2 statistic 88.75 11.84 115.45 70.52 50.48 - 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Estimated Probabilities on 100 Holdout Samples 
Standard Wilcoxon-Z P-value 
Mean Deviation Max Median Min Median x2 P-v alue 
Manipulators 0.224 0.048 0.351 0.184 0.142 25.564 55.679 
Controls 0.008 0.007 0.018 0.006 0.001 (0.000) (0.000) 
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8.6.4 The Enhanced Model as a Classification Tool 
Similarly to figures 8.1 and 8.2, the model can make two types of errors: it can 
classify a company as a non-manipulator when it manipulates (Type I error) and it can 
classify a company as a manipulator when it does not manipulate (Type II error). The 
probability cut-offs that minimise the expected costs of misclassification are presented 
in Table 8.8. The results are qualitative similar across WESM L and unwcighted probit 
estimation methods, thus the discussion is focused on the unwcighted probit 
estimation, in Panel B. In the estimation sample, at relative error costs of 10: 1, the 
model classifies companies as manipulators when the estimated probabilities exceed 
0.301 (a score greater than 
-0.87); it misclassifies 38.4% of the manipulators and 6.5% 
of the non manipulators. 
Similarly, at relative error costs of 20: 1 the model classifies companies as 
manipulators when the estimated probabilities exceed 10.4% (a score greater than - 
1.12); it misclassifies 35.1% of the manipulators and 8.6% of the non-manipulators. 
At the relative error costs of 30: 1 the model classifies companies as manipulators 
when the estimated probabilities exceed 0.095 (a score greater than -1.31); it 
misclassifies 32.1% of the manipulators and 14.5% of non-manipulators. In the 
holdout sample, at relative error cost of 20: 1, the model classifies companies as 
manipulators when the estimated probability exceeds 10.4% (a score greater than - 
1.12); it misclassifies 38.1% of the manipulators and 9.1% of the non-manipulators. 
Similarly, at relative error cost of 30: 1 the model misclassifes 34.2% of the 
manipulators and 11.1% of the non-manipulators. 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 report the performance of the un-weighted probit model. 
The figures present the following information: (1) the probability cut-offs associated 
with each relative error cost assumption, (2) the percentage of correctly classified 
manipulators, and (3) the percentage of incorrectly classified non-manipulators. For 
the estimation sample in Figure 8.3, the percentage of correctly classified 
manipulators ranges from 61.6% to 67.9%, while the percentage of incorrectly 
classified non-manipulators ranges from 6.5% to 14.5%. For the holdout sample in 
figure 8.2, the percentage of correctly classified manipulators ranges from 57.3% to 
65.8%, while the percentage of incorrectly classified non-manipulators ranges from 
7.1%to 11.1%. 
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These results suggest the improved model identifies potential manipulators, 
with smaller error rates than the 8-variable Beneish (1999) Model. Comparing the 
misclassifications at the holdout sample, between the improved model and the 8- 
variable model, it can be inferred that the improved model classifies manipulators 
with a lower misclassification rate. More specifically, at relative error cost 10: 1 in the 
holdout sample the improved model classifies correctly 57.3% of the manipulators, 
while the 8-variable model correctly classifies 41.6%. Similarly, at relative error cost 
20: 1 the 11-variable model classifies correctly the 61.9% of the manipulators, 
misclassifying only 9.1% of the controls as manipulators. In contrast, the 8 variable 
model correctly classifies the 51.7% of the manipulators and classifies incorrectly 
8.9% of the controls. A similar pattern is observed at the 40: 1 relative error cost. This 
evidence suggests the proposed 11-variable model classifies manipulators at a lower 
Type I and Type II error rate. 
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Table 8.8 
Cut-off probabilities and Probability of Type I and Type II Errors for Various Levels of Relative Costs in the Estimation Sample (132 
manipulators and 2,636 controls) and in the Holdout Sample (53 manipulators and 1,055 controls)' 
Panel A: WESML Estimation Sample Holdout Sample 
Relative costs of Probability of Classification 
Type I and Type 11 
Cut-off Probability of Classification errors t  Errors Probability 
errors Type I Type 11 Type I Type II 
1: 1 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10: 1 0.451 0.856 0.002 0.915 0.002 
20: 1 0.154 0.405 0.024 0.437 0.025 
30: 1 0.105 0.364 0.031 0.413 0.038 
40: 1 0.075 0.315 0.041 0.384 0.047 
60: 1 0.055 0.271 0.107 0.311 0.127 
100: 1 0.004 0.201 0.151 0.251 0.184 
Panel B: Unweighted Probit Estimation Sample Holdout Sample 
Relative costs of Cut-off Probability of 
Classificati on 
Type I and Type 11 Probability of Classification errors Errors Probability 
errors Type I Type II Type I Type 11 
1: 1 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10: 1 0.301 0.384 0.065 0.427 0.071 
20: 1 0.104 0.351 0.086 0.381 0.091 
30: 1 0.095 0.321 0.145 0.342 0.111 
40: 1 0.054 0.271 0.195 0.304 0.184 
60: 1 0.031 0.242 0.204 0.273 0.224 
100: 1 0.002 0.198 0.221 0.224 0.257 
'A Type I error is defined as classifying an observation as a control when it manipulates. A type ll error is defined as classifying and 
observation as a manipulator when it is a control. 
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Figure 8.3: The Classification Performance of the Unweighted Probit Model 
for Different Relative Error Cost Assumptions (Estimation Sample) 
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Figure 8.4: The Classification Performance of the Unweighted Probit Model 
for Different Relative Error Cost Assumptions (Holdout Sample) 
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10 to 1 20 to 1 40 to 1 
10 to 1 20 to 1 40 to 1 
8.7 Conclusions 
The evidence in this chapter is based on a sample of companies that were publicly 
discovered to manipulate earnings. Such companies likely represent the upper tail of 
the distribution of companies that seek to influence their reported earnings through 
earnings management. The evidence of a systematic association between earnings 
manipulation and financial statement variables is of interest to both academics and 
professionals (i. e. investors, regulators, auditors) because it suggests that accounting 
information can be used as an assessment of reliability. 
In order to estimate Beneish's (1997,1999) classification model in the UK 
setting, a sample of 185 manipulators is gathered. The sample of manipulators 
consists of 98 companies publicly censured by the FRRP and 87 companies red 
flagged by the Company Reporting. Statistical evidence suggests two sub-samples of 
manipulators are not drawn from different populations. Thus, a merged sample of 185 
manipulators is used, matched by industry and year to a sample of 3,691 controls. 
The characteristics of manipulating firms are investigated on various 
dimensions, including accrual quality, financial performance and balance sheet 
strength. It is found that manipulators are usually high growth companies with 
increase leverage. Moreover, at the time of manipulations, accrual quality is low and 
performance is deteriorating. In an effort to enhance Beneish's model detecting ability 
further financial variables are explored. It is found that directors of manipulating 
firms appear to be highly paid on the basis of the underlying revenue generated. 
Manipulating firms appear to have a wider gap between taxable and financial profits, 
as implied by their lower effective tax rate. Finally, at the year of manipulation, audit 
fees scaled by assets are increased, suggesting that more audit work is needed to 
compensate for weaker controls. 
Based on the above findings, two logistic regression models to determine the 
probability of manipulation are developed. The first model utilises the eight variables 
described in Beneish (1997,1999). The second model includes three more variables: 
(i) Audit fees to assets index, (ii) Effective tax rate index and (iii) Directors 
Remuneration to sales index. The robustness of models' coefficients is tested in 100 
different estimating and holdout samples. Both defined models appear to be 
insensitive in random sampling. It is shown that both models have power to detect 
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manipulations within estimation and holdout samples. It is shown that the 11-variable 
model has lower error rates in misclassifying manipulators and controls. For example 
at the relative cost of misclassification of 20: 1, the 11-variable model's detection rate 
for manipulators is 10% higher than the rate of the 8-variable model. 
Despite this increase in detection rate, the rate of classification errors remains 
material, making further investigation of the results an important element to the 
models' implementation. That is, since both models' variables exploit distortions in 
financial statement data that could result from manipulation, it should be recognised 
that such distortions may have an alternative origin. For example, they could be the 
result of a material acquisition or disposal during the period assessed a material 
change in the company's strategy or a significant change in the company's economic 
environment such as tightened credit and weak demand. 
It should be emphasised that one unavoidable issue in developing models to 
detect manipulation is that the public discovery of a manipulation is a rare event. 
Thus, similar to bankruptcy prediction models, the estimated models generate a high 
frequency of false positives (i. e. Type II error, where a control is misclassified as 
manipulator). Another limitation of this analysis is that there have been used only 
manipulations that were actually identified by the FRRP or by Company Reporting. 
There are likely to be many cases where a manipulation goes undetected, or is at least 
not subject to an FRRP censure. 
One further limitation of the model is that it is estimated using financial 
information for publicly traded companies. Therefore, it cannot be reliably used to 
study privately-held firms. Another limitation is that the earnings manipulation in the 
sample involves earnings overstatement rather than understatement and therefore, the 
model cannot be reliably applied to investigate companies operating that are seeking 
to manage earnings downwards. 
An interesting path for future research would be to investigate other 
companies with a high probability to manipulate earnings. For example, do they 
engage in earnings management, within the limits of accounting standards? Do they 
experience declines in subsequent financial performance and in market value? Are 
they more likely to record future asset write-offs ? 
This chapter provides useful insights into research on earnings management. 
Prior research has generally focused on measures of discretionary accruals as proxies 
for incentives to engage in earnings management. The results of this research suggest 
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that researchers could also consider lleneish's models as an alternative proxy for 
detecting the likelihood of earnings manipulation. In addition, it is found that taxable 
profits arc unusually low during manipulation years. An important avenue for future 
research is to better understand the role of real transaction management from 
companies seeking to achieve specific earnings' targets. 
Finally, the analysis in this chapter could provide useful insights to auditors, 
regulators, investors and other financial statement users about the characteristics of 
manipulating companies. By better understanding these characteristics, financial 
statement users would be in a better position to identify and eliminate manipulation 
activity in the future. The efficient operation of capital markets depends significantly 
on the quality of the financial information provided to the interested parties. 
Eliminating manipulation activity should lead to improved financial information and 
hence more efficient allocation of capital. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This research is concerned with understanding the influence of managerial discretion 
allowed in accounting estimates and policies on earnings, through earnings 
management and earnings manipulation. In doing so, there are analysed specific case 
studies involving earnings management, the conditional distribution of earnings 
among thresholds and the characteristics of companies that have been publicly 
criticised for earnings manipulation. 
This thesis contributes to the empirical earnings management literature by 
investigating the characteristics of companies that breach accounting standards and 
fail to provide a true and fair view in their published financial statements. These 
instances of earnings manipulation are analysed using company-level data and cross- 
sectional panel data. While others have documented the characteristics of companies 
manipulating earnings in the US, this line of research provides new evidence, 
investigating the UK market. 
This chapter provides a summary of the main findings and contributions. In 
addition, it offers a discussion of the limitations of the analysis and suggests new 
avenues for future research. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
Section two presents a summary of the main findings of each chapter. Section three 
discusses possible limitations and section four suggests extensions for future research. 
9.2 Summary of main findings 
In the second chapter of the thesis provides a discussion of the recent literature in 
earnings management and earnings manipulation. In addition there is identified a gap 
in accounting literature and auditing standards in setting a robust definition for 
earnings management and earnings manipulation. It is discussed that earnings 
manipulation is considered to be associated with accounting fraud whereas earnings 
management usually is treated as the application of aggressive accounting practices 
within the limits of accounting standards. The main hypotheses tested in this thesis are 
summarised in table 10.1 
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Table 10.1 Summary of Hypotheses 
Chapter Hypothesis Result 
4 H1 Earnings manipulation involves accounting treatments beyond the limits Confirmed through 
of true and fair view and results from escalating earnings management. interview with FRRP 
Confirmed 
5 H2: The instances earnings management and earnings manipulation involve examining case 
specific accounting treatments. studies 
6 
Confirmed, 
H3: Earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases. Figure 6.1 
6 
Confirmed, 
H4: Earnings are managed to avoid losses. Figure 6.3 
6 H5: The 
frequencies of small negative non-discretionary earnings levels Confirmed, (changes) and small positive non-discretionary earnings levels (changes) are Table 6.3 
equal to the frequencies expected under a smooth distribution. 
H6: The proportion of observations with positive earnings levels (changes) Confirmed, 6 is larger than the proportion of observations with positive non-discretionary Tables 6.3,6.4 
earnings levels (changes). 
6 H7: Earnings discontinuity at zero has not declined over the last years of the Confirmed, 
sample. Figure 6.12 
7 H8: FRRP companies are characterised by deteriorating performance in the Confirmed, 
defect year. Figure 7.1 
7 H9: Corporate governance in FRRP companies is of a lower quality Confirmed, 
comparing to the control sample. Table 7.6 
7 Hio: The financial variables described in M-Score model are correlated Confirmed, 
with the likelihood of earnings manipulation. Tables 7.8,7.9 
8 H11: A probit model based on M-score's variables can be used as a Confumed, 
classification tool for signalling earnings manipulation. Figures 8.1,8.2 
8 H12: The inclusion of the three additional variables will increased the ability Confirmed, 
of the model to identify manipulators and decrease misclassification errors. Figures 8.3,8.4 
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Further, there are provided methodological details of different approaches into 
earnings management research together with the main limitations of each 
methodology. These approaches are grouped under three categories namely: (a) 
discretionary accruals models, (b) specific accruals models and (c) conditional 
distributions. Additionally, there are discussed the main motives behind earnings 
management, as they are identified in recent literature. It is discussed that it would be 
useful for regulators, standard setters and stakeholders the investigation of earnings 
manipulation in the UK, expanding the findings of Peasnell et al. (2004) about 
companies censured by the FRRP. Finally, it is suggested that it could be fruitful to 
research the application of Beneish's (1999) model in the UK setting and to suggest 
possible improvements. 
Chapter three provides an analysis of the research questions implementing an 
artificially imposed framework in exploring the mechanics of earnings management 
and earnings manipulation. The purpose of this framework is to facilitate the testing 
of the research hypotheses. Previous studies on earnings management have focused 
on the impact of discretionary accruals and relatively little attention has been given to 
specific accruals and how they can be used in signalling earnings manipulation. 
Chapter four provides an analysis of the exploratory research interviews with 
the FRRP and aims at understanding the investigation process of the panel, the 
regulators perceived difference between earnings management and earnings 
manipulation and the wider role of the panel. It is found that the Panel recently 
adopted a proactive approach while in the past was operating only in a reactive basis 
responding to complaints and referrals. Interviews with the Panel revealed the 
increased importance for research in the field of earnings manipulation in the UK, as a 
model for detecting non compliance with accounting standards would be useful for 
both regulators and investors. It is also documented that Panel's view is that earnings 
manipulation usually results from earnings management. This is consistent with 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that firstly companies manage earnings within the 
limits of accounting standards and gradually these aggressive accounting practises can 
escalate, violating the true and fair view principle. Nonetheless, it remains unclear at 
which stage earnings management becomes earnings manipulation. Finally, it is 
discussed the broader role of the Panel which is to improve the quality of financial 
reporting in the UK. To achieve this, the Panel has adopted a risk based approach in 
selecting companies for reviewing. Panel's focus shifts into business sectors under 
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increased financial and commercial pressures. In these sectors the Panel seeks to 
identify companies that fail to comply with accounting standards and requests 
paradigmatically from them to restate their accounts. 
Chapter five provides an analysis of specific case studies of earnings 
management and earnings manipulation. These cases are examined systematically 
under specific categories: accounting treatments in acquisitions, revenue recognition, 
capitalisation of expenses or R&D costs, amortisation or impairment of goodwill, 
recognition/classification of financial or non-current assets, estimations in 
depreciation or pension funds, provisions for deferred tax or future liabilities. It is 
suggested that earnings management cases involve specific accounting techniques 
exploiting the managerial discretion allowed by certain accounting standards. These 
findings can be seen as very preliminary evidence of the existence of earnings 
management and earnings manipulation and how specific accruals can be useful in 
investigating earnings manipulation. 
Chapter six investigates a large sample of 9,809 UK firm-years and 
documents that earnings are distributed discontinuously around basic thresholds. This 
chapter provides empirical evidence that earnings decreases and losses are frequently 
avoided thought earnings management. It is suggested that a significant percentage of 
the companies with small pre-managed earnings decreases or losses exercise 
discretion to report earnings increases or positive earnings. Moreover it is found that 
earnings management to avoid losses is more pervasive than earnings management to 
avoid earnings decreases. The results are robust to alternative methods of scaling 
earnings. Examining earnings management to avoid losses, it is found that the two 
main two components of earnings: cash flow from operating activities and changes in 
working capital, are used to manage earnings. 
It is reported that discretionary accruals have the effect of increasing the 
frequency of positive earnings levels and changes. Additionally, firm-year 
observations with small positive reported earnings are investigated, as they are the 
ones more likely to manage earnings. It is found that observations with small positive 
earnings are more likely to relate to companies in the upper market value quartiles. 
Additionally it is found that these observations are more likely to relate to the latest 
years covered in the sample. 
Chapter seven of this thesis examines the characteristics of companies that had 
to restate financial statements after an FRRP enquiry. First it is found that FRRP 
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companies (earnings manipulators) are characterised by weak earnings performance 
in the defect year. As further evidence of the performance difficulties facing censured 
companies, additional tests reveal that FRRP companies are highly leveraged, less 
likely to decide dividend increases, more likely to have a lower effective tax rate, 
more likely to have deteriorating performance and increased audit fees. Though, while 
the profitability of the FRRP sample is weak in the defect year, they do not appear to 
be persistent underperformers. 
The second main result of chapter seven, relates to the association between 
corporate governance characteristics and the likelihood that a company is censured by 
the FRRP. While univariate tests indicate no difference in the use of outside directors 
between FRRP and control companies, multivariate tests reveal that the FRRP sample 
is associated with higher paid directors and higher audit fees. To the extent that cases 
identified by the FRRP represent examples of low accounting quality, these results 
support the hypothesis that effective corporate governance can improve the quality of 
published accounting reports. Tests also reveal that FRRP companies are less likely to 
have a Big Four auditor. This is consistent with other research that has uncovered a 
negative association between auditor size and discretionary accruals. 
Finally, this chapter analysed the dynamics of earnings manipulation in 
relation to balance-sheet strength, performance and accrual quality using the variables 
suggested in Beneish's (1999) M-score model. It is found that companies censured by 
the FRRP are usually high growth companies facing declining profitability and 
pressured margins. Non-current assets in these companies are more likely to include 
material balances in items like goodwill and capitalised development costs. 
Furthermore, they are more likely to have higher paid directors comparing to their 
peer group. Additionally they are more likely to have a lower effective tax rate and 
incur higher audit fees on their asset value basis. Finally, they are more likely to have 
a decreased depreciation expense and increased accruals. 
The purpose of chapter eight is to estimate a model for detecting earnings 
manipulation. In doing so, the sample of FRRP censured companies was compared to 
a sample of companies publicly criticised by Company Reporting for non compliance 
with accounting standards. Discussions with the Panel revealed that it often uses this 
source for initiating investigations. A comparison of the two sub samples suggests 
that they are drawn from the same population. 
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The characteristics of the 185 companies discovered to manipulate earnings 
are investigated on various dimensions, including accrual quality, financial 
performance and balance sheet strength. Based on the above findings, two logistic 
models to determine the probability of manipulation are developed. The first model 
utilises the eight variables described in Beneish's (1999) M-Score model. The second 
model includes three more variables: (i) Audit fees to assets index, (ii) Effective tax 
rate index and (iii) Directors Remuneration to sales index. The robustness of the 
models' coefficients is tested in 100 different estimating and holdout samples. Both 
defined models appear to be insensitive in random sampling. It is shown that both 
models have power to detect manipulations within estimation and holdout samples. 
Though, it is shown that the 11-variable model has lower error rates in misclassifying 
manipulators and controls and increased likelihood in identifying manipulators. 
9.3 Limitations 
Recent literature and auditing standards provide no clear definition for earnings 
management or earnings manipulation. Therefore it is not clear the stage at which 
earnings management becomes earnings manipulation. This research defines earnings 
management as the result of managerial discretion in accounting choices and 
estimates exercised within the limits of accounting standards without violating the 
true and fair view principle. On the other side, for the purpose of this research 
earnings manipulation is defined as the result of managerial actions that violate the 
true and fair view principle and fail to comply with the accounting standards. 
Some researchers suggest that earnings management is beneficial for market 
participants as it provides managers with the opportunity to communicate to investors 
their private information about the future prospects of their company. lt is further 
suggested that it enhances the relevance of accounting information making it more 
useful for investment decisions even thought the reliability of accounting information 
is compromised. The examination of the impact of earnings management to 
investment decisions as well as the debate on relevance-reliability of accounting 
information are beyond the objectives of this research. 
The panel data used in this research exclude financial institutions as they 
follow a different accrual generating process and they are more likely to manage 
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earnings for different purposes, as they are highly regulated and they are required to 
preserve specific liquidity requirements. 
Whilst chapter two discusses that there are instances of earnings management 
to decrease earnings this falls outside the research objective of the current thesis. 
However, earnings management to reduce earnings and big-bath accounting practises 
can introduce noise in the discontinuities of earning among thresholds observed in 
chapter six. Earnings management to decrease earnings is possible to be escalated, 
violating accounting principles, though these instances fall outside the area of this 
research. 
It should be emphasised that one unavoidable issue in developing models to 
detect manipulation is that the revelation of a manipulation is a rare event. Thus, 
similar to bankruptcy prediction models, the estimated models generate a high 
frequency of false positives. Another limitation of this analysis is that there have been 
used only manipulations that were actually identified by the FRRP or Company 
Reporting. There are likely to be many cases where a manipulation goes undetected, 
or is at least not subject to an FRRP censure. 
The role of the FRRP is to ensure that the provision of financial information 
by public and large private companies complies with relevant accounting 
requirements. There were a small number of instances of non compliance where 
companies had to restate their accounts without having to decrease their earnings. The 
investigation of these companies falls outside the remit of this research. Finally, a 
limitation of this research is that it investigated publicly traded companies. Therefore, 
it cannot be reliably used to study privately-held firms. 
9.4 Extensions and suggestions for future research 
There has been an effort in identifying periods of recessions/credit crunch and the 
datasets used include the period 1999-2000 which is characterised by economic 
downturn. Though, the recent recession after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the 
US and the nationalisation of Northern Rock in the UK has put companies' finances 
under immense pressure. It would be interesting to investigate earnings management 
in the current setting and estimate the pervasiveness of `big bath' accounting. 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate companies 
that appear to have a high probability to manipulate earnings but have not been 
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censured. For example, do they engage in earnings management, within the limits of 
accounting standards? Do they experience declines in subsequent financial 
performance and in market value? Are they more likely to record future asset write- 
offs? 
This chapter provides useful insights into research on earnings management. 
Prior research has generally focused on measures of discretionary accruals as proxies 
for incentives to engage in earnings management. The results of this research suggest 
that researchers could also consider Beneish's (1997,1999) models as an alternative 
proxy for detecting the likelihood of earnings manipulation. In addition, it is found 
that taxable profits are unusually low during manipulation years. An important avenue 
for future research is to better understand the role of real transaction management 
from companies seeking to achieve specific earnings' targets and how models for 
detecting earnings manipulation can be improved. Another avenue for further research 
would be to investigate further earnings thresholds, such as analysts' consensus and 
whether the expected discontinuities can be attributed to discretionary or specific 
accruals. 
Finally, the introduction of IFRS in the EU aims to form a homogeneous 
capital market improving comparativeness and consistency. To ensure that the single 
market for financial service operates efficiently, there is the need for consistent 
supervision and enforcement. It would be interesting to investigate how the 
enforcement bodies operate in other EU member countries as well as the 
characteristics of companies that manipulate earnings in those markets. 
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Appendix 
Background on audit quality and audit oversight the bodies PCAOB and AIU 
The global significance of Enron and other such scandals (WorldCom, Global 
Crossing, Parmalat and Ahold) arising in the immediate aftermath gave weight and 
momentum to a new regulatory emphasis on "audit quality": 
"Recent corporate failures have... also led to questions as to the effectiveness of audits 
and the integrity of the audit process and emphasized the key role of high quality 
auditing standards" (IAASB, 2003a, p. 3) 
The introduction of inspections of audit work was initiated by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the US and the Audit Inspection 
Unit (AIU) in the UK. AIU is part of the Professional Oversight Board (POB) and 
reflected concerns with the effectiveness of self-regulatory, professional "peer 
review" systems and a desire to validate the process of providing an audit opinion 
(PCAOB, 2004,2006; AIU, 2005,2006). 
Accordingly, while the primary regulatory focus has become "audit quality", 
this has been coupled with a process intended to enable audit practices to become 
more "auditable" (FRC, 2006a, b; POB, 2006a, b, 2007). This focus is particularly 
evident in the formal remit of the regulatory inspections. For example, the AIU in the 
UK states that: 
"The overall purpose of our work is to monitor and promote improvements in audit 
quality, thereby enhancing investor confidence in the audit process and financial 
reporting. Our responsibility extends beyond compliance with specific requirements of 
the regulatory framework and includes an assessment of the key audit judgments 
made" (AIU, 2005, para. 4.1). 
The emphasis on monitoring is reflected in regulatory requirements for audit firms to 
set out in writing how their audit methodology meets the requirements of UK 
Auditing Standards. Audit firms must show they have in place an annual compliance 
review process which covers a sample of completed audits (referred to by the UK's 
AIU as the Audit Quality Review (AQR) process) (AIU 2005/6). 
In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the PCAOB to perform a 
continuing programme of inspections to review the degree of compliance (in terms of 
audit performance) of each registered accountancy firm. Such inspections are required 
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to include reviews of selected audit engagements and an overall evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the quality control system of the firm, and the manner of the 
documentation and communication of that system by the firm. The PCAOB undertook 
limited inspections of the Big Four firms in 2003 (see PCAOB, 2004), followed by 
the first full series of inspections of all the registered public accounting firms in 2004. 
Khalifa et al., (2007) investigate how audit practices changed audit 
methodologies to reflect the requirement of regulators for increased audit quality. 
They identify major discursive shifts in audit methodologies, with the dominant audit 
discourse switching from one of "business value" to one of "audit quality". This study 
also illustrates how conceptualisations of "risk" are now clearly appended to the term 
"audit risk", as opposed to the "business" or "strategic" risks which were central to 
the mid-1990s methodological leanings of most of the big audit firms. In their 
research Humphrey et al., (2009) explore how regulatory relationships in the global 
audit arena are being affected by the current financial crisis. 
Background on earnings management to decrease earnings 
Badertscher et at. (2009) analyse a set of firms that restated earnings upward because 
of accounting irregularities identified by SEC. Their results are consistent with the 
restatement sample firms having managed earnings downward in their original 
financial statements to create cookie jar reserves, to depress share prices prior to 
corporate and insider stock purchases. 
Former SEC Chairman Levitt, in his widely cited "numbers game" speech 
(Levitt 1998), made explicit the SEC's concerns that earnings management raises 
questions about the integrity of financial reporting. Levitt highlighted five common 
"accounting gimmicks, " of which three were examples of downward earnings 
management: 
"A third illusion played by some companies is using unrealistic assumptions to 
estimate liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs. In 
doing so, they stash accruals in cookie jars during the good times and reach into then: 
when needed in the bad times. " 
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